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Abstract 
 
Proceedings of the NKS/Barents Rescue 2001 LIVEX seminar, held at Rosers-
berg Castle, Stockholm, on October 23-24, 2001. At the seminar, results from 
the Gamma Search Cell of the Barents Rescue 2001 LIVEX were presented and 
the performance and experiences of airborne and car-borne teams that took part 
in the exercise were evaluated. In the Gamma Search Cell, the mobile teams 
found about 50 % of a large number of radioactive sources hidden within the 
exercise area. The exercise demonstrated that it is necessary to practise and 
test equipment under out-door conditions. By which method a source is found is 
important information in the evaluation of the result. Complementary methods are 
necessary to find hidden sources. For heavily shielded sources methods based 
on scattered radiation should be developed. 
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Preface 
This report contains the proceedings of the NKS/Barents Rescue 2001 LIVEX seminar, held 
at Rosersberg Castle, Stockholm, on October 23-24, 2001. The Barents Rescue 2001 LIVEX 
took place in the surroundings of Boden, Sweden in September 2001. As part of this exercise, 
the Gamma Search Cell was conducted to exercise airborne and car-borne teams in searching 
for and identifying lost radioactive sources. 
The objectives of the seminar have been to bring together the organizers and participants of 
the Gamma Search Cell with the aim of enhancing cooperation between Nordic and European 
mobile teams within nuclear emergency preparedness, to present and discuss team results and 
experiences of the Gamma Search Cell, and to evaluate the performance of mobile gamma 
spectrometry in a nuclear emergency. The seminar and these proceedings together aim at the 
evaluation of the Barents Rescue 2001 LIVEX Gamma Search Cell.  
The seminar was organized by the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research (NKS) project BOK-1: 
Nuclear Emergency Preparedness, in collaboration with the Swedish Rescue Board (SRV) 
and Danish Emergency Management Agency (DEMA). Special thanks are due to Sven-Erik 
Lodén, SRV, and Kim Bargholz and Kirsten Juul, DEMA, for valuable help in organizing the 
seminar, and to the Swedish Rescue Board for sponsoring the seminar. 
Bent Lauritzen 
Project leader BOK-1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Geographical maps provided in this report: 
© Lantmäteriverket Gävle 2002. From Geographical data of Sweden, reference no. 
M2002/2277. 
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Seminar programme 
Tuesday, October 23, 2001 
09:30-10:00 Registration 
10:00-10:15 Welcome and Practical Arrangements 
 (Bent Lauritzen, NKS/Sven-Erik Lodén, SRV) 
SESSION 1.  Barents Rescue 2001 LIVEX 
10:15-10:45 Organization and work in the Gamma Search Cell (Robert R. Finck, SSI) 
10:45-11:15 The radioactive sources and how we arranged them (Thomas Ulvsand, FOI) 
11:15-11:45 Analysis and presentation of results in REAC (Robert R. Finck, SSI) 
11:45-12:00 Experiences of the Gamma Search Cell exercise (Peder Beausang, FOI) 
12:00- 13:00 Lunch  
SESSION 2.  Team presentations, AGS  
13:00-14:00 Presentation by team SEC (Kenneth Lidström, Sweden) 
  Presentation by team SEA  (Sören Byström, Sweden) 
  Presentation by team NOC  (Thor Engøy, Norway) 
  Presentation by team DKA  (Kim Bargholz, Denmark) 
14:00-14:10 Break 
14:10-15:10 Presentation by team ATA/ATK/ATL (Wolfgang Fehringer, Austria) 
  Presentation by team FIA  (Markku Kettunen, Finland) 
  Presentation by team SEB  (Simon Karlsson, Sweden) 
15:10-15:30 Coffee break 
SESSION 3.  Team presentations, CGS 
15:30-16:30  Presentation by team FIK (Jarkko Ylipieti, Finland) 
  Presentation by team LVK  (Andrejs Dreimanis, Latvia) 
  Presentation by team RUM/RUN (Sergey Vasiliev, Russia) 
  Presentation by team FIL  (Mikael Moring, Finland) 
16:30-16:40   Break 
16:40-17:40  Presentation by team LTK  (Arunas Gudelis, Lithuania) 
 Presentation by team RUA/RUK/RUK (EMERCOM, Russia) 
  Presentation by team NOL    (Mark Dowdall, Norway) 
19:00    Dinner at Rosersberg Castle 
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Wednesday, October 24, 2001 
SESSION 3.  Team presentations, CGS (continued) 
08:30-09:30  Presentation by team SEM (Christer Samuelsson, Sweden) 
 Presentation by team NOK  (Mark Smethurst, Norway) 
 Presentation by team DKK  (Helle K. Aage, Denmark) 
 Presentation by team SEK/SEL (Olof Karlberg, Sweden) 
SESSION 4.  Workshop: Monitoring for radioactivity 
09:30-12:00 Group discussions. Groups will be formed to discuss topics of mobile 
monitoring for nuclear emergency preparedness. 
12:00-13:00 Lunch  
SESSION 4.  Workshop: Monitoring for radioactivity (continued)   
13:00-14:30 Presentations by group representatives  
14:30-15:00 Coffee break 
SESSION 5.  Future work 
15:00-15:30 Discussion: How can we improve co-operation concerning emergency  
 preparedness? 
15:30-16:00 ECCOMAGS  (Hans Mellander, SSI)   
16:00 End of workshop 
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Session 1 
 
Barents Rescue 2001 LIVEX 
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Description of the Gamma Search Cell Exercise  
Robert R. Finck, SSI 
 
The Swedish Rescue Services Agency was commissioned by the Swedish Government in 
1999 to plan and conduct an international exercise on the theme of a nuclear emergency. The 
exercise, named Barents Rescue 2001, was to take place in the northern part of Sweden 
during 2001 and conducted as a civil exercise with the support of military resources. Several 
Swedish authorities were ordered to take part in the exercise. Invitations were sent out to the 
European countries Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Norway, Poland and Russia. Several other countries were invited to participate with 
observers. Altogether 24 countries participated in the Barents Rescue 2001 exercise. 
The aim of Barents Rescue 2001 
The aim of Barents Rescue 2001 was to 
• improve the international civilian - military cooperation in rescue services, 
• improve the capability to cooperate and lead rescue services for large accidents, 
• improve the capability to assess a radiological emergency based on measurements, 
• improve the capability to provide information on measures taken in large accidents, 
• gain knowledge and create contacts across boarders between authorities and people. 
It was early decided that the planning of the exercise should be done in international 
cooperation between countries invited. Three international planning conferences were held, 
the Initial Planning Conference (IPC) 10 - 11 May 2000 in Boden, the Main Planning 
Conference (MPC) 8- 9 November 2000 in Luleå and the Final Planning Conference (FPC) 
17 - 19 June 2001 in Kiruna. In addition a number of workshops were held with detailed 
planning of different parts of the Barents Rescue exercise.  
In the planning process it was decided that Barents Rescue should contain different sub-
exercises with different themes and time-scales in order to illustrate different aspects of 
nuclear and radiological emergencies. The early phase of a nuclear emergency was tested in 
the international alarm exercise ALEX in March 2001. It was a surprise alarm exercise 
involving a fictitious nuclear power plant in Sweden. Participating countries took part in the 
exercise from their own emergency response centres in each country. 
The final part of the Barents Rescue exercise, the LIVEX (Live Exercise), was aimed at a 
joint international exercise with monitoring and rescue teams in place in Sweden. After 
lengthy discussions within the international planning groups it was concluded that it would be 
difficult to conduct a realistic large scale field exercise in the northern part of Sweden on the 
theme of a nuclear power accident. This is because distances to actual nuclear power stations 
are too far to generate heavy life-threatening fallout in this part of Sweden. Instead it was 
decided to use a different scenario with lost radioactive sources. This kind of accidents has 
occurred, for example the Cosmos-954 re-entry over Canada in 1978 and the Goiânia accident 
in Brazil 1988. Such events could lead to the need for international assistance with airborne 
and car-borne measurements, medical treatment of irradiated people, evacuation and 
decontamination of highly radioactive areas, etc. 
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General design of the Gamma Search Cell exercise 
During the main planning conference it was decided that a challenging exercise would be a 
large scale search for orphan gamma radiation sources, simulating a radiological emergency 
with lost radioactive sources. This part of the LIVEX was named the Gamma Search Cell 
(GSC). The theme of lost sources was also used in the Command Exercise and the Field 
Exercise that were part of LIVEX. 
According to the LIVEX scenario an unknown number of radioactive sources were suspected 
to have been illegally buried in the large bogs and forests of northern Sweden in the 1950s 
and 60s. For some reason, perhaps due to a road construction, at least one of the buried 
sources had reappeared and caused radiation injury and the death of people. Parts of this 
source, and possibly other sources, could have been spread over of thousands of square 
kilometres. The task for the search teams of the Gamma Search Cell was to locate as many 
sources as possible within the areas defined by the exercise management.  
The search for orphan gamma radiation sources over large areas was designed to be a 
practical experiment were different teams, measuring equipment, assessment methods and 
tactics could be compared. Rapid positioning and identification of sources found including the 
reporting of source data to a Radiological Emergency Assessment Centre (REAC) was 
encouraged to obtain a situation that would be as close to the demands of a real emergency 
situation as possible. 
About 10 helicopter search teams and 15 car-borne search teams had announced their 
participation in the GSC-exercise. Quite large areas were needed to hide the sources since 
each team should be able to perform their search without interference from other teams that 
could reveal source locations. The exercise was set to continue for three days and each team 
should have the possibility to locate a number of sources each day. This would need at least, 
as many sources as there were teams. For car-borne teams the road lengths had to be at least a 
hundred kilometres each day. For airborne teams, search areas requiring at least a couple of 
hours of flight time each day were needed. The I19 Regiment of the Swedish Armed Forces in 
the town of Boden offered suitable areas covering these demands. The Regiment arranged for 
the use of several hundreds of square kilometres of its exercise grounds (firing ranges) 
northwest and southwest of Boden. 
The I19 exercise grounds were large, but not large enough to allow all teams to obtain 
completely separate search areas. The number of available radioactive sources that could be 
used in the exercise was also limited. Therefore, a compromise between realism and 
efficiency was made in such a way that teams had to share search areas. For car-borne teams, 
five search areas were defined (C1 - C4, C7). These should be covered during the three days 
of exercise. 1 - 8 sources were placed in each area. This meant that 3 - 4 car-borne teams had 
to use the same area at the same time. To allow all car-borne teams to have the same 
prerequisites within each area, information on identified source locations had to be kept secret 
between teams until the end of the exercise. 
In a real situation the findings from airborne search would be followed up on the ground with 
hand held equipment. The exercise management decided that this practice should be allowed 
and encouraged in the exercise. Therefore, all car-borne teams were granted access to results 
from at least one airborne team. The information exchange between airborne and car-borne 
teams was assigned country by country. Countries without airborne teams got access to 
Swedish airborne results. The time and area slots of airborne and car-borne teams were 
distributed so that car-borne teams generally were assigned to areas that had been covered by 
airborne search the day before. Unfortunately, due to morning fog during all three exercise-
days, this cooperation between airborne and car-borne teams could not be fully accomplished. 
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The follow up of sources on the ground required search teams to get close to hidden sources. 
Since sources should be located by radiation measurements and not by eye, the sources could 
not be visibly marked. Special safety arrangements were put into practice to allow teams to 
operate safely in the search areas with hidden sources. Physical arrangements of different 
kinds were built around all sources to prevent people and wildlife to get in touch with the 
sources. Access to the exercise grounds was legally restricted and physically stopped using 
roadblocks. Military radiation protection personnel guarded the areas around the clock. 
Special arrangements were made to ensure that only the approved search teams taking part in 
the GSC-exercise had access to the exercise grounds where the sources were placed. 
After the end of the three exercise days the source locations, radionuclides and activities of all 
hidden sources were published and the measurement data from all teams shared among the 
participants of the GSC. 
Responsible authorities and support 
The authorities responsible for planning and conducting the GSC-exercise were the Swedish 
Rescue Services Agency (SRV), the Swedish Radiation Protection Authority (SSI), the 
Swedish Defense Research Agency (FOI) and the Swedish Armed Forces (FM). 
In November 2000 the Nordic Nuclear Safety Research (NKS) decided to support teams from 
the Nordic countries for their participation in the Gamma Search Cell. This made it possible 
for some teams to participate. The support of NKS also made it possible to compile this 
report. 
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The radioactive sources and how they were arranged 
Thomas Ulvsand, FOI 
 
The purpose of the exercise was to find and identify various gamma-emitting radioactive 
sources. According to the LIVEX-scenario you would expect the sources to be unknown, 
hidden, buried or in other ways hard to find and to identify. This was the situation we wanted 
to create for the exercise. We also had to consider radiation protection aspects. The 
arrangements must be able to perform in a safe way giving minimal doses to the managing 
personal, according to the ALARA-principle. The arrangements also had to ensure that doses 
to measuring teams or to the public by mistakes were avoided. 
The sources we used were borrowed, rented or bought from national suppliers of radioactive 
sources, from hospitals and radiography companies, from the Swedish Armed Forces and 
from laboratories.  We used 24 Co-60, 11 Cs-137, 2 Mo-99, 2 Ir-192, 1 I-131, 3 natural Ra 
and 1 Am-241 sources, totally 44, ranging in activity between 0.0004 - 41 GBq. 
In the exercise area the sources were placed in shelters, sheds, vehicle carts or in free air with 
special arrangements for the protection aspects.  We used 15 tons of concrete-filled boxes to 
build shields for protection and to create confusing radiation fields. In some cases we tried to 
combine two sources of which just one was supposed to be seen from the air. If and when a 
car search team then entered the area to verify this finding they were supposed to find another 
source, positioned some distance away. The sources 4:2 and 4:3 and likewise the sources 4:6 
and 4:7 are arranged according to that idea. 
In the following pages photographs and presentations of each and every one of the sources, 
nuclide, activity, shielding and other relevant information are given. The Co-60 sources are all 
of the same type, namely equipment for exercises in training in the Swedish Armed Forces. 
They are all activated and loaded at the same time, which explains why they all have the same 
activity.  
The position of radiation sources was determined by hand held GPS equipment. The 
uncertainty in the coordinates given is in the order of 10-20 m. For sources placed in 
buildings the uncertainty is somewhat larger since the GPS-reading usually was done close to 
the nearest wall outside the building. This adds an additional uncertainty of 5 - 10 m, i.e. 
overall uncertainty in the coordinates given of 30 m for sources placed in buildings. 
The photographs are taken by Robert R. Finck and Thomas Ulvsand during the planning, 
preparation and exercise periods. The two aerial views of source 5:2, 5:3 and 5:4 are taken by 
Staffan Hennigor from Forsmark NPP in Sweden, during the last exercise day. 
The blocks that were used as shields are wooden boxes filled with concrete (Figure 1). Their 
outer dimensions are 720 × 185 × 200 mm and the wood is 22 mm thick. 
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Figure 1. Concrete block.      
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Source code: 1:1  Coordinate E: 1756005 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7298134 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
In a wooden cage in a gravel pit, shielded upwards with 4 layers of concrete blocks. 
 
 
Before placing source, shielding and mask 
 
 
Source with mask and shielding 
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Source code: 1:2  Coordinate E: 1756005 
Nuclide: I-131  Coordinate N: 7299224 
Activity: 10.3 – 8.5 GBq 
 
In a shed collimated with lead bricks producing a beam upwards and to the west 
 
           
The source is placed in a shed in a plexiglass tube between lead bricks 
 
3 m
10 m
The shed seen
from above
lead
source
The source and lead shields
 
Sketch of the source arrangement 
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Source code: 1:3  Coordinate E: 1755956 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7299830 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
In wooden cage at the end of the road, shielded sideways with concrete blocks. 
 
 
Before placing source, shielding and mask 
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Source code: 1:4  Coordinate E: 1756747 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7300334 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
In wooden cage on the south side of the closed road, shielded sideways with concrete blocks. 
 
 
Before placing source, shielding and mask 
 
 
View from the west 
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Source code: 2:1  Coordinate E: 1764029 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7307246 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
Inside the round concrete bunker. Radiation beam parallel to the ground and directed towards 
the road. 
 
 
Before placing the source in the bunker 
 
 
After placing the source and covering the entrance 
  22 
Source code: 2:2  Coordinate E: 1764048 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7307266 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
Inside the concrete bunker. Radiation beam directed approximately 30 degrees upwards. 
 
         
Before placing the source in the bunker  Photo from the source position  
 
 
 
After placing the source and covering the entrance 
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Source code: 2:3  Coordinate E: 1764844 
Nuclide: Mo-99  Coordinate N: 7307031 
Activity: 0.9 – 0.5 GBq 
 
In tracked vehicle cart, collimated upwards with opening angle approximately 45 degrees. 
 
Open generator with the source left inside 
 
 
Masked vehicle cart with the source inside 
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Source code: 2:4  Coordinate E: 1765350 
Nuclide: Mo-99  Coordinate N: 7305451 
Activity: 5.5 – 3.0 GBq 
 
In the house, on the attic. 
 
 
The house in which the source was placed 
 
 
Open shield with the source placed behind it  
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Source code: 2:5-1  Coordinate E: 1763466 
Nuclide: Cs-137  Coordinate N: 7306095 
Activity: 3× 0.5 GBq 
 
Level guards inside tracked vehicle cart, directed upwards. 
 
Source code: 2:5-2  Coordinate E: 1763466 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7306095 
Activity: 3 × 0.02 
 
Level guards inside tracked vehicle cart, directed to SW. 
 
 
Inside the cart with the Cs-sources to the right and the Co-sources to the left 
 
 
Finishing the mask on the cart 
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Source code: 2:6  Coordinate E: 1760526 
Nuclide: Am-241  Coordinate N: 7302595 
Activity: 0.0004 GBq 
 
In cart, taped on the inside of the plastic hood, about 1.5 m above the ground. 
 
 
The position of the source is marked with a ring 
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Source code: 3:1   Coordinate E: 1766304 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7316848 
Activity: 4 × 4.9 GBq 
 
In storehouse 36, shielded sideways with a lot of concrete. 
 
 
 
 
The sources were placed approximately in the middle of the building. They were shielded 
with 62 cm of concrete towards the long sides of the building and with 32 cm towards the 
short sides. Four slits in the front direction due to openings for the manoeuvring rods. Some 
additional shielding with lead cans, corresponding to a thickness of 3 - 4 cm, backwards and 
sideways.
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Source code: 4:1  Coordinate E: 1760923 
Nuclide: Cs-137  Coordinate N: 7321390 
Activity: 0.4 GBq 
 
In a red shed, shielded sideways. 
 
 
No photo of the shed exists. The source was in a lead container with the lid lifted away 
 
Source code: 4:2  Coordinate E: 1760488 
Nuclide: Cs-137  Coordinate N: 7323895 
Activity: 2.5 GBq 
 
In a bird nesting box. Shielded upwards with 6 cm of lead. 
 
  
The  source
 
The false bird nesting box with a lead   Sketch of the arrangements of the 
brick on the roof. The nesting box is 3 m  source and the shields  
above the ground 
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Source code: 4:3  Coordinate E: 1760310 
Nuclide: Ir-192  Coordinate N: 7323933 
Activity: 12 GBq 
 
Radiographic source in a tree, about 3 m above the ground. 
 
 
The position of the source is marked with a ring 
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Source code: 4:4  Coordinate E: 1761137 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7323702 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
Source code: 4:5  Coordinate E: 1761117 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7323744 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
In concrete fire trenches, covered with steel plate and stones. The two trenches are separated 
by 50 m. 
 
     
One of the fire trenches 
       
                Sketch of how the sources were arranged 
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Source code: 4:6  Coordinate E: 1761442 
Nuclide: Cs-137  Coordinate N: 7323932 
Activity: 1.3 GBq 
 
In tracked vehicle cart, shielded upwards with concrete blocks. 
 
 
The source was shielded upwards with three layers of concrete blocks and collimated in 
WNW direction towards the terrain track 
 
 
The source and concrete blocks inside the cart before closing and masking  
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Source code: 4:7  Coordinate E: 1761559 
Nuclide: Cs-137  Coordinate N: 7323941 
Activity: 1.9 
 
In tracked vehicle cart, shielded sideways. 
 
 
The source was collimated with a big angle upwards by just taking the lid away and shielded 
sideways with two layers of concrete blocks. The photo is taken just before the lid was taken 
away 
 
 
The tracked vehicle cart in position in the forest 
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Source code: 5:1  Coordinate E: 1756869 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7322034 
Activity: 40 GBq 
 
Radiographic source in a drainage drum under the road. 
 
 
The source position under the road is indicated with a ring  
 
 
The road drum, the source guide and the transport container. 
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Source code: 5:2  Coordinate E: 1755733 
Nuclide: Cs-137  Coordinate N: 7321627 
Activity: 2.6 GBq 
 
In a red shed, no shielding upwards. 
 
         
 
 
 
The source was placed into the metal frame, close to the lead container 
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Source code: 5:3  Coordinate E: 1755750 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7321686 
Activity: 2 × 4.9 GBq 
 
In a wooden cage, no shielding. 
 
 
One of the two sources is opened 
 
 
Aerial view of sources 5:2 and 5:3 
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Source code: 5:4  Moving between Coordinate E: 175490 - 175670  
Nuclide: Cs-137            Coordinate N: 732240 - 732400 
Activity: 1.9 GBq 
 
In car cart moving along a road loop, shielded to all sides. 
        
The car and cart seen from helicopter  The road loop 
 
         
Inside the cart. The ordinary lid was taken 
away and the source was covered with a thin 
plastic disc 
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Source code: 5:5  Coordinate E: 1756402 
Nuclide: Ir-192  Coordinate N: 7324293 
Activity: 41 GBq 
 
Radiographic source below a boulder. 
 
         
The boulder under which the source           Sketch of the source arrangement 
was placed 
 
 
The source placed under the boulder 
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Source code: 6:1  Coordinate E: 1761020 
Nuclide: Cs-137  Coordinate N: 7302427 
Activity: 2.6 GBq 
 
Reference source in a tracked vehicle cart. 
 
 
 
 
Source code: 6:2  Coordinate E: 1761670 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7302884 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
Reference source in a wooden cage. 
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Source code: 7:1  Coordinate E: 1725376 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7340248 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
In storehouse 27, source collimated in SE direction. 
 
 
 
 
 
The source is opened 
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Source code: 7:2  Coordinate E: 1721169 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7340769 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
In storehouse 22, source collimated in ENE direction. 
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Source code: 7:3  Coordinate E: 1718957 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7338223 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
In storehouse 51, collimated towards storehouse 52. 
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Source code: 7:4  Coordinate E: 1718983 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7338209 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
In storehouse 52, collimated towards storehouse 51. 
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Source code: 7:5  Coordinate E: 1711648 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7331315 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
In storehouse 50, source shielded in direction NW over N to SE 
 
 
No photo of the source exists 
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Source code: 7:6  Coordinate E: 1721282 
Nuclide: Ra-226           Coordinate N: 7340593 
Activity: Natural 
 
Source code: 7:7   Coordinate E: 1718765 
Nuclide: Ra-226           Coordinate N: 7337175 
Activity: Natural 
 
Source code: 7:8   Coordinate E: 1712920 
Nuclide: Ra-226           Coordinate N: 7318874 
Activity: Natural 
 
Pieces of rock containing Uranium ore, placed in wooden boxes. 
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Source code: R1:1  Coordinate E: 1769622 
Nuclide: Cs-137  Coordinate N: 7313225 
Activity: 1.9 GBq 
 
Reference source at the air field in tracked vehicle cart. 
 
 
 
 
Source code: R1:2  Coordinate E: 1769447 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7313487 
Activity: 4.9 GBq 
 
Reference source at the air field in tracked vehicle cart. 
 
 
 
  46 
Source code: X:1  Coordinate E: 1762946 
Nuclide: Cs-137  Coordinate N: 7303659 
Activity: 1.9 GBq 
 
Pre-exercise source in lead container in cart. Source arrangement was the same as in 5:4 
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Source code: X:2-1; X:2-2 Coordinate E: 1764308 
Nuclides: Cs-137; Co-60 Coordinate N: 7308519 
Activity: 0.5 GBq; 0.02 GBq 
 
Pre-exercise sources. Level guards in Volvo, directed towards the road. 
 
 
 
  48 
Source code: X:3  Coordinate E: 1764698 
Nuclide:Cs-137  Coordinate N: 7306720 
Activity: 2 × 0.5 GBq 
 
Pre-exercise source. Level guards in Volvo, not opened. 
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Source code: X:4  Coordinate E: 1764300 
Nuclide: Co-60  Coordinate N: 7306424 
Activity: 2 × 0.02 GBq 
 
Pre-exercise source. Level guard in Skoda, directed towards the East. 
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Source code: X:5  Coordinate E: 1763856 
Coordinate N: 7305822 
Nuclides: Cs-137; Cs-137; Cs-137; Co-60; Co-60; Ba-133 
Activity: 1.3; 1.9; 0.4; 0.1; 0.1; 0.004 GBq 
 
Pre-exercise source in transport lorry. All sources in closed lead containers. 
 
 
Photo taken at other location 
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The Gamma Search Cell and Radiological Emergency 
Assessment Centre, REAC 
(From the Exercise Specification) 
Robert R. Finck, SSI 
 
The Gamma Search Cell in Barents Rescue LIVEX 2001 conducted an exercise aimed at 
search and identification of orphan radioactive sources over large areas. Gamma emitting 
sources of different radionuclides were used. The number of radiation sources, their locations 
and activities were not revealed to the participants in advance. The task for each participating 
team was to determine the position, radionuclide, activity and dose rate of as many sources as 
possible within the assigned search area and time allotted and to report the findings as soon as 
possible to the Radiological Emergency Assessment Centre, REAC. 
Participation and equipment 
Participation in the Gamma Search Cell was open to teams using fixed wing aircraft, 
helicopters and cars. Measuring equipment was gamma spectrometers based on sodium iodide 
crystals or semiconductor detectors based on high purity germanium. Teams could also 
participate with non-spectrometric instruments such as geological survey instruments and 
dose rate meters.  
Time schedule 
Most participating teams arrived in Boden on Wednesday, September 12. An opening and 
information meeting was held on September 13. Information on activities concerning 
reference measurements and pre-exercises was given in the mornings of September 14 and 15. 
Detailed orders for each exercise day were given in the evening of September 16, 17 and 18. 
On September 16 a pre-exercise was conducted during three hours. In the afternoon of 
September 13 the official LIVEX opening ceremony was held. The main exercise took place 
during September 17 - 19. Source locations and results from teams were presented in the 
morning of September 20. 
Airborne search for orphan gamma radiation sources 
Helicopters were allotted to five search areas of 2 x 5 km2 (A1-A5). Only one helicopter was 
allowed into a search area during a time slot (A single exception was made for three Swedish 
military helicopters flying in formation in area A5 during the last hour of the exercise). The 
time allotted to each search area was about 50  55 minutes. During the three exercise days 
there were 7 - 8 time slots per day for each search area. However, due to fog in the mornings, 
only afternoons could be used for airborne search. 
A specific training area 3 x 3 km2 (A6) was assigned. In this area two radiation sources (Co-
60 and Cs-137) were well marked and visible from the air. The training area was open from 
September 13 until September 19. In addition, two radiation sources (Co-60 and Cs-137) were 
available for reference measurements at the aviation field. Airborne teams were provided with 
maps of the search areas. 
Helicopters were allowed to fly at their own choice within the borders of the search areas, but 
were not allowed to land there. The minimum flight height was 60 m due to the safety 
distance to sources. There was unassigned space between individual search areas allowing 
helicopters to make close turns just outside the area. One fixed wing aircraft participated also. 
It was given time slots when helicopters were not in the air. The Air Wing performed 
command and control of all airborne activities. 
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Helicopter teams reported source findings to REAC within one hour after landing. A specific 
Source Identification Report (SIR) was used. In addition, teams could report more detailed 
measurement data at their own choice. Details concerning reporting procedures and data 
formats were provided separately. 
The search areas are shown in Appendix 1. 
Car-borne search for orphan gamma radiation sources 
Car-borne search teams were given different areas and roads to search. Four (A1-A4) of the 
five search areas assigned to airborne search were also open for car teams and teams on foot 
with portable equipment (corresponding to car-borne search areas C1-C4). About 300 km of 
roads were available for car-borne search and divided into five sub-areas (C1-C4, C7). 
Typically 3 - 6 car teams shared one sub-area. Teams were allowed to leave their car and 
perform search on foot in the terrain with portable equipment.  
Car-bone teams had access to radiation sources for training and reference measurement in the 
specific training areas at A6 and at the helicopter airfield. Access to the training area at the 
airfield was allowed from September 13 and at the A6 area from September 14.  
All teams were provided with road maps showing search roads and areas. The area A5 was 
only assigned to airborne search and not open for car-borne search or search on foot.  
As soon as a team found a radiation source, its position, radionuclide and estimated activity 
should be reported to REAC. 
The search areas are shown in Appendix 1. 
Cooperation between airborne and car-borne teams 
Cooperation between a helicopter team and a car-borne team was allowed for each 
participating country. Measurement results could be exchanged through the web site 
maintained by REAC. Countries without a helicopter could obtain information from Swedish 
airborne teams. Time slots were generally allocated so that car-borne teams should be able to 
use data from airborne teams that had been in the area the previous day. The car-borne team 
could then follow up and more closely identify and quantify sources on the ground that have 
been identified from the air. However, due to the morning fog this cooperation could not be 
fully accomplished. 
Presentation of results and scientific evaluation 
Source findings were reported on the Source Identification Report. Reporting was made by 
telephone, fax or email to REAC. Track measurement data was reported on data media or by 
email in the specific NKS-format. The NKS-format was first used during the Resume 99 
exercise in Gävle.  
A password protected web site was used to display results from all participating teams in the 
Gamma Search Cell. Each team had access to its own results on the web, but different teams 
could not see each others results until the end of the exercise. At that time all results were 
made available to all participants together with details on source data. General information 
about teams, the progress of the exercise and other information of general interest were 
provided on a web site open to the public. 
The Nordic Nuclear Safety Research, NKS, supported participating teams from the Nordic 
countries. NKS collected measurement information from all teams to facilitate a subsequent 
scientific evaluation of measured results. Generally all participating teams will be allowed to 
use all data that have been reported to REAC and documented. When using data from other 
teams in scientific reports, these teams should be duly referenced and acknowledged. 
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A follow-up meeting for all participating teams was held at Rosersberg on October 23 - 24, 
2001. At this meeting, participants presented their measurements and experiences from the 
exercise. The written contributions are included in the proceedings of this joint measurement 
report. 
Radiation safety 
The exercise was conducted with high radiation safety demands. The Swedish Radiation 
Protection Authority stated conditions for the use of radiation sources in the exercise and 
issued the permission according to the Swedish legislation. 
The firing ranges around Boden were used for placing the radiation sources in the Gamma 
Search Exercise. Airborne and car-borne teams had access to these areas, but the areas were 
prohibited for the public to enter. All teams were provided with special identification tags and 
car signs to allow admittance to the restricted areas. Teams entering and leaving the restricted 
areas had to report to the Ground Control in REAC. 
Radiation sources were placed behind barriers so that no person could inadvertently come 
close to them. In addition, strong radiation sources were only placed in areas legally off-limits 
to the public. The sources were locked in such a way that they could not be removed from 
their places without using physical force. Exercise areas were guarded around the clock by a 
specially assigned organisation. 
All persons participating in the Gamma Search Cell had to carry dosimeters. These were 
supplied by the exercise management at the start of the exercise and collected after the 
exercise. Teams could also use their own dosimeters, but it was obligatory to carry the special 
dosimeters supplied by the management. In addition, all participating search teams were 
encouraged use dose rate instruments. 
There was one specific person responsible for radiation safety. 
Security 
The Host Nation Support (HNS) was responsible for guard duties. Secure areas for parking of 
cars with equipment was provided. Helicopters were guarded round the clock. 
Web sites 
The web site http://barentsrescue.srv.se was the main site for information concerning the 
Barents Rescue LIVEX 2001. Measurement data from the Gamma Search Cell was made 
available to search teams on the password protected web site http://barentsrescue.ssi.se. 
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Search results and conclusions 
Thomas Ulvsand, FOI 
Robert R. Finck, SSI 
 
The search results for all teams are graphically presented in Figure 2 on the next page. The 
presentation is based on Source Identification Reports (SIR) used during the exercise, the 
teams written reports in these proceedings, and in some cases a judgement from the authors if 
a source is found or not. By which method a source was found is not possible to see from the 
graphic. 
It is a difficult task to find and identify hidden radioactive sources; the results of the Barents 
Rescue Gamma Search Cell exercise clearly indicate that. It is of course possible in a real 
accident that the source activities are stronger and that you know what type of nuclide you are 
looking for. Nevertheless the exercise gave the participating teams a good opportunity to 
practise and test their equipment and search strategy. Most teams found it very valuable to 
have their equipment tested under out-door conditions, mounted in vehicles and bumping 
around on gravel roads or in helicopters and with a limited time at their disposal. Many 
problems had to be dealt with like broadening of photo peaks and to optimise between 
detector systems. Background discrimination, how the system alerts when passing a source, 
on-line or post processing of data, and accurate positioning are other examples. No team 
found all sources, and a few sources were not found at all. The results for the different teams 
show a big variety, but every team found at least some sources.  
Due to the fact that the mornings during the three exercise days were to foggy to allow flying 
in the area, there were limitations in flying time for the air teams, compared to what was 
scheduled. This affected the results as the time accessible for air gamma search was very short 
for each team, to get as many teams as possible an opportunity to participate in the search. 
This in turn in some cases hampered planned cooperation between air search and ground 
search teams.  
The results are summarized in a very simple way in Figure 3. The percentage given is of the 
total number of possible findings, i.e. the number of sources times the number of teams 
looking for them. The number is corrected for if teams have not been in certain areas. 
The number of possible findings was for AGS 150 and for CGS 432. In practise the possible 
number of findings for the AGS-teams is less than 150, due to the fact that some sources were 
arranged in such a way that they should not be seen from the air. 
It is necessary to use spectrometric equipment to identify nuclides. It seems to be hard and 
time consuming to estimate the source activity and no one of the air teams has managed to do 
it. Good knowledge of parameters like dose rates, distance and thickness of shields is 
necessary, something you do not have in aerial search. Car search teams that have been 
successful in estimating the activity have used a combination of methods to gain knowledge 
of these parameters. One can use dose rate meters to estimate the distance to the source by 
using the inverse square law. By analysing the relation between the photo peak and the 
Compton continuum in a gamma energy spectrum you can get some idea of the thickness of 
the shield.  
Car search teams have reported that sources were found with other methods than based on 
measuring radiation. In same cases the team had information from their flying team and some 
teams looked for other signs than radiation like white poles or suspicious buildings. So the 
fact that a source is reported as found does not necessarily mean that something can be said 
about the effectiveness of the equipment used.  
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source code 1:1 1:2 1:3 1:4 2:1 2:2 2:3 2:4 2:5 2:6 3:1 4:1 4:2 4:3 4:4 4:5 4:6 4:7 5:1 5:2 5:3 5:4 5:5 7:1 7:2 7:3 7:4 7:5 7:6 7:7 7:8
team
ATA
DEA
DKA
FIA
NOC
RUA
SEA
SEB
SEC
1:1 1:2 1:3 1:4 2:1 2:2 2:3 2:4 2:5 2:6 3:1 4:1 4:2 4:3 4:4 4:5 4:6 4:7 5:1 5:2 5:3 5:4 5:5 7:1 7:2 7:3 7:4 7:5 7:6 7:7 7:8
EEE
LVE
SEF
1:1 1:2 1:3 1:4 2:1 2:2 2:3 2:4 2:5 2:6 3:1 4:1 4:2 4:3 4:4 4:5 4:6 4:7 5:1 5:2 5:3 5:4 5:5 7:1 7:2 7:3 7:4 7:5 7:6 7:7 7:8
ATK
ATL
DKK
EEK
FIK
FIL
LVK
LTK
NOK
NOL
PLK
RUK not1
RUL
RUM
RUN not2
SEK
SEL
SEM
SEP
found, correct nuclide and activity (+/- 25%)
found, correct nuclide
found
found, wrong nuclide not1 Two SIR with Co-60 in one and Am-241 in the other
not found not2 Give two sources, I-131 (correct) and Zr-95 (wrong)
not in search area  
Figure 2. Search results.
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AGS Air Gamma Search 
AS Air Search (with simple equipment, like dose rate meters) 
CGS Car gamma Search 
Figure 3. Search results, fractions of sources found. 
 
A more detailed and systematic analysis of by which method and equipment sources were 
found, can tell whether large detectors give better results than small detectors, or if one 
detector system or method is better than another. This can be an issue for future work to 
improve preparedness against radiological accidents. 
The twin sources 2:1 / 2:2 and 4:4  / 4:5 were placed close together. It can be noticed that in 
several cases just one of them was reported.  For air search it is understandable that it is 
difficult to separate two sources of the same kind. Car search teams, however, should have a 
search strategy that ensures that if sources are placed close together, one notice that there is 
more than one. 
Just as it was planned some sources that were found by car search did not turn up in air search 
reports and vice versa. This is important knowledge in a preparedness point of view, to find 
all sources you must use complementary search methods. 
The weakest source that was found from the air was 4:1, a 0.4 GBq Cs-137 source. Two out 
of seven teams reported it. The source with the strongest output was 5:1, a 40 Gbq Co-60-
source, with just a slightly better result. The output from this source is around 400 times the 
output from the weaker source, but it was buried to give mainly scattered radiation. Maybe 
there is a need to develop methods to evaluate scattered radiation too, as a complement to 
using photo peaks. 
There exist many computerised programmes for analysis and presentation of data.  An 
evaluation of their functionality when used by more or less experienced operators, sometimes 
under stress, could be wise to perform. The fact that different teams and nations use different 
programmes makes it more difficult to cooperate and exchange data and results, both in 
research, exercises and accidents.   
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Session 2 
 
Team reports, Air Gamma Search (AGS) 
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Austria, team ATA 
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Austrian Team (ATA) 
Wolfgang Fehringer, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Civil Protection School 
Andreas Polaschek, Gendarmerie Headquarter of Lower Austria 
 
Team members:  
Wolfgang Fehringer, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Civil Protection School 
Andreas Polaschek, Gendarmerie Headquarter of Lower Austria 
Alois Geyrhofer, Gendarmerie Headquarter of Lower Austria 
Gerd Schlager, Police Department of Salzburg 
Christian Ebner, Police Department of Salzburg 
Wohlgang Klösch, Austrian Research Centers Seiberdorf (ARCS)  
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Equipment 
Portable Air - Car Borne System 
 
 
Detection system: 
• Radiation measuring device SSM1. Time of integration: 5 seconds  
• External plastic-scintillator-probe or high-volume Geiger-Müller-probes (Gamma-
counter) 
Data acquisition and navigation system: 
• Rugged military laptop 
• Built-in modem and GPS with external antenna 
• Mobile power pack 
With the built-in modem we can transmit measuring and positioning data to headquarters. 
Advantages of the System: 
• Short installation time (10 min) 
• Simplified handling and data analysis (no experts are necessary) 
• Usable for car and helicopter operation 
• Online navigation with digital map  
• Unlimited operation time (depends on power pack) 
• Very rugged system (100% ready for duty) (10 systems are on duty in Austria) 
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Methods 
Airborne gamma search: 
• Flying height: 80 m (Barents Rescue - 60 m) 
• Speed: 80 km/h 
• Line spacing: 100 - 150 m (meander) 
• Detector position: on the bottom of the cabin 
• Measurement: in counts per second (cps) 
• Two officers 
One officer takes the seat beneath the pilot and holds the laptop on his knees. 
During the flight the pilot can have a look on the screen, where  
• the actually position, 
• the track, 
• the compass-card and 
• the count-rate curve  
can be seen. 
So the pilot in Boden was able to fly a very exact track in the exercise. 
Data analysis 
We have got three possibilities to analyse the measuring track: 
First a 1:1-overlay for each usable map with four variable count-rate colours to produce a 
stepped radiation picture: 
• File name 
• Scale 
• Officer 
• Date and Time (UTC) 
• Height 
• Countrate of the background (starting point) 
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Analysis without digital map (area A1) 
 
Here you can see the exact work of the Swedish pilot whom we have got.  
Now we have got the proof, that we can put our equipment in any helicopter and co-
operate with pilots, who never have done this work before. A great independence for our 
system. 
Analysis with digital map (area A1) 
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The second possibility to analyse is the count-rate curve with distance in km: 
Counts per second depend on distance (area A1) 
 
The third analysis with the table consists of: 
• count-rate  
• position data in WGS84-format and in Austria additional in our national format 
• both is saved each second 
Table evaluation: 
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Results 
Area A1: 
3 of 4 sources have been detected by helicopter 
Area A2: 
For this area we are not able to present any results because we did no measurements there 
Area A3: 
The only one source in this area has been detected by helicopter  
Area A4: 
3 of 7 sources have been detected by helicopter (flight has been stopped because of the 
weather situation) 
Area A5 : 
4 of 5 sources have been detected by helicopter 
 
Conclusions 
During this exercise we got a lot of practise to take measurements in an area with a high 
and very different radioactive background. 
We met many nice and very helpful people who gave us assistance during this exercise. 
We really enjoyed our stay in Sweden. 
The main advantage of our system is the really short time for being ready to make 
measurements (about 10 minutes). Although we only can inform the headquarters about 
the difference to the count rate of the background it is a very useful and important 
information for urgent decision-finding in the field of radiation protection. 
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Denmark, team DKA 
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Danish Team DKA 
Kim Bargholz, Frank Andersen, 
Danish Emergency Management Agency, Nuclear Safety Division 
 
LOS, PEV, and Træholt; Danish Army 
 
 
Equipment 
The Danish Team DKA uses standard detectors and spectrometers manufactured by the 
Canadian company Exploranium. Installation of the equipment in the Fennec helicopter, 
operated by the Danish Army, is performed using special designed mounting equipment. In 
this way the two Danish AGS systems can be installed in all Fennec helicopters operated 
by the Danish Army i.e. in total 12 helicopters. The equipment used for the two Danish 
AGS systems consists of: 
• AS-550 Fennec helicopter  
• Exploranium GPX-1024 16 L NaI(Tl) detector 
• Exploranium GR-820 multichannel analyser (512 channels) 
• Exploranium PI660 pilot indicator 
• Differential GPS 
• Radar altimeter 
• Pentium PC with Windows 98 
• Special designed soft ware 
Methods 
The Danish AGS systems are designed for emergency preparedness purposes i.e. the 
systems should be used for fast mapping of the contamination levels on the ground after an 
accident involving radioactive material. However, searching for orphan sources can be 
done using the same equipment and methods as for mapping of ground level contamination 
levels. 
Usually, flight lines going north to south or west to east is planned with a certain line 
spacing depending on the type of measurements that should be performed. During the 
search for orphan sources at the LIVEX exercise 100-meter line spacing was chosen. The 
areas to be surveyed were 2 by 5 km of size resulting in 21 lines going north to south. The 
speed during the measurements was initially set to approximately 150 km/h. However, due 
to the limited time for survey in each area the speed had to be increased to approximately 
170-180 km/h in order to cover the whole area with a line spacing of 100 meter. During all 
flights the altitude was 60 meter AGL. 
As an example of the actual flight lines Figure 1 shows the lines flown in area A1 during 
the exercise. Due to the pilot indicator it is possible to perform actual flight lines that are 
close to the planned lines. The pilot indicator at all times shows the pilot how many meters 
the helicopter is of track both horizontally and vertically. Consequently the pilot can adjust 
  72 
the actual track so it matches the planned track within a difference of no more than 10-20 
meters. 
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Figure 1: Actual flight lines at area A1 performed by DKA 
During a survey the Danish airborne system measures one spectrum per second together 
with altitude read from the radar altimeter and the position determined by the DGPS 
system. All data obtained every second are stored as binary files that can be processed 
afterwards. Online data processing is not included in the Danish system. As the system is a 
emergency preparedness system that in accident situation is operated by non-experts the 
system should be as simple as possible in order to ensure that the system is operated 
correct. 
Data analysis 
To process large series of data from e.g. AGS systems DEMA has developed a Windows 
NT/2000 data processing tool called NUCSpec (Ref 2). NUCSpec is capable of viewing 
the large data files in an easy way using the waterfall technique and processing the data 
using both the standard techniques and more advanced methods such as NASVD. 
When a data file is opened in NUCSpec the active window is divided into 4 different views 
- two spectrum views (upper and lower) and two information views (upper and lower). 
Figure 2 shows the NUCSpec layout when a data file is open. 
Upper spectrum view 
The upper spectrum view shows a large number of spectra. The total number of spectra 
viewed depends on the size of the window. Each spectrum is shown as horizontal pixel-
lines, with each line representing a spectrum (512 or 256 channels) with different pixel 
colours indicating different numbers of counts. A red pixel may represent channel counts 
around 100 counts, whereas a blue pixel could represent channel counts around 10. The 
colour scale can be changed by use of the colour set-up menu in the set-up pull down menu. 
In this way a large number of spectra can easily be viewed on the screen together as colour 
lines, and as the human eye easily detects gradients in colours it is easily discovered when 
(even minor) spectrum changes occur. By use of the scroll bars in the upper spectrum view it 
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is possible to sweep back and forth (in time) through the data file in order to find spectra of 
peculiar appearance. 
 
Lower spectrum view 
The lower view shows the spectrum pointed at by the arrow in the upper spectrum view. 
The spectrum is shown as an ordinary gamma-spectrum i.e. counts vs. channel number. 
Upper information view 
Upper information view contains all information related to the spectrum the cursor points 
at when the upper spectrum field is active. The first line is the spectrum number, which 
always shows the actual spectrum number pointed at (the series of spectra are numbered 
beginning with zero). The time shown is the UTC time determined from the GPS or the 
computer system. The coordinates shown (N,E) are determined by GPS/DGPS 
measurements. Live time and real time is shown for each measurement and the altitude is 
shown if it is measured and included in the data file. The Window Cnt is the count rate of 
a user-defined region of interest (user defined window). 
Lower information view 
The lower information view contains information similar to the upper information view. 
However, the information is related to the spectrum shown on the lower spectrum view i.e. 
the spectrum pointed at by the arrow to the left in the upper spectrum view. 
 
Figure 2: Layout of NUCSpec with an open data file (only channel 1-256)  
Using NUCSpec, standard processing of the data is possible, such as the windows method 
(stripping), conversion of stripped count rates to ground level concentrations, altitude 
corrections, dose rate calculations using the Spectrum Dose Index (SDI) method, extended 
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windows method for calculation of Cs concentrations. Projections can be chosen from a 
user defined range of different coordinate systems including the Swedish RT90 system. 
However, at the LIVEX exercise the Noise Adjusting Singular Value Decomposition 
(NASVD) was primarily used for processing the data and to identify positions of orphan 
sources. 
NASVD is a method developed for processing spectral data series (Ref 1). The method 
determines a set of spectral components that in linear combination can describe each 
measured spectrum from the data series. 
1. The first component is the average of all spectra. It is termed spectral component 
S0. 
2. The second component (termed S1) is determined, so linear combinations of S0 and 
S1 can describe all spectra in the best way with only the two components. 
3. The third component (termed S2) is determined so it in combination with S0 and 
S1 can describe all spectra in the data series in the best way with only three 
components. 
4. The fourth component (termed S3) is determined so it in combination with the three 
first components can describe all spectra in the best way. 
5. The fifth component (termed S4) etc. 
Based on the spectral components it is possible to identify different kinds of radioactive 
isotopes that have been present in the area surveyed. As an example the data obtained from 
area A1 can be used. Spectral component No.3 is shown in Figure 3. 
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Figure 3: Spectral component No 3 obtained from NASVD processing of the data from area 
A1 
As seen from Figure 3 the spectral shape is clearly caused by Co-60 present in the area. 
Based on this component it possible to identify the places where Co-60 has been present 
looking at the concentration of the component in each spectrum in the data series. 
In case of more than one isotope present in the area other components would show this as 
typical spectral shapes for that specific isotopes. 
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In Figure 4 the concentration of spectral component No 3 obtained from NASVD 
processing the data from area A1 are shown. In total approximately 3800 spectra were 
measured in area A1. 
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Figure 4: Concentration of spectral component No 3 in the data series measured in area A1 
In Figure 4, it can be observed that spectral component No. 3 contributes to spectrum No. 
1024 and No. 1065. It is seen that the contribution is larger in spectrum No 1024 than in 
spectrum No. 1065. This is also clearly seen from Figure 3 where spectrum No. 1065 is 
shown in the lower spectrum view. It is obvious looking at Figure 3 that Co-60 (spectral 
component No 3) is present in spectrum No. 1024 whereas the contribution in spectrum No 
1065 is hard to recognize.  
Reconstruction of the spectral data series using the spectral components from the NASVD 
processing can remove the noise in the spectra if only the components with real spectral 
shapes are included. In Figure 5 the reconstructed spectra is shown. 
After reconstruction it is observed that the Co-60 signal both at spectrum No 1024 and 
spectrum No 1065 is easily seen both in upper and lower spectrum view.  
In this way possible contribution from orphan sources to the spectral measurements can be 
identified. 
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Figure 5: Reconstructed spectra using the NASVD method (only channel 1 to 256 shown) 
 
Results 
Within one hour, source identification papers, NKS files, and dose rate maps were 
delivered to REAC. All results were obtained using the NUCSpec program. 
Besides that source identification papers and the NKS files DKA also produced and 
delivered dose rate maps from the surveyed areas. The dose rate maps were produced using 
the SDI method  (Ref 3) and presented in MapInfo together with geographical maps made 
available by the Swedish organizers of the exercise. 
In Figure 6 the dose rate map covering area A1 is shown. It is clearly seen where the three 
Co-60 sources are placed and also the Ir-192 source position can be identified. If for 
example the Co-60 or Ir-192 signal were mapped the positions of the sources would have 
been even more obvious. 
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Figure 6: Dose rate map from area A1 determined from DKA measurements 
During the exercise DKA succeeded in surveying all 5 areas and also the reference area A6 
were surveyed during the pre exercise. The orphan sources identified by DKA in each of 
the 5 areas are listed in the tables below. Only the type of source and the position of the 
source were reported. No attempt was made to estimate the source strength. The source 
strength estimation will always depend on a lot of assumptions on shielding etc and 
therefore always including a large uncertainty. Looking from an emergency preparedness 
point of view the main goal is to identify the position of a possible orphan source and the 
type of source. The precise strength should be determined from ground level measurements 
at the coordinate given by the airborne team. 
 
Sources identification results from area A1 by DKA 
Nuclide Code Position Reported position Comments 
Co-60 1:1 1756005 
7298134 
1756100 
7298100 
Reported correctly by DKA 
I-131 1:2 1756005 
7299224 
1755920 
7299267 
Reported correctly by DKA 
Co-60 1:3 1755956 
7299830 
1756000 
7299900 
Reported correctly by DKA 
Co-60 1:4 1756747 
7300334 
1756800 
7300300 
Reported correctly by DKA 
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Sources identification results from area A2 by DKA 
Nuclide Code Position Reported position Comments 
Co-60 2:1 1764029 
7307246 
 
Not found  placed inside concrete 
bunker 
Co-60 2:2 1764048 
7307266 
 
Not found  placed inside concrete 
bunker 
Mo-99 2:3 1764844 
7307031 
 Not found 
Mo-99 2:4 1765350 
7305451 
1765387 
7305419 
Reported by DKA but identified as 
Tc-99 
Cs-137 2:5-1 1763466 
7306095 
 
Not found  weak source directed 
upwards 
Co-60 2:5-2 1763466 
7306095 
 
Not found  weak source directed 
SW 
 
Sources identification results from area A3 by DKA 
Nuclide Code Position Reported position Comments 
Co-60 3:1 1766304 
7316848 
1766274 
7316825 
Reported correctly by DKA 
 
Sources identification results from area A4 by DKA 
Nuclide Code Position Reported position Comments 
Cs-137 4:1 1760923 
7321390 
1760912 
7321349 
Reported correctly by DKA 
Cs-137 4:2 1760488 
7323895 
 
Not found  placed in a birdhouse, 
shielded upwards 
Ir-192 4:3 1760310 
7323933 
1760326 
7323952 
Reported correctly by DKA 
Co-60 4:4 1761137 
7323702 
 
Not found  placed in concrete fire 
trench and covered with steel plate 
and sand 
Co-60 4:5 1761117 
7323744 
 
Not found  placed in concrete fire 
trench and covered with steel plate 
and sand 
Cs-137 4:6 1761442 
7323932 
 
Not found  placed in tracked 
vehicle cart, shielded upwards 
Cs-137 4:7 1761559 
7323941 
1761502 
7323985 
Reported correctly by DKA 
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Sources identification results from area A5 by DKA 
Nuclide Code Position Reported position Comments 
Co-60 5:1 1756869 
7322034 
1756897 
7322002 
Reported correctly by DKA 
Cs-137 5:2 1755733 
7321627 
1755703 
7321622 
Reported correctly by DKA 
Co-60 5:3 1755750 
7321686 
1755703 
7321622 
Reported correctly by DKA 
Cs-137 5:4 Moving  Not found  moving source 
Ir-192 5:5 1756402 
7324293 
1756489 
7324250 
Reported correctly by DKA 
 
Conclusions 
The Danish airborne team DKA found and identified the sources that could be seen from 
measurements with AGS. Only one of the sources found was not identified correctly (in 
area A2 Mo-99 was reported as Tc-99). The sources not found by DKA was either heavily 
shielded upwards or directed/collimated narrowly i.e. the AGS teams had to fly directly 
above the narrow beam in order to detect the source if possible. 
It was during the exercise proven that the NUCSpec software developed by DEMA is a 
fast and reliable processing tool for AGS data both for mapping of contamination and for 
identifying orphan sources. Also production of NKS files and colour coded maps showing 
the levels of radiation at ground level can be performed fast and reliable. 
The exercise also showed that bringing a helicopter from Denmark to neighbouring 
countries could be done without any problems. In fact bringing the helicopter that the 
equipment is designed for eliminates many problems connected to installation of the 
equipment in other aircrafts. Performing flights in e.g. more hilly areas than can be seen in 
Denmark was also proven to be possible including flight planning using completely 
different projection as the Swedish RT90 coordinate system. 
In general the Danish airborne team found the LIVEX exercise very useful both as a test 
for carrying out help to neighbouring countries and as a test of our own ability to perform 
airborne surveys in different areas than can be seen in Denmark. 
Acronyms 
DEMA  Danish Emergency Management Agency 
DAR  Danish Army 
DKA  Danish airborne team No. A 
NASVD  Noise Adjusted Singular Value Decomposition 
AGS  Airborne Gamma-Ray Spectrometry 
SDI  Spectrum Dose Index 
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Finnish Team (FIA) 
Markku Kettunen 
 
Team members: 
Mika Nikkinen 
Tapio Heininen 
Kari Keskitalo 
Anita Pippuri 
Juha Brander 
 
Equipment 
6x4 inch NaI detector + MicroNomad analyzer 
70% HPGe detector + DART analyzer 
GPS GLONASS satellite navigator 
Three IBM ThinkPad laptop computers 
DC/AC inverter 
The above instruments were installed in a Swedish civilian helicopter (Eurocopter 350), 
which was furnished by the organizer of the "Barents Rescue 2001" event. 
Methods 
The helicopter flew continuously over the measurement area at a height of 60 meters. Its 
speed varied between 150 and 230 km/h. The lines were spaced 100 meters apart. The 
spectrometers had an integration time of about 1 second. Navigation was primarily based 
on the GPS and MapPerfect navigation programs. Turns were made inside the 
measurement area. The aim was to provide coverage that was as uniform as possible for 
the whole measurement area within the limited flight time.  
A back seat was removed from the helicopter, and the detectors were positioned in its 
place. The detectors were protected against shock and vibration. Their location was chosen 
to minimize attenuation from incoming radiation. The helicopter body attenuation factor 
was modelled using point-source measurement. 
Data analysis 
The online detection of the source was based on the online display of the SAMPO 
program. Sources were recognized using predefined regions of interest (roi) areas by 
checking for the sum spectra after the measurement and then processing the data. HPGe 
and NaI detector data were used to determine both the nuclide and the activity of the 
orphan source. The SAMPO and GMLINT programs were used for the post-processing. 
The activity estimate was based on the approximation done by the GMLINT program. All 
possible shielding was evaluated with the graphics produced by GMLINT.  
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K-40 
Co-60 
 
Figure 1. An example of a SAMPO window. The last 360 spectra of the measurement are 
shown. K-40 can be easily identified and two peaks of Co-60 point sources are visible. 
Results 
During the exercise, all five measurement-areas were scanned.  
Area A1  
Found sources: 
I-131 21°2252.68 65° 41 29. 60 3 GBq 
Co-60 21°2248.97 65° 41 45. 86 1 GBq 
   Open source 
Co-60 21°2354.90 65° 42 08. 50 1.2 GBq 
   Open source 
Co-60 21°2241.99 65° 40 53. 75 0.6 GBq 
   Prop collimated 
Cs-137 21°2354.90 65° 42 09. 00                 0.25 GBq 
   Uncertain 
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Figure 2. A low-energy window showing both Co-60 and I-131 detections. The red point 
in the upper left corner is an open top of a hill.  
All the A1 sources were found and identified correctly, with one extra Cs-137 source being 
reported as not absolutely certain. 
Area A2 
Found sources 
Cs-137 21°3633.00 65°4622.80 1 GBq 
Cs-137 21°3545.51 65°4426.39 0.5 GBq 
 
131I
60Co
60Co
60Co
137Cs
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Figure 3. The sources within the area were somewhat uncertain. The upper source was 
found outside the area. It could also have been scattered radiation due to the hill that was 
being approached. The lower identified point close to the detection limit. 
 
Five A2 sources were missed, one Mo-99 source being found and reported as Cs-137. 
Area A3  
Found sources: 
Co-60 65°5028.61 21°3826.16 2.5 GBq 
- 65°5133.12 21°3919.0  
137Cs
137Cs
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Fortress, added for car teams for further checking 
 
Figure 4. Co-60 map of the area, with one clear source visible. The fortress on the top of 
the hill produced a higher count rate. There may have been a source inside the building or 
the count rate may have been higher due to the K-40 found in the concrete. 
 
An A3 Co-60 source was correctly found, and a bunker was checked as a possible hidden 
source. 
Area A4 
Found sources: 
Ir-192 65°5430.39 21°3123.16 2.7 GBq 
Co-60 65°5421.31 21°3226.16 0.3 GBq 
Cs-137 65°5430.39 21°3301.44 0.8 GBq 
Cs-137 65°5310.75 21°3154.40 0.5 GBq  
Apparent activity, prob. collimated 
60Co
Fortress
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Figure 5. A Co-60 map of the area, with one clear source being visible.  
60Co
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Figure 6. Total counts for area 4. One Ir-192 source is clearly visible.  
Four A4 sources were found and identified correctly. 
Area A5 
Found sources: 
Co-60 65°5334.79 21°2511.10 2 GBq   
Ir-192 65°5455.94 21°2626.70 2.9 GBq  
- 65°5342.86 21°2639.30 Uncertain, added for  
  car teams for further  
  checking 
 
192Ir
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Figure 7. Total counts found in area 5. Two strong sources were clearly visible, one 
additional high count, a hot spot, was added for further inspection by the car teams. The 
flight lines were selected according to visual navigation. 
Three A5 sources were found, and two were identified correctly. 
60Co
Source
192Ir
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Figure. 8. The results of the measurements and the flight path can be plotted on the map in 
real time when computers are connected by the PC network. This map was produced after 
the measurements had been made. 
 
Conclusions 
The good spectral quality of the rather small detectors allowed most of the hidden sources 
to be found using the advanced post-processing technique. Altogether 13 of the 23 hidden 
sources were revealed. 
Acronyms 
Airborne radiation measurements, for locating lost point sources. 
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The German AGS team (DEA) 
Airborne measurements of hidden radioactive sources 
C. Strobl*, M. Thomas*, I. Winkelmann* 
*Federal Office for Radiation Protection, 10318 Berlin, Germany 
 
The German aerogamma team of the Federal Office for Radiation Protection (BfS) and the 
Federal Border Police (BGS) participated in the Barents Rescue Exercise 2001 in Boden 
(Sweden). We particularly took part in the Gamma Search Cell which was integrated 
within the Joint Field Exercises. The aims of the airborne measurements were the 
localization and mapping of artificial sources and the determination of their activities.  
We used a high purity germanium-semiconductor detector with a relative efficiency of 
50 % and a 12 l NaI(Tl)-detector array for our measurements. Both detectors measured 
simultaneously. Gamma-ray spectra were recorded every two seconds with the NaI(Tl)-
spectrometer and every ten seconds with the HPGe-spectrometer. 
Due to the bad weather conditions we could only fly over three measurement areas and the 
test area. A 137Cs-source and a 60Co-source were positioned within the test area, which 
enabled to check the calibration of the measurement systems. 
 
In the test area we focused our interest on two aspects: 
On the one hand the laboratory calibration of the two detector systems for the 
radionuclides 137Cs and 60Co should be verified. Therefore the two sources were overflown 
in a direct flight path (trajectory a). On the other hand the flight regime with flight paths of 
100 m distance and a flight altitude between 60 m and 100 m should be practiced 
(trajectory b). The trajectories of the two flight regimes and the locations of the 137Cs- and 
60Co-sources are shown in Figure 1. Each section of trajectory b is numbered. 
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Figure 1: Trajectories of the two flight regimes in area A6 
and the locations of the 137Cs- and 60Co-sources. 
 
In Figure 2 the net count rates of the 137Cs window (600  720 keV) and 60Co window 
(1050 1400 keV) determined with the NaI(Tl)-detector array are plotted. For the 
calculation of the net count rates in the above mentioned windows we used the stripping 
coefficients which were determined from measurements of a set of calibration pads doped 
with potassium, uranium series and thorium series activities. Further the net count rates 
were normalized to a flight altitude of 100 m. 
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Figure 2: Net count rates of 137Cs and 60Co along trajectory a. The Greek numbers 
indicate the position along the flight path (Figure 1). 
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Within the 137Cs window a small peak is identifiable when we overflew the 60Co source. 
This peak is caused by the incomplete stripping of the 60Co fraction within the 137Cs 
window. To solve this problem further mathematical operations will be done. 
 
As both sources have not been shielded the activities can be calculated by the equation (1):  
 
)h(
E
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tp
h4NA ⋅µ
γ ⋅ε⋅
⋅π⋅⋅
=   
 
with 
A: activity of the source [Bq] 
N: counts of gamma rays detected per second  
h: flying altitude [m] 
pγ: emission probability of the gamma ray energies being considered  
εE: detector response of the gamma ray energies being considered [m2] 
µL: mass attenuation coefficient in air of the gamma ray energies being considered [m-1] 
t: time [s] 
 
Using Equation (1) and the maximum count rates shown in Figure 2, the activity of the 
137Cs-source is calculated to be 2.7 ± 0.5 GBq and the activity of the 60Co-source to be 
5.00 ± 0.3 GBq. These values are in very good agreement with the activities 
(2.8 GBq (137Cs), 5.0 GBq (60Co)) published by the organizer.  
In a second flight above the test area (trajectory b) this field was overflown with parallel 
flight paths and a distance between them of about 100 m. The 60Co-source was identified 
on the flight sections 2, 3, 4 and 5 and the 137Cs-source was identified on the flight sections 
8 and 9 (Figure 3). The calculated activities of both sources are equal to the values 
mentioned above.  
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Figure 3: Net count rates of 137Cs and 60Co along trajectory b. The numbers indicate 
the different flight sections, which are presented in Figure 1. 
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Additionally to the evaluation of the NaI(Tl) spectra the HPGe spectra gave us the 
possibility to clearly identify individual radioactive nuclides. In Figure 4 the spectra I, IV 
and VI recorded by the HPGe-detector along trajectory a are shown. Spectrum 1 shows the 
background situation without any radioactive sources. In contrast, spectrum IV was 
measured near to the 137Cs-source and spectrum VI near to the 60Co-source. 
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Figure 4: 3 selected HPGe-spectra 
along the trajectory a. 
 
Based on this perception from the test field, it was clearly shown that the calibration 
factors are correct and the chosen flight regime was usable for the search of radioactive 
sources. Nevertheless we tested different flight regimes at other measurement fields to find 
out the best way to overfly a certain area. Two flight regimes are shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5: Two flight regimes (trajectories), which guarantee a distance of 100 m between 
different flight sections. 
 
For the presentation of our results from the measurement areas we show as an example 
area A4. Two 60Co sources, four 137Cs sources and a 192Ir source were positioned. The 
locations of the sources and the flight regime are shown in Figure 6. 
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Figure 6: Trajectory of the flight regime in area A4 and the 
locations of the 137Cs-, 60Co- and 192Ir-sources. 
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In the data evaluation we first calculated the net count rates within the 60Co window along 
the trajectory of this flight. As presented in Figure 7 a 60Co-source was overflown during 
the flight section 6, whereas in the flight sections nearby (16,17) no increased 60Co net 
count rates were detected. 
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Figure 7: Net count rates of 60Co along the flight 
path. The numbers indicate the different flight 
sections, which are presented in Figure 6. 
 
The profile of the 137Cs net count rates along the trajectory is plotted in Figure 8. Here, 
several regions with increased net count rates could be identified. A detailed data analysis 
showed that for example the higher net count rates during flight section 6 can occur due to 
the influence of 60Co as also seen in the test flight area. Increased net count rates in flight 
sections 10, 11, 12 and 13 which were detected simultaneously in the low energy (250 
500 keV) spectrum could be related to the radionuclide 192Ir. Thereby the increased count 
rates in the 137Cs window are caused by Iridium peaks at 604 keV (8.2 %) and 612 keV 
(5.3 %). The dominant peaks of 192Ir lie at 296 keV (29.6 %), 308 keV (30.7 %), 316 keV 
(82.7 %) and 468 keV (47 %) and can be detected in the low energy window. As shown in 
Figures 7, 8 and 9 the 137Cs(1)-sources are measured in flight sections 4 and 19, the 
137Cs(2)-source is detected in flight section 7, the 60Co-source is measured in flight section 
6 and the 192Ir source is found in flight sections 10, 11, 12 and 13. Only the 137Cs(3)-source 
could not be located. 
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Figure 8: Net count rates of 137Cs along the flight path. 
The numbers indicate the different flight sections, 
which are presented in Figure 6. 
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Figure 9: Net count rates of 192Ir along the flight path. 
The numbers indicate the different flight sections, 
which are presented in Figure 6. 
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Mapping of natural radionuclides 
In addition to the identification and determination of the activities of the radioactive 
sources within the areas A2, A3 and A4 we calculated the specific activities of the natural 
radionuclides and the dose rates. The dose rate in nSv/h of the areas A2, A3 and A4 are 
plotted in Figure 10. As expected the dose rates over sea are clearly lower than over land.  
 
A2 A3 
                           
 
A4 
 
Figure 10: Measured profiles of the dose rates in the areas A2, A3 and A4. 
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Conclusion 
As a result we can conclude that the exercise Barents Rescue 2001 contributes in an 
important way to assure the quality of the airborne measurements from the BfS and BGS. 
Furthermore it documented the effectiveness of the aerogamma spectrometry for the search 
of hidden radioactive sources. This exercise served to optimize the measurement systems 
and the data evaluation in future. 
  104 
  105 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Norway, team NOC 
  106 
  107 
Norwegian Team (NOC) 
Thor Engøy*, Maj. Lars Antonsen†, Maj. Kjetil Vik, Capt. Vebjørn Karlsen, 
Capt. Håkon Kristensen, Lt. Torbjørn Enger, Lt. Jan Ivar Johansen, 
2. Lt. Kai Henning Bjøreng, Raymond Andreassen. 
 
Equipment 
• Airborne platform: Sea King MK-43B helicopter belonging to the Royal 
Norwegian Air Force, primary purpose search and rescue  
• Detector assembly: Exploranium GPX 1024 with 4 detectors each consisting of a 4 
l NaI (Th) crystal and a photomultiplier tube. 
• Data collection hardware: Exploranium GR820 for automatic detector gain control 
and multichannel analysis (256 channels) 
• Navigation data collection: Garmin 12XL handhelp GPS with external antenna and 
serial interface 
• Computer: Dell Latitude Cpt laptop computer with extra serial port 
• Data collection software: Geological Survey of Norway (NGU) Mobile Gamma-
Radiation Monitoring program 
• Data replay software: NGU Mobile Gamma Radiation Measurement Replay 
program (example of run given in Figure 1) 
Methods 
Flying height: 60 m; flying speed: 50 knots; line spacing: 200 m. 
Sampling time: 1 s. 
Detector position: inside plywood box, strapped to the floor inside the helicopter, on the 
left hand side and approximately in the length wise middle, above filled fuel tanks. 
Search method: start in one corner of rectangular search area and perform searches parallel 
to the longest side separated by 200 m and record manual hits; upon completion of area 
scan, perform a closer positioning / data collection of specific hits. 
Data analysis 
Source localization: sources were located by moving the helicopter in four directions 
relative to early position; possible buildings or platforms that could house the sources were 
noted. 
Source identification: sources were identified by visual inspection of spectra, comparing 
them with spectra of expected industrial sources (Cs-137, Ir-192, Co-60).  
                                                 
* Norwegian Defence Research Establishment, P.O.Box 25, NO-2027 Kjeller, Norway, email: 
thor.engoy@ffi.no 
 DEFCOMNON, NAE 
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Source strength estimation was not attempted. Total count data during hover over sources 
were reported. 
 
Figure 1: Post search replay of data using software developed by the Geological Survey of 
Norway.  Shown is the stacked spectra display where a Co-60 source is identified on the 
fly. 
Results 
A1: 
Co-60 at NE Stortjärnen, S Stortjärnen and W Risheden found. 
I-131 at E Rishedsmyran not found during search. Postprocessing of data not meaningful 
due to garbled navigational data. 
A2: 
Not searched 
A3: 
Co-60 at ENE Ågärden found 
A4: 
Search incomplete (and without instrument and source identification support personnel) 
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A5: 
Ir-192 at E Svenskberget found; Co-60 and Cs-137 at W Kusträsket found. Location of all 
sources shifted north. Probable cause of discrepancy: decimal fraction of minutes reported 
as opposed to minutes and seconds expected by recording group 
Co-60 at NNW Kusträsket not found during search.  
 
The following trial was not reported: During one of the above searches a signal was 
detected in the vicinity of a moving car. It was attempted to check whether the signal came 
from the car.  However, a quick pass along the road could not locate the car and normal 
search pattern was resumed.  
Conclusions 
Exercise goals 
The Norwegian gamma search teams (NOA, NOB, NOC) had the following goals for the 
exercise: 
• Pilot test instrument with NGU data collection and replay software onboard Royal 
Norwegian Air Force helicopters 
• Train crews with no prior experience in airborne gamma search in operation of the 
instrumentation; train support personnel 
• Collect, interpret (source identify) and report data to Gamma Search Cell, including 
processed data (doserate) in NKS-format 
• Evaluate and compare various helicopter platforms for ease of use of the 
instrumentation 
Only Sea King MK-43B helicopter (NOC) received preliminary acceptance for operating 
the instrumentation onboard. This impacted the training of other crews directly and the 
comparison between platforms.  
All other goals and expectations exceeded:   
• Various fixes were made during the exercise. Instrument stabilization was greatly 
improved after signal from defective detector was discarded. Subsequently the 
instrumentation package could be deployed at 10 minutes notice. Blown fuses due 
to erroneous polarity in ground power supply were changed.  Two bug fixes to a 
PC program performing GPS data conversion were made. During playback of data 
it became evident that the energy calibration was slightly altered after hover over 
Co-60 source.  To improve K-40 stabilisation, 500 g of Seltin salt was brought 
onboard during search. 
• The helicopter crew became very capable in the course of the exercise in 
manoeuvring and identifying certain sources directly online. 
• Sources were identified from all searched areas. With aid from GSC one NKS-
formatted file was mapped during a pre-exercise search. Four files were handed in 
during the exercise, two of which were garbled. 
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Possible improvements: gains 
• Service poorly functioning detector: increased signal to noise ratio (4 detectors 
instead of 3) 
• Incorporate navigational data collection (in decimal fraction minutes) into gamma 
monitoring software: fewer things to go wrong 
• Calibrate detector for specific platform and detector placement: allow estimate of 
source strength 
• Acquire post processing capability to compare to / search for known sources from 
library: quicker identification of a wider set of sources 
• Acquire post processing capability of results mapping: improved location of 
sources  
• One-button start-up of data collection: less risk of data loss due to operator error 
Acronyms 
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Russian Team (RUA) 
Nikolai Drozdov, Emercom 
 
Team members 
Helicopter commander  1 
Engineer - dosimetrist - 2 
Equipment 
Air magnetometer AeroMaster 
Air gamma-spectrometer Urtec PEI GPS 
Air gamma-survey set 
On-board computer 
Pilot indicator  
Accumulator 
Charging device 
Methods 
Detection of radionuclides using the spectrometric method. Flight altitude  70-80 m. 
Flight speed  110-120 km/h. 
Data analysis 
Defined in real time. 
Results 
7 ionising radiation sources were found.  
Conclusions 
We could not fully demonstrate our technical facilities 
Limited number of flights 
Unfavourable weather conditions 
Bad radio communication with personnel at collection and analysis of data location 
Problems using the reporting forms issued by REAC 
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Swedish Team (SEA) 
Sören Byström 
Peter Hagthorpe 
Anders H. Lindén 
Ari Tryggvason 
Mats Wedmark 
Ulf Adolfsson (Aircraft Company) 
Hardy Häggman (Aircraft Company) 
 
Equipment 
Fixed Wing Aircraft. Shrike Commander 500S. 
Equipment used is part of standard equipment for airborne geophysical measurement. 
Exploranium GR820 with 16.8 litres downward and 4.2 upward looking NaI detector. 
256 channels data 12.5 keV. 
Sampling time 1 second. 
Positioning system DGPS. Altitude above ground measured with radar Altimeter. 
Methods 
Nominal altitude above ground 60 meter. 
Aircraft speed 250 km/h (70 m/s)  
Line spacing 100 meter. 
Detector is mounted in luggage room in aircraft. Upward looking detector is somewhat 
shielded of fueltank. 
No source recognition on line in aircraft. 
Search method: Straight lines over the area on different heights. Due to time limits (50 
minutes) only one altitude used. 
Data analysis 
Two different methods used. 
Method 1 
• Selectable ratios between low part (<1.4 MeV) and high part (>1.4 MeV) of spectra. 
• Thorium, Uranium and Potassium are reduced from channel data, with the assumption 
that there is no manmade influence above 1.4 MeV. Selectable windows to show parts 
of remaining data. 
• Natural Dosrate and manmade Dosrate automatically calculated. 
• Alert levels that warn if any ratio, Manmade window, Dosrate etc is outside given 
limits. 
• Nuclide strength. A rough figure form manmade dosrate in microGy/h. 
  118 
Method 2 
Based on SVD, Potassium, Uranium and Thorium are reduced from data, or rather all data 
that are not point sources are reduced. 
Selectable windows to show parts of remaining data. 
 
Results 
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The results for Swedish team SEA 
Area 1. Sources reported after one hour after landing was correct. All sources were 
found and correct nuclide was reported.  
Area 2. Co-ordinates for sources reported after one hour after landing was correct. 
One source was found. Wrong nuclide was reported (Cs-134 instead of MO-99) 
Area 3. Sources reported after one hour after landing was correct. All sources were 
found and correct nuclide reported. 
The work carried out the following days indicated a few more sources (in the region of 
acceptable signal to noise ratio). 
Conclusions 
Line spacing 100 meters and an altitude of 60 meters was used. 
In a real situation, Fixed wing aircraft probably has been used for a wider search and 
Helicopters/Cars for more detailed search. If so an altitude between 100 to 150 meter and a 
line spacing of perhaps 200 meters in a first search have been a reasonable compromise. 
As the difficult task is to select correct hotspots form data where signal to noise ratio is 
low, future efforts will be focused on that. 
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The Swedish AGS team (SEB) 
Simon Karlsson, Hans Mellander 
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority 
   
Equipment 
At SSI there is no system dedicated for airborne measurements at present and therefore the 
exercise was an excellent opportunity to develop and test a system for airborne gamma 
spectrometry and also to test the co-operation with the Swedish armed forces. The 
installation was made together with the Swedish Defence Research Agency (team SEC) 
and the Swedish Defence Material Administration, FMV. Two Swedish helicopter 9 or 
MBB BO 105 was used for the installations.  
 
 
Figure 1.   The helicopter used by team SEB was of the type MBB BO 105. 
 
The helicopter was equipped with systems available at our laboratory. The detectors are 
normally used for ground-based measurements so they are not optimised for AGS 
measurements.  The two systems consisted of the following: 
A HPGE-system containing: 
• 70 % HPGe detector from EG&G Ortec 
• Dart Multichannel analyser from EG&G Ortec 
• SveeEight GPS from Trimble 
• Latitude C800 from Dell 
A NaI-system containing: 
• 5x 5 NaI detector (1,6 litres) 
• GDM 40 RPS from Gammadata 
• Latitude C800 from Dell 
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The intension was to use the NaI system to find and quantify the sources while the HPGe 
system mainly was aimed for identification purposes. They were placed in the rear end of 
the helicopter to get the best possible field of view while measuring. The problem with the 
helicopter type used is that the fuel tanks are situated underneath the floor resulting in a 
high and variable attenuation of the incoming photons. Even though it would have been 
preferred we didnt have the time or possibility to mount the detectors externally. 
   
Figure 2. The two detectors were placed in the rear end of the helicopter. The  
 measurements were controlled by two operators with laptops.  
 
All equipment was installed on two aluminium plates, one for the detectors and one for the 
electronics. Power was taken from the helicopter and no internal batteries were used in the 
systems. The two GPS receivers were fed with a signal from an antenna placed in the front 
window of the helicopter. 
Methods 
The methods used for the measurements were developed during discussions before the 
exercise and during the pre-exercise test flights. The fact that an area of 2 x 5 km was to be 
measured within 50 minutes gave rise to the question whether covering the whole area was 
more important than to follow up indications of sources in more detail. It was decided that 
the whole area should be covered since the car teams were supposed to follow up the 
indications.  
The pre-exercise test flights were to a large extent dedicated to co-operation with the 
pilots, navigation and testing the speed needed to cover the area within the time limit. It 
was finally decided to fly at a speed of around 80 knots and to use 100 meter line spacing. 
To avoid too sharp turns the whole area was flown with two hundred meter line spacing at 
first and then this was repeated a second time with one hundred meters displacement of the 
flight lines. By the use of this method the whole area could at least be sparsely covered 
even if time- consuming problems arose during the measurement. A few times there was a 
couple of minutes left for further investigation after covering the whole area. That time 
was used to check places where a source was suspected or to check whether places where a 
large response had been obtained concealed more than one nuclide. The HPGe-detector 
proved useful in these situations. During all measurements the flight height was held to the 
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minimum limit of sixty meters (200 feet) from the radar altitude meter in the helicopter. 
The integration time used was two seconds for both systems. 
Data analysis 
Since it wasnt known what nuclides the hidden sources consisted of it was first discussed 
to use a peak search method on the collected spectra to be able to find sources of any 
energy. With good statistics this could have been a useful method, at least for the HPGe-
system. Since the expected count rate was too low it was instead decided to use windows 
to cover suspected nuclides while the total count rate and some quotients between low and 
high energy were used for nuclides not accounted for. In co-operation with Thomas Hjerpe 
from the University of Lund we also implemented a moving background method where 
the average window count rate for the latest x spectra was compared with the y spectra 
before them.  
The software normally used at SSI for mapping of extended sources like fallout or natural 
radiation were not optimised for the search of point sources. A lot of effort was put into 
modification of existing software and construction of new software during the months 
before the exercise. The Swedish measurement teams from SSI and FOI were also 
reinforced by Benno Bucher from Switzerland. The software developed by him and Hans 
Mellander was used with the HPGe-system during the flights. The different software 
included digital maps with preset flight lines, navigation support, time plots of all 
calculated parameters and rainbow spectra. Alarm levels could be set to each of the 
parameters. The NaI-system used a peak search method applied to the calculated 
parameters and a scrollbar could be used to continuously optimise the colour scale in the 
plots of all parameters. These two functions proved to be very efficient.  
With the time limit of 1 hour for delivery of the SIR-documents there was no time for 
detailed analyses of the data. During the flight we took notes of places where sources were 
found or suspected. After landing the data from both systems was compared by checking 
one flight line at a time for suspected sources. The SIR-documents together with NKS-files 
with total counts were delivered within one hour (almost) to REAC. A few times the 
delivered data was updated after a more detailed analysis. The locations of the sources 
were also delivered to the two Swedish car teams SEK and SEL for follow up of our 
indications the next day. 
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          Figure 3.   The analysis and visualisation software used for the NaI-system 
                            showing a measurement in area A4. 
 
 
                       Figure 4.   The visualisation software used for the HPGe-system 
                                         showing a measurement made in area A5. 
Results 
The tables below show the reported sources from team SEB together with the true sources 
and their locations. In most cases we did not try to estimate source activity but sometimes 
CPS was reported as an indication to the strength of the source.  
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Table 1.   Area A1 – All sources were found and one more was reported as suspected. 
Reported 
source 
Reported 
location 
Comment True source /
Source code 
True 
location 
Activity 
(GBq) 
Co-60 1755973 
7298118 
Source clearly seen with both 
systems. 
Co-60 / 
1:1 
1756005 
7298134 
5 
I-131 1755976 
7299189 
Source clearly seen with both 
systems. 
I-131 / 
1:2 
1756005 
7299224 
9.25 
Co-60 1756001 
7299850 
Source clearly seen with both 
systems. 
Co-60 / 
1:3 
1755956 
7299830 
5 
Co-60 1755890 
7299810 
The same source was by 
mistake reported for two 
adjacent flight lines 
 
- 
 
- 
 
- 
Co-60 1756700 
7300300 
Source clearly seen with both 
systems. 
Co-60 / 
1:4 
1756747 
7300334 
5 
Cs-137 1755316 
7299429 
Possible source seen with NaI 
but nothing seen with HPGe. 
No source - - 
Comment: After area 1 was covered with flight lines we had a few spare minutes to hover 
over source 1:1 and 1:3 to check for other nuclides than Co-60. No additional sources were 
found. 
Table 2.   Area A2 – No sources were found in this area. We started to get worried here! 
Reported 
source 
Reported 
location 
Comment True source / 
Source code 
True 
location 
Activity 
(GBq) 
- - No source found. Co-60 / 
2:1 
1764029 
7307246 
5 
- - No source found. Co-60 / 
2:2 
1764048 
7307266 
5 
- - No source found. Mo-99 / 
2:3 
1764844 
7307031 
3.1 
- - No source found. Mo-99 / 
2:4 
1765350 
7305451 
18 
- - No source found. Cs-137 / 
2:5-1 
1763466 
7306095 
3 x 0.5 
- - No source found. Co-60 / 
2:5-2 
1763466 
7306095 
3 x 0.02 
Table 3.   Area A3 – The Co-60 source was easily found. 
Reported 
source 
Reported 
location 
Comment True source / 
Source code 
True 
location 
Activity 
(GBq) 
Co-60 1766244 
7316818 
Large response on both 
HPGe and the NaI system. 
Co-60 
3:1 
1766304 
7316848 
4 x 5 
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Comment: At first we reported two additional sources in area A3 but those reports were 
cancelled after further analyses in the same evening. 
Table 4.   Area A4 – Three (or five) out of seven sources was found.  
Reported 
source 
Reported 
location 
Comment True source / 
Source code 
True 
location 
Activity 
(GBq) 
- - No source found. Cs-137 
4:1 
1760923 
7321390 
0.4 
- - No source found. Cs-137 
4:2 
1760488 
7323895 
2.5 
Ir-192 1760303 
7323910 
10 times background (cps). Ir-192 
4:3 
1760310 
7323933 
13 
- - Possibly seen together with 
the Co-60 source below. 
Co-60 
4:4 
1761137 
7323702 
5 
Co-60 1761120 
7323767 
6 times background (cps). Co-60 
4:5 
1761117 
7323744 
5 
Cs-137 1761492 
7324048 
3 times background (cps). Cs-137 
4:6 
1761442 
7323932 
1.3 
- - Possibly seen together with 
the Cs-137 source above. 
Cs-137 
4:7 
1761559 
7323941 
1.9 
Comment: An additional Cs-137 source was reported at first but it was cancelled after 
further analyses. A few spare minutes after covering the area was used for hovering over 
the Ir-192 source. We suspected a Cs-137 source there but it couldnt be found. 
Table 5.     Area A5 – All sources were found even though source 5:1 was reported as Cs-
137 instead of Co-60. 
Reported 
source 
Reported 
location 
Comment True source / 
Source code 
True 
location 
Activity 
(GBq) 
Cs-137 1756884 
7322015 
Reported as a suspected, 
very weak source. 
Co-60 / 
5:1 
1756869 
7322034 
40 
Cs-137 1755704 
7321628 
Reported in the same place 
as the Co-60 source below. 
Cs-137 / 
5:2 
1755733 
7321627 
2.6 
Co-60 1755704 
7321628 
10 times background (cps). Co-60 / 
5:3 
1755750 
7321686 
2 x 5 
Cs-137 1755892 
7322989 
Suspected source, small 
response 
Cs-137 / 
5:4 
Moving 1.9 
Cs-137 1755977 
7322600 
Weak source but clearly 
seen. 
Cs-137 / 
5:4 
Moving 1.9 
Ir-192 1756447 
7324289 
Seen on several flight lines. 
40 times background (cps). 
Ir-192 / 
5:5 
1756402 
7324293 
46 
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Comment: The vehicle with the moving Cs-137 source was seen during the flight and it 
was suspected to conceal a source of some kind. Instead of following the car we continued 
on the flight lines as before.  
Conclusions 
Taking into consideration the small and internally mounted NaI-detector the results are 
satisfactory. Since the sources were shielded in many different directions a more detailed 
evaluation of the system sensitivities is difficult to make but a larger NaI-detector is 
probably necessary to find sources of lower activity than ~1 GBq and the same accounts 
for quantification of extended sources. The HPGe detector worked good as a complement 
to the NaI but could also have been externally mounted for better response to low energy 
sources. 
From an operational point of view everything worked very well except for some small 
problems with the GPS and some problems with vibrations that mostly occurred while 
turning the helicopter. The pilots were very professional and the co-operation with them 
and the other helicopter staff worked very well. The support from the Swedish Defence 
Material Administration during the exercise days was great. 
The exercise delivered a unique possibility to test the capability of the participating teams 
in finding lost sources. It was very interesting to take part in the measurements and team 
SEB had the opportunity to fly in all five areas. Because of the very tight schedule and the 
misty mornings this wasnt possible for all teams. With the large efforts to collect all 
sources, position them in the terrain and handle them it was a pity that all teams couldnt 
fly in all areas and also that there wasnt more time for investigation in each area. 
All the work needed to keep the systems working, perform the measurements and analyse 
the data made it almost impossible to visit and follow other parts of the exercise or to 
socialise with other teams to any larger extent. This was made even worse by the fact that 
the teams were competing against each other. Competition is fun but it could also have 
been very interesting to train co-operation with teams from other countries. 
Acronyms 
SSI  Swedish Radiation Protection Authority 
FOI  Swedish Defence Research Agency 
FMV - Swedish Defence Material Administration 
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Swedish AGS Team (SEC) 
Kenneth Lidström and Göran Ågren 
FOI NBC Defence 
 
Equipment 
The measuring unit was based on two separate systems, one being a 4-L NaI-detector and 
the other a 50% (relative a 3x3 NaI) HPGe detector. The NaI system contained a GDM 
40 (Gammadata Burklint AB) portable unit, which included MCA, amplifier, high voltage 
supply, data logger and GPS. For visualization and data storage, a 1 GHz notebook was 
connected and the software was RPS (made by SSI).  
The HPGe system was equipped with a DART (Ortec) unit, which contained MCA, 
amplifier and high voltage supply. This system was also equipped with the same type of 
computer as the previous system. For the positioning data a separate GPS unit was 
connected to the serial port of this computer. The software for this system was also 
developed by SSI and named DART. The two systems were completely independent 
except for the GPS antenna. 
 
Figure 1. The picture is taken from the rear side of the helicopter. The red box on the left 
is the 4-L NaI detector and to the right is the 50% HPGe detector.  
 
All necessary equipment except the computers were mounted on aluminum plates which 
were placed on the rear floor inside the military helicopter model 9. Three seats were 
remained, one for the pilot and the other two for the operators of the systems. The 
detectors were both facing backwards to decrease the shielding effects of the fuel tanks 
which are mounted under the floor of the helicopter. 
  136 
 
Figure 2. The helicopter (hkp-9) that team SEC used during the Barents Rescue exercise. 
missions. 
 
Methods 
According to the exercise regulations, the time limit in each of the 2x5 km areas was 50 
minutes. The team chose to use a flight pattern of 20 x 5 km with 100 meter between the 
flight lines. We used the minimum flight height of 60 meter.  
The conditions above gave a calculated minimum velocity of 150 km/h to cover the whole 
area. The velocity during the missions was approximately 80 knots (~150 km/h) in air 
speed, which sometimes needed to be corrected for the influence of wind speed. The 
sampling time for each spectrum was set to 2 seconds. For activity calculations the systems 
were calibrated against reference sources provided at the beginning of the exercise.  
The strategy behind the configuration of the measurement unit was to use the NaI-system 
for reconnaissance purposes and when a source was detected to use the HPGe-system. The 
latter was meant do be done with the helicopter hovering over the source to perform a 
longer sampling time for a more specified nuclide measurement. Due to the time 
constraint, this strategy was only applied two times. The results were mainly achieved with 
the NaI-system.  
Data analysis 
Several energy-windows were set in the systems to cover key-lines (one of the largest 
photo peaks) from I-131, Ir-192, Cs-137, Co-60 and the natural K-40, Th-232 and U-238 
chains. Some of these were also presented in relationships with others (i.e man-made as 
ratios of natural). These results were presented live on screen and also logged into separate 
files in combination with position data. For the NaI system with the limited resolution, 
pulses from a nuclide can appear in other energy windows. This interference was not 
considered. 
Results 
The results are described as a comparison to the data given by the exercise staff of real 
location and activity of the placed sources. These are given for each area as tables (see 
below). The column named source activity describes the declared activity of the source and 
reported activity the activity measured by the team. The column with the header difference 
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describes the distance in meter between the location estimated of the team and the given 
location given by the exercise staff.  
Table 1. Reported results from area A1. Three sources were reported from team SEC 
according to SIR-documents.  
N
U
C
LI
D
E 
SO
U
R
C
E 
A
C
TI
V
IT
Y
 
[G
B
q]
 
C
O
D
E 
R
EP
O
R
TE
D
 
A
C
TI
V
IT
Y
 
[G
B
q]
 
D
IF
FE
R
EN
C
E 
 
[m
] 
PL
A
C
ED
 
C
O
M
M
EN
TS
 
Co-60 5 1:01 0.5 87 
In wooden cage in gravel 
pit, shielded upwards with 
concrete blocks  
I-131 9.25 1:02 
Not 
detected  
In shed, collimated with 
lead bricks upwards and to 
the W 
No trace 
 of I-131 
Co-60 5 1:03 0.5 54 
In wooden cage at the end 
of the road  
Co-60 5 1:04 1.0 62 
In wooden cage on the 
south side of the closed 
road  
 
Table 2. Reported results from area A2. Two sources were reported from team SEC 
according to SIR-documents. One of these was later cancelled.  
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Co-60 5 2:01 0.1 402 
Inside the round concrete 
bunker False 
Co-60 5 2:02 0.1 377 
Inside the concrete bunker, 
collimated obliquely 
upwards False 
Mo-99 3.1 2:03 
Not 
detected  Inside tracked vehicle cart  
Mo-99 18 2:04 
Not 
detected  In the house on the attic  
Cs-137 3x0.5 2:5-1 
Not 
detected  
Inside tracked vehicle cart, 
level guards, directed 
upwards  
Co-60 3x0.02 2:5-2 
Not 
detected  
Inside tracked vehicle cart, 
level guards, directed SW  
Am-241 0.0004 2:06 
Not 
detected  
In cart, on the inside the 
hood, about 1.5 m above 
ground  
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Table 3. Reported results from area A3. One source was reported from team SEC 
according to SIR-documents.  
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Co-60 20 3:01 1.0 24 
In storehouse 36, 
side shielded with 
lots of concrete 
blocks 
 
Table 4. Reported results from area A4. Four sources were reported from team SEC 
according to SIR-documents.  
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Cs-137 0.4 4:01 
Not 
detected  
In red shed, in lead 
container, side 
shielded  
Cs-137 2.5 4:02 3.4/1.5 
215/ 
307 
In "birdhouse". 
Shielded with a lead 
brick upwards 
Two reported 
locations. Long dist. 
Interference from  
Ir-192 rise activity 
estimation 
Ir-192 13 4:03 8.0 97 
Radiographic source 
in a tree  
Co-60 5 4:04 0.5 61 
In concrete fire 
trench, covered with 
steel plate and sand  
Co-60 5 4:05 0.5 18 
In concrete fire 
trench, covered with 
steel plate and sand  
Cs-137 1.3 4:06 2.7 89 
In tracked vehicle 
cart, shielded 
upwards with 
concrete blocks  
Cs-137 1.9 4:07 2.7 83 
In tracked vehicle 
cart, side shielded 
with transport 
contain.  
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Table 5. Reported results from area A5. Three sources were reported from team SEC 
according to SIR-documents.  
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Co-60 40 5:01 
Not 
detected  
Radiographic source in 
drainage drum under 
the road 
Cs-137 2,6 5:02 6.7 33 
In red shed, no 
shielding 
Co-60 2x5 5:03 5.3 54 
In wooden cage, no 
shielding 
Cs-137 1.9 5:04 
Not 
detected  
In car cart moving 
along the roads, 
shielded to all sides 
Ir-192 46 5:05 10.0 64 
Radiographic source 
below boulder 
 
Conclusion 
This was our first experience to practice reconnaissance from helicopter. The first 
challenge was to install the equipment in the helicopter and receive a flight permission for 
the complete unit. The physical environment in a helicopter is not ideal in aspects of space, 
vibrations and attenuating material. In this set-up the main problem was the fuel tank in the 
floor below the disposable area.  
The second challenge was to find a possible way to evaluate spectra with short sampling 
times (i.e. few pulses per channel) in real time.  
The third challenge was to survive in the limited space of the helicopter with the mind 
focused on a computer screen during sharp turns and sometimes also bumpy flights 
without vomiting.  
As a conclusion, the accomplished results from this exercise exceeded what we hade 
expected previous to the exercise. The increase in the peak resolution (FWHM) for the 
HPGe system was about 1.5 keV for 660 keV which can be accepted for these purposes but 
some work will be made to decrease the influence of the measurement platform. Another 
aspects is to construct a module that contains these systems and which easily can be 
installed on many different platforms (primarily in different car- or helicopter models). 
More work should also be made to develop methods for fast and reliable evaluations of the 
measurement data in real time.  
The lack of distinct peaks during the mission in area A2 created some suspected sources 
that we in the end generally classified as false. The suspicions were a consequence of the 
exercise arrangement, since the operators expected to find sources. These expectations 
probably decreased the threshold for the signal level that could be accepted as significant. 
In the real situation, it would be possible to reduce such false positives by longer 
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measurement times over suspicious locations. The problem can also be reduced by using 
more sophisticated methods for data analysis in real time.  
The covered distance per spectra, with the speed of 150 km/h, was approximately 80 meter 
and the distance between each flight line was 100 meter. This gave an uncertainty of at 
least ± 50 meter for the estimated location of each source. The reported location was also 
sometimes rounded off. 
In area A4, around source 4:02, two sources were reported. An explanation for this can 
probably be uncertainties in the positioning procedure. The activity estimation in at least 
one of these was also to high, probably influenced of the higher energy peaks from Ir-192.  
The conclusion of the results are that with this type of: 
- reconnaissance pattern  
- equipment configuration  
- flight height  
- velocity  
- configuration of the detected sources  
It is possible to locate a lost source within a radius of 100 meter or less.  
Overall: this exercise has been very helpful for further development of these techniques. 
Acronyms 
AGS Airborne gamma spectrometry 
FOI Swedish Defence Research Agency 
FWHM Full Width Half Maximum 
HPGe High purity germanium 
NaI Sodium Iodide 
SIR Source Identification Report 
SSI Swedish Radiation Protection Institute 
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Team reports, Car Gamma Search (CGS) 
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Austria, team ATK/ATL 
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Austrian Team (ATK/ATL) 
Wolfgang Fehringer, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Civil Protection School 
Andreas Polaschek, Gendarmerie Headquarter of Lower Austria 
 
Team members:  
Wolfgang Fehringer, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Civil Protection School 
Helmut Lackinger, Federal Ministry of the Interior, Civil Protection School 
Andreas Polaschek, Gendarmerie Headquarter of Lower Austria 
Alois Geyrhofer, Gendarmerie Headquarter of Lower Austria 
Gerd Schlager, Police Department of Salzburg 
Christian Ebner, Police Department of Salzburg 
Wohlgang Klösch, Austrian Research Centers Seiberdorf (ARCS)  
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Equipment 
Portable Air - Car Borne System 
 
 
Detection system: 
• Radiation measuring device SSM1. Time of integration: 5 seconds  
• External plastic-scintillator-probe or high-volume Geiger-Müller-probes (Gamma-
counter) 
Data acquisition and navigation system: 
• Rugged military laptop 
• Built-in modem and GPS with external antenna 
• Mobile power pack 
With the built-in modem we can transmit measuring and positioning data to headquarters. 
Advantages of the System: 
• Short installation time (10 min) 
• Simplified handling and data analysis (no experts are necessary) 
• Usable for car and helicopter operation 
• Online navigation with digital map  
• Unlimited operation time (depends on power pack) 
• Very rugged system (100% ready for duty) (10 systems are on duty in Austria) 
 
 147  
Methods 
Car-borne gamma search: 
• Driving speed: about 30 km/h 
• Detector position: inside the car as high as possible 
• Measurement: in cps 
• Two officers 
• Task for the car-borne team is also to mark and secure the dangerous zone (in Austrian: 
10 µSv/h) 
One officer takes the seat beneath the driver and holds the laptop on his knees. During the 
measurement the pilot can have a look on the screen, where  
• the actually position, 
• the track, 
• the compass-card and 
• the count-rate curve  
can be seen. 
Data analysis 
We have got three possibilities to analyse the measuring track: 
First a 1:1-overlay for each usable map with four variable count rate colours to produce a 
stepped radiation picture: 
• File name 
• Scale 
• Officer 
• Date and Time (UTC) 
• Height 
• Count rate of the background (starting point) 
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Analysis without digital map (car-borne gamma-search around the sarcophagus of Chernobyl) 
 
 
Analysis with digital map (like AGS, Team ATA) 
The second possibility to analyse is the count-rate curve with distance in km: 
Counts per second depend on distance (area A1) 
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(Chernobyl) 
 
The third analysis with the table consists of: 
• countrate  
• position data in WGS84-format and in Austria additional in our national format 
• both is saved each second 
Table evaluation (Chernobyl): 
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Results 
Area C1: 
2 of 5 sources have been detected by car (because it was not possible to go in the whole area 
with the car Ford Transit).  
Area C2: 
For this area we are not able to present any results because we did no measurements there 
Area C3: 
The only one source in this area has been detected by car  
Area C4: 
1 of 7 sources has been detected by car (because it was not possible to go in the whole area 
with the car Ford Transit).  
Area C7: 
For this area we are not able to present any results because we did no measurements there 
Conclusions 
During this exercise we got a lot of practise to take measurements in an area with a high and 
very different radioactive background. 
We met many nice and very helpful people who gave us assistance during this exercise. We 
really enjoyed our stay in Sweden. 
The main advantage of our system is the really short time for being ready to make 
measurements (about 10 minutes). Although we only can inform the headquarters about the 
difference to the count rate of the background it is a very useful and important information for 
urgent decision-finding in the field of radiation protection. 
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Denmark, team DKK 
 152  
 153  
Danish Team (DKK) 
Kirsten Brogaard Juul, DEMA  (Navigator) 
Geno Møller Pedersen, DEMA  (Driver) 
Helle Karina Aage, DTU  (System operator) 
 
Equipment 
The system used by the Danish team is of the same type as the ones used by the Baltic 
countries: 
• 4L NaI(Tl)-detector (16*4*4) 
• Exploranium GR320 spectrometer, 512 channels 
• Exploranium GR660 software. 
• DGPS. 
• Exploranium GR130 portable spectrometer 
Additional equipment: 
• Garmin portable GPS and compass 
Detector mounted on the roof at 220-cm height: back of the car, right side. 
Size of detector 10.16*10.16*40.64 cm3. Al-box of 1.5-mm thickness with 2-cm PUR foam. 
Detector encapsulation 0.25 mm stainless steel. 2s-measurements and stabilisation on 208Tl 
2615 keV. 
Methods 
Purpose / Strategy 
The purpose of the Barents Rescue exercise was defined from an Emergency Management 
Point of View: 
• Find as many sources as possible as quick as possible. 
• Try to recognise source type without spending too much time. 
• Calculation of source strength was of lesser importance. 
• Co-operation with Danish AGS team when possible. 
Search method 
The search method was developed during the exercise, as the DKK team was an 
inexperienced team that had not worked together before (second DK CGS team). The search 
during the first day (C7) did not go very well. Too much time was spent on minor roads and 
on roads in bad conditions. After the first day it was clear that it was impossible to cover more 
than 50-60 % of the search areas because of size and road conditions. 
It was decided to skip doubtful roads (the 2-wheel drive car could not cope with too difficult 
terrain) and minor roads without heavy track marks that could indicate transportation of a 
source / shielding material. Also the team navigator was on the lookout for suspiciously 
looking buildings or vehicles independent of the operator. 
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Driving speed 
For optimum performance a driving speed of 40-50 km/h was hoped for. This turned out not 
to be possible. The driving speed varied from 15 km/h to 50 km/h due to different types of 
road conditions. 
The first day in area C7 the driving speed on good roads upon leaving the area was up to 70-
80 km/h in order to leave the area on time.  
Data analysis 
On the road: source identification 
During the search the data were analysed with Exploranium GR660 software. While 
measuring it is possible to see colour plots (rainbow) of the spectra, the latest measured 2s-
spectrum and window count rates for selected channel windows. These functions each occupy 
a window and only one window can be seen at a time. It is possible to set up the system to 
show stripped window count rates, however, only a certain number of windows can be 
defined. Four energy windows can be displayed at the same time. It was chosen to use a high-
energy window (K), a 137Cs window and two low- energy windows. It was then possible to 
tell whether an increase in the number of counts in e.g. the low energy window seemed source 
related or more likely related to an increase in the K-window. (It was chosen for the K- 
window to display non-stripped count rates, therefore also contribution from U and Th could 
be found in this window.) 
The Exploranium software has no alarm function and it is not (yet) possible to view stripped 
spectra. Thus source observation depends solely on the skills of the operator. A new software 
version has just been discussed. 
Figure 1 and Figure 2 show examples (different windows) of increases in stripped count rates 
(K-window not stripped!) Figure 1 shows an increase in the caesium window together with an 
increase in the low energy-windows. This source was unshielded. Figure 2 shows an increase 
in the low energy windows only. This source was shielded. 
On the road spectrum stripping 
The stripping factors (approximates) for some low energy windows were calculated from 
measurements performed in Boden during the pre-exercise day prior to the start of the exercise 
itself. 
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Figure 1. Unshielded 137Cs source (passed twice). 
 
 
Figure 2. Shielded 137Cs source. 
Off the road: source identification 
In case of shielded or partly shielded sources it may not be possible to identify source type 
from the CGS measurements due to not being able to get close to the source with the 
equipment. Therefore an Exploranium GR130 portable instrument was used, too. It can show 
dose rates, count rates and 256-channels gamma-spectra. 
Sometimes the peak identification was made only from GR130-measurements and sometimes 
this was not enough, either. 
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On the road: calculation of distance from full energy peaks 
When passing a source at constant speed the relation between distance to source, r, and 
FWHM is approximately: 
  350 keV  r = 0.69 FWHM (m) 
  662 keV r = 0.65 FWHM (m) 
1250 keV  r = 0.59 FWHM (m) 
A calculation of the function of FWHM (m) in relation to distance to source was made during 
calibration of CGS equipment for equivalent surface activity of 137Cs, where the calibration 
took place in Næstved, Denmark, and was based on fixed car-position measurements on a 
point source placed at 800 different positions. Also calculation of absolute detector efficiency 
versus distance was done for the calculation of source strengths. 
Figure 3 shows stripped count rates from an unshielded 137Cs source passed twice. 2s-
measurement time, car speed 2 km/h, distance 17 m and source strength 16.5 MBq. 
 
Figure 3. Calculation of distance and source strength. 
FWHM: 2s*24*2 km/h = 26.7m. Distance: 0.65*26.7m = 17.3 m. Maximum count rate: 100 
cps. Source strength: 100 cps/ 0.629 counts/γ = 15.90 MBq (using absolute detector efficiency 
as a function of distance). 
The team spent the pre-exercise day testing this method - when a source was found one 
should drive slowly past it to find the FWHM.  Already at the calibration area it turned out 
that there were problems due to non-uniform shielding of sources. As the exercise turned out, 
it was not possible to use the above-mentioned method. The car speed was too variable and 
often no full energy peaks could be detected. Most distances were estimated visually if the 
source could be seen or from a number of GR130 air kerma rate measurements. 
Off the road: source strengths from air kerma rates 
It was too difficult to estimate source strengths from the CGS measurements. Instead the 
GR130 instrument was used with a portable GPS to at least give some air kerma rates closer 
to the source and from different directions to the source. 
Only one estimate of source strength (3:1) was performed during the exercise. Result: 10 GBq 
versus 20GBq. Source 3:1 was a composite of 4 60Co sources but was not identified as such.  
No further calculations of source strength have been made. It is planned to re-evaluate the air 
kerma rate measurements when information on source shielding material is available to test 
scientific methods because different types of shielding is a problem in general. 
Post-processing: MapInfo and NUCSpec with NASVD 
The data were analysed later with the NUCSpec software that includes facilities for NASVD 
processing. This data analysis has to be done on a different computer than the one used in the 
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car. It was not possible (time and personnel related) to do this until in the evenings after the 
searches were done.  From NASVD processing it is possible to reconstruct single measure-
ments with noise removal  or one can just analyse the general shapes found in the series of 
measurements. Also SDI air kerma rates were plotted on a map and additional stripping 
factors were calculated. 
Results 
Sources found and not found 
Table 1 shows which sources the Danish CGS team found. For sources not observed, the 
closest distance to source has been calculated from DGPS readings. No consideration has 
been taken to the fact that the car sometimes seems off track compared to MapInfo maps (East 
direction, interference from airwing?). Some sources were observed as suspicious 
measurement points during the exercise but were not reported. They have later been 
recognised as sources. Also some sources were reported as wrong isotopes. 
Source 1:2 was initially reported as 133Ba due to peak identification of two gamma energies 
close to high intensity barium peaks, 87 keV and 361 keV while on the scene. The 
measurements were difficult to deal with because of spectrum drift upward due to high count-
rates. Later further peaks were identified and source type changed to 131I. 
Figure 4 shows spectrum component S1 from NASVD processing of the data file including 
measurements on source 1:2. The spectrum is almost a real environmental iodine spectrum. 
Source 2:4 was investigated on foot because of a small increase of low energy counts. The 
team soon learned to search for changes in scattered radiation instead of full energy peaks. 
The air kerma rate increased when approaching a house. No isotope fingerprints were found 
and the source was dismissed as interesting but probably caused by building materials. A 
major difficulty of the exercise was the frequent changes in natural background that caused 
several false alarms due to naturally occurring anomalies. However, those alarms had to be 
taken seriously considering the possibility of finding a 226Ra source. 
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Table 1. DKK identified and not identified sources. 
Source GBq No. Found Comments 
60Co 5 1:1 Y  
131I 9.25 1:2 Y First reported as 133Ba, changed to 131I 
60Co 5 1:3 Y  
60Co 5 1:4 N Closest distance 449 m 
60Co 5 2:1 Y  
60Co 5 2:2 Y  
99Mo 3.1 2:3 N Missed, closest distance 80 m 
99Mo 18 2:4 N Hunt at private quarters. Not 
reported. 
Closest distance 147 m 
137Cs 3*0.5 2:5-1 N Closest distance 490 m 
60Co 3*0.02 2:5-2 N Closest distance 490 m 
241Am 0.0004 2:6 N Missed at 5m-distance. 
137Cs 2.6 6:1 Y Calibration source 
60Co 5 6:2 Y Calibration source 
60Co 4*5 3:1 Y  
137Cs 0.4 4:1 Y  
137Cs 2.5 4:2 N Suspicion. Measurements on foot. Post- 
identification. Not reported. 106 m 
192Ir 13 4:3 N Suspicion. Closest distance 281 m 
60Co 5 4:4 Y Reported as 192Ir, paper mistake 
60Co 5 4:5 Y Reported as 192Ir, paper mistake 
137Cs 1.3 4:6 Y What happened to SIR-source type? 
137Cs 1.9 4:7 N Closest distance 217 m 
60Co 5 7:1 N Missed, closest distance 479 m 
60Co 5 7:2 N Missed, closest distance 177 m 
60Co 5 7:3 N Missed, closest distance 93 m 
60Co 5 7:4 N Missed, closest distance 67 m 
60Co 5 7:5 N Missed, closest distance 21 m 
226Ra Nat. 7:6 N Missed at 6m-distance. 
226Ra Nat. 7:7 N Missed, closest distance 418 m 
226Ra Nat. 7:8 N Missed, closest distance 45 m 
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Figure 4. Source 1:2. 9.25 GBq 131I. 
The sources 4:4 and 4:5 could not be identified as 60Co on the scene. The SIR-reports were 
filled in without the source type intending to put in the source type upon delivery of the paper 
SIR-reports. However, they could not be identified in post processing with NUCSpec either 
because of lack of full energy peaks. 
Figure 5 shows some measurements of those 60Co- sources. In Figure 6 are shown the first 
two spectral components from the NASVD processing (sources 4:2, 4:3, 4:4 and 4:5 in file). 
In S2 - right axis - one notices a 137Cs signal around channel 110 (source 4:2) and in S1 - left 
axis - a very dominant scattered signal 
 
Figure 5. Scattered photons from 60Co source (NUCSpec). 
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Figure 6. Spectral components for file brb029.spc. 
Analysis performed after the exercise shows that those sources had a high probability of being 
60Co. After a recalculation of stripping factors for the file in question a small peak in the 
cobalt window was seen, Figure 7. 
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Figure 7. Stripped count rates for different energy windows. 
The sources were reported as 192Ir by mistake due to filling in the isotope types in the last 
minute. During the search in area C4 the team was co-operating with the AGS team that had 
spotted this isotope and the CGS team went to investigate this. At the scene suspicion arose 
and the source was thought to be possibly caesium. The papers were filled in but this source 
was never reported by telephone. A post-processing of data at REAC showed a possibility of 
caesium and possibly something else. The source(s) was not reported. However a mix-up of 
SIR-reports occurred and the two unknown sources found in this area (sources 4:4 and 4:5 
were erroneously reported as the suspected 192Ir source instead of heavily shielded unidenti-
fied sources. 
After the exercise the possible iridium and/or caesium source was identified as 137Cs. Figure 8 
shows a NUCSpec view of this source that was not possible to see on the CGS equipment. 
The arrow shows source position. 
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Figure 8. Caesium source 4:2 at arrow. 
Figure 9 shows the track lines for DKK. The source locations were plotted on the map to 
identify in which files (26 files) additional information might be found). It is seen that some 
of the sources the team drove right by without noticing. This is especially true for area C7 
where the team started with a thorough search in the Southern part of the area and spent a 
long time without finding anything. At the Northern end where most of the sources were 
located the team was speeding to get out of the area on time. 
 
Figure 9. Track lines and source positions, MapInfo. 
Figure 13 and 14 show SDI air kerma rates. Most hot spots in area C7 were actually caused 
by natural environmental isotopes, Figure 10. 
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Figure 10. False alarms in area C7 at dark brown spots. 
A first post-processing of the data for area C7 during the exercise did not show any signs of 
missed source signals. A second post-processing of data after the exercise did not reveal 
source 7:5 (60Co) or source 7:8 (226Ra) either (files brb011 and brb010). 
Post-processing of file brb012 (7:1, 7:2, 7:3, 7:4, 7:6 and 7:7) with new stripping factors 
indicated the possibility of a 60Co source around spectrum no. 637. Comparison of co-
ordinates show that this might be source 7:3 or 7:4. Source 7:2 should have been seen around 
no. 792, if present. Please confer Figure 11 and Figure 12. (Energy calibration: 662 keV in 
channel 110, 2615 keV in channel 418.) 
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Figure 11. Stripped counts in low energy window. 
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Figure 12. Stripped counts in cobalt window. 
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Figure 13. SDI CGS air kerma rates for DKK. Continued in Figure 14 due to limited number 
of pixels on map. (Also SDI air kerma rates driving to and from the areas can be seen.) 
MapInfo. 
 
Figure 14. SDI CGS air kerma rates for DKK, continued. MapInfo. 
Conclusions 
For the DKK CGS team participation in the Barents Rescue exercise has been a valuable 
experience.  
The team had very little practical CGS fieldwork experience on arrival and had never worked 
together before. The pre-exercise day therefore was spent on calculation of stripping factors 
and testing calculation methods.  
The first day of the real exercise was spent mainly on gaining experience regarding optimum 
car speed and search strategies. Also the tasks of the individual team members were worked 
out at this time. At the end of the exercise the team had gained a lot of experience and found 
most of the γ-sources passed within a reasonable distance. Though, some of them were not 
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reported, most were in fact successfully investigated as suspicious and in that sense also 
found. 
Regarding the identification of source types the theoretical background was mostly related to 
unshielded sources. The team gained a lot of information on spectral shapes describing what 
sources do look like in environmental surroundings  especially regarding shielded sources. A 
new search strategy for shielded sources was developed during the exercise. 
In the on the road processing and post processing of data it was found that the set-up of the 
CGS system could be improved. This is true especially for the setting up of colours on the 
monitor and not the least for calculation of stripping factors for use while measuring. It was 
found that in surroundings with frequent changes in the contents of natural isotopes and 
landscape geometry it is necessary (during post-processing) to perform a calculation of 
stripping factors for each area in question. 
For the calculation of source strengths future work will need to be done. The methods brought 
to the exercise were not sufficient for the way the exercise was performed. When dealing with 
sources not uniformly shielded at all sides difficulties were encountered and it was concluded 
that the source strength could not be calculated solely from the CGS measurements (at 
present). 
With this new experience at hand, in case of emergencies the new CGS team could now 
function on its own which means that in the future Denmark now can use two CGS teams. 
Acronyms 
CGS Carborne Gamma Spectrometry 
DEMA Danish Emergency Management Agency 
DTU Technical University of Denmark 
NASVD Noise Adjusted Singular Value Decomposition 
SDI Spectrum Dose Index 
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Estonia, team EEK 
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Estonian Team (EEK) 
Eia Jakobson 
Larissa Palmin 
Aldo Tera 
 
Equipment: 
NaI(Tl)-spectrometer Exploranium GR-660 
Volume 4 l 
Multichannel analyser Exploranium GR-320 
No of channels 512 
No of spectra per minute 30 
GPS type DGPS 
Coordinate system WGS 84 and RT 90 
Dose rate instrument Exploranium GR-130, volume 1.5 inch, 256 channels 
Methods: 
Driving speed: 30-50 km/h 
Detector height: 2m on the roof of the car 
Search method: reading of a spectrum 
Data analysis: 
Source recognition: according gamma peak energy  
Identification: mostly by spectrum & by hand-held spectrometer 
Location: using car coordinates 
Nuclide source strength: By calculations depending on gamma dose rate & distance & gamma 
constant 
Results: 
We represented our data only in .nks format. Reports were also made electronically. 
Maps are represented on the Barents Rescue homepage. 
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Area No of sources in 
the area 
No of 
sources 
located 
by EEK 
Sources 
identified by 
EEK 
Remarks 
C 3 1 Co-60 source 1 source 1 Co-60 source The same source was reported 
to REAC two times 
C 4 4 Cs-137, 2 Co-
60 and 1 Ir-192 
sources  
3 sources 1 Cs-137, 1 Co-
60 source 
1 source was wrongly reported, 
but this place has higher 
background. 
C 1 3 Co-60 and  
1 I-131 source 
2  I-131 was unidentified, but 
energy of peak was reported. 
C 2 4 Co-60, 2 Cs-
137, 1 Am-241,    
2 Mo-99 sources 
4 sources 2 Co-60 and 1 
Cs-137 sources 
 
C 7 5 Co and  
3 Ra-226 sources 
5 sources 5 Co-60 sources  
 
Conclusions: 
Team EEK got a lot of good experiences of finding real sources. 
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Finland, team FIK 
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Finnish Team (FIK)  
Jarkko Ylipieti, Tarja Ilander, Mikko Leppänen 
STUK - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
P.O. Box 14 00881 Helsinki FINLAND 
 
Equipment 
Toyota 4Runner 
 Normally the car is in ready for immediate use at the Regional Laboratory in  
Northern Finland (Figure 1). 
Dose rate instruments 
 Geiger Müller Tube RD-02L (Figure 2) 
 RDS-200 survey meter (Figure 3) 
 TSA search meter 
Laptop 
 Dell Latitude C600 
 Installed software:  desktop mapping MapInfo 
   dose rate mapping Sahti 
Navigation 
 IMTEC Supported model 5 GPS receiver with Trimple antenna 
 Magellan 315 GPS Navigator 
Communications 
 GSM and NMT mobile phones 
 PCMCIA card for data sending (not used in the exercise) 
Additional 
provided by the organiser: 
 Personal dosimeters, paper and digital maps, radiophones 
Methods  
The crew consisted of three members. One of the members was the driver, one operated 
laptop, and the third monitored the dose rate instruments.  
The strategy in the large area was to drive at least along all the main roads but, also gravel 
roads in order to avoid driving along same road twice. However, the flight data proposed a 
route if one was available. The average speed was about 30km/h, but rose to 60km/h if the 
road or the search area ended and we had go back to the same road. During the first day we 
were in a hurry to get out of the area in time, so the speed in the rest of the area was close to 
the speed limit, 90km/h. 
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Digital maps of the exercise area were registered in the desktop mapping software (MapInfo), 
and the directory where the maps were located was instructed to dose rate the mapping 
software (Sahti). Sahti obtained the positions from GPS satellites and located us on the 
registered maps. As these coordinates were updated every 5 seconds, we always had our 
correct position. This was important because the areas were large and the time available for 
each area was short. There was no time to get lost.  
The TSA search meter was set to alarm when the counts, which exceeded the natural 
background. During the drive the natural background level varied according to the terrain; in 
the low natural background area the alarm level should have been lower than that in the high 
natural background area. Whenever the TSA search meter alarmed, we reduced our speed and 
checked the dose rate. Whenever the dose rate was close to or over 0.20 µSv/h, we get out of 
the car and investigated the reason for the elevated dose rate. Naturally buildings and stopped 
vehicles were suspected, but sometimes there were no buildings or other suitable targets to 
check. The exposed cliffs and rocky terrain frequently triggered an alarm in the TSA search 
meter.  
One useful method was to use the flight data prepared the day before. Flight data reported by 
the Finnish AGS team (FIA) were used very effectively on one day. 
On the last day of the exercise we noticed that all the sources were marked with a white pole. 
This information helped us to find one source - the pole was visible from the road we were 
driving along, and the source was hidden in the forest about 100 m from the road. 
Data analysis 
When we located the source, we measured the dose rate surrounding the point in at least four 
directions with the RDS-200. The directions and dose rates were marked on the Source 
Identification Report (SIR). The source was also marked on the desktop mapping software as 
a symbol, from which we transferred the coordinates in RT-90 format to the SIR. If we were 
not able to get the car close to the source, we obtained the coordinates from the handheld GPS 
receiver. 
Results 
We found four sources during the pre-exercise day, and eleven sources and one extra source 
during the exercise days. The dose rate from the Sahti is indicated in yellow boxes on the 
maps. More detailed dose rates were reported in the Source Identification Reports. 
Area C7 
Area C7 was very large (Figure 4). We drove 200 km in eight hours and found five sources. 
We also reported one source, which was not the correct one. It was a cardboard box that 
triggered an alarm in the TSA search meter and the RDS-200 measured 0.5 
mikroSievert/hour. We reported this because our equipment reacted. The rest of the sources 
were hidden in military storage buildings. One source was not found because of the lack of 
time.  
Areas C1 and C2 
We obtained these (Figure 5) source locations from the flight team (FIA). As the coordinates 
were rather exact, we did not have any problems finding the sources (Figure 6). We were not 
able to get the Sahti (and Sahti GPS) near to one source because it was not accessible by road. 
The coordinates from the FIA were entered on the handheld GPS, and the RDS-200 was 
carried to the source by foot. 
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Areas C3 and C4  
Area C3 (Figure 7) was rather monotonous. There was only one source in the large green 
building. We did not have any flight data available for area C4 (Figure 7). In area C4 we 
found four sources, one of them even though it did not register on our equipment. We 
happened to notice the white pole, which led us to the source. 
Conclusions 
At the beginning of the planning exercise we had reserved only two persons for the team. In 
the pre-exercise we had a third member and this proved to be necessary.  
Sahti (RD-02L) was very useful for navigating, but it was too slow to detect point sources 
from a moving vehicle. Sahti requires a slow driving speed on order to obtain enough counts 
to calculate the dose rate. The more sensitive device (TSA search meter) was very useful.  
The exercise was very interesting and it gave us a lot of experience that will be of great 
benefit in the future. 
 
Figure 1. Toyota 4Runner. 
 
     
 
Figure 2. Geiger Müller Tube. Figure 3. RDS-200  
 survey meter RD-02L. 
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Figure 4. Area C7 
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 Figure 5. Flight data  
 176  
   
Figure 6. Areas C1 and C2 
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Figure 7. Areas C3 and C4
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Finnish Team (FIL) 
Mikael Moring, Tapani Honkamaa, Kaj Vesterbacka, Pertti Niskala 
STUK - Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority 
P.O. Box, 14 00881 Helsinki, FINLAND 
 
Equipment 
The Finnish moving radiation measurement laboratory is built into a VW Transporter Syncro 
with a heightened roof. The laboratory is in constant preparedness and is deployable within 
one hour of the arrival of the crew. In its standard form the laboratory is equipped with the 
following: 
• Air sampling unit (not used in LIVEX) 
• Rigidly mounted Gamma spectrometry detector (Ortec standard P-type 35 % HPGe, 
Nomad gamma spectroscopy unit (MCA+HV supply +linear amplifier) 
• Pressurised Ionisation chamber (PIC, Reuter Stokes RS-112) 
• Dose-rate meter GM Rados RD-02L (spare for PIC, not used in LIVEX) 
• Dose-rate meter Alnor RDS-120  (with Beta Probe) 
• Trimble GPS (not differential, serial signal dividable to three computers) 
• Three networked computers: 
• Dose rate mapping, Sahti Software (STUK) 
• Mobile gammaspectrometry, Sampo Software (Doletum Oy) 
• Data communication  
• GSM and NMT-450 phones 
• UPS 
• 220 V, 3.5 kW Car Power system 
• Personal dosimeters (not used in LIVEX) 
• Gas-masks and overalls (not used in LIVEX) 
Additionally, during the LIVEX excercise we had with us  
• Portable gammaspectrometry unit (19% HPGe, Nomad and portable computer)  
• TSA scintillation detector mMCA-430 1" (dia) x 2" (height) NaI(Tl) Scintillation detector 
For the exercise we also equipped the gammaspectrometer with a simple angular search 
device consisting of a scale of degrees and some lead bricks. As a preparation for the exercise 
we also made excel-sheets for point-source activity and dose rate calculations. These 
additions will be part of the standard equipment of the laboratory in the future. 
The maps used during the exercise where provided by the organiser. The paper and digital 
maps where scarce on detail that would have been desired for route planning and source 
location. In our navigation software we used the provided raster map in MapInfo RT90 format 
and plotted the GPS data (WGS84) onto the map. The map co-ordinates fitted well with the 
GPS-data (Fig. 2)   
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Methods 
The main search instrument in the vehicle was the 35% HPGe detector. It is rigidly mounted 
in a standing position (facing upwards) approximately in the middle of the vehicle and the 
detector height is 1.45 m above ground. The detector is shielded by its dewar and the vehicle, 
but this shielding is mostly from directly beneath (the road surface). Radiation from a few 
meters distance from the road has fairly free passage to the detector through the car windows. 
Some additional shielding came from operating staff and other equipment (the PIC and 
Dynawatt units are positioned high up in the vehicle). 
Our maximum driving speed during searching was 40 km/h in all areas but C7, where we 
drove the last part (south) according to speed regulations. On gravel roads the speed limit was 
actually set by the equipment, because microphonics in the crystal greatly increased with 
increasing speed and the useful speed was normally reduced to less than 30 km/h. 
The spectrum acquisition time used during searching was 5 seconds. Our spectrometer is 
connected to a PC with Sampo software and during driving one person was dedicated to this 
computer screen at all times. The software displays a waterfall plot of the complete spectra 
(4096 channels), the total counts and the counts in three ROI areas (fig. 3 and 4). 137Cs (661.7 
keV) and 60Co (1332.5 keV) where always in two of the ROI areas. The third area varied. In 
most search areas it was at 192Ir (316.5 keV), but we also tried to keep it at very low energies 
(< 40keV) in an attempt to get an indicator for microphonic noise. This was not very 
successful. In an attempt to find also other nuclides the software did peak search and nuclide 
identification, and displayed the found peaks according to their peak significance in a separate 
window. The identified nuclides for each spectrum (usually none) where shown as a list on 
the computer screen. As nuclide library we used a "standard" library with the addition of 
some nuclides known to be used in medicine or the industry. All nuclides known to be 
imported, exported or sold in Finland during the year 2000 were marked with an "*" in the 
library to facilitate speedy decisions in the field. 
When searching, the TSA scintillation detector mMCA-430 was used in search mode: when 
the measurement was started, the meter automatically counts background for 20 seconds. The 
meter gives an audible alarm, when the total count exceeds the background by 4 sigma levels 
Our normal crew consists of three members. One person was concentrating on the SAMPO 
screen at all times. One person was obviously driving, and the third was responsible for 
navigating and "tactics". This person was also responsible for our handheld search instrument. 
In most areas during the exercise we had a fourth crewmember, who used the portable 
spectrometer. 
The main difficulty in searching for sources was to screen out real sources from elevated 
background and detector noise (mainly microphonics and GSM-phones). Areas with elevated 
background where often large enough to be discriminated from point sources. In many cases 
visual inspection of the surroundings was a good tool for sorting out these areas. Rocky 
terrain, open cliffs or sand areas usually hold some uranium, which heightens the natural 
background.  
The signal due to detector noise is not always easy to distinguish from a weak source with 
low energy or some collimation (fig. 3). Detector noise can always be ruled out by driving the 
same area (slowly) again, but this takes time and the rate of noise peaks in our detector was 
too high for us to be able to check every peak this way. So in many cases we made our 
decisions based on the TSA meter. If the total counts in the spectrometer suddenly rose by 
50% there should have been an audible alarm also from the TSA meter if the rise was due to 
radiation. If the TSA meter did not detect anything we decided that the signal was probably 
due to detector noise.  
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Our aim was to scan as much of the road in each area as possible. The crew had no previous 
experience with measuring strong and partly shielded sources, so we wanted to take some 
time at the sources we found and describe them accurately (nuclide and strength). This lead to 
that we had to keep our driving speed as high as feasible, even at the risk of losing some 
weaker sources. 
In the areas where we had flight data available we naturally tried to locate all sources that the 
aircrew had found.   
Quite early in the exercise it became evident that the sources in the open areas (not prohibited 
to the public) were placed inside buildings. This lead us to drive more slowly near any 
buildings that looked like army storehouses, which was a very successful tactic.  
Data analysis 
After getting the first signal from a (suspected) source we used several methods for finding 
the exact location of the source. 
• Visual inspection of the area 
This was often enough as many sources where clearly visible 
• Determining the direction to the source using the gamma spectrometer in the car and led 
bricks to shield in different directions 
Moving lead bricks in front of the spectrometer and looking for the direction where the 
count rate was at a minimum was a fast and efficient way of locating the sources. With 
this method it was also possible to gain some information on the location of sources inside 
closed areas (buildings). It was also helpful in finding closely separated sources and 
discriminating between a 137Cs source and an area with elevated fallout. 
• Sending a crew member with handheld equipment 
In search mode the TSA mMCA instrument was very useful in locating sources within 
approx 50 m. When used in spectrum acquisition mode it was helpful in assessment of the 
shielding characteristics of the source i.e. helping to localise the maximum primary 
photon beam for more accurate analysis for HPGe-detectors.   
After the exact location of the source was determined we tried to find the direction of minimal 
shielding and make our activity measurements from there either with the portable 
spectrometer or with the one in the car. In all cases we were able to find a direction where the 
primary peaks were prominent, so the nuclide identification was easy. 
The source activity was first estimated from the gamma peak areas and corrected for distance 
and air attenuation. If several measurements were made from different locations the one, 
which yielded the highest activity was used and reported as apparent activity in the source 
identification report (SIR). To estimate the amount of shielding, the spectrum shape (height of 
peaks versus height of Compton continuum) was visually checked and the measured dose rate 
values where compared to dose rate values calculated assuming an unshielded source. The 
estimated source activity given in the SIR was not based on any exact calculation, but a true 
estimate derived from the above information. 
The source location was taken from MapInfo, simply by estimating the distance and direction 
to the source from the present position of the vehicle taken from the GPS (non-differential) 
and shown on the map by the SAHTI dose-rate mapping software. The position was reported 
in RT-90 co-ordinates from the cursor location data shown in MapInfo.        
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During the exercise there was very limited time for post processing of data. After the exercise 
we have checked the data from areas where we went past sources without finding them. The 
post processing did not reveal any new sources.  
Results 
During the exercise we reported a total of 15 sources, with an addition of the two calibration 
sources in area C2 reported by many teams the total goes up to 17. All reported sources where 
correctly identified. 
Source locations 
Most sources were located correctly within a distance of 20 meters, which is enough for the 
purpose of this exercise. Some exceptions exist, especially the locations for sources 01:04 and 
04:02 where further off. These sources where at places where you could not go by car, and 
our handheld GPS was in use in our support vehicle and the given maps where not detailed 
enough for locating the sources visually. The source 07:05 was off by approximately 35 
meters too. Given that the position of the source given by the organisers is correct this can 
only be explained by a sustaining error in the GPS position. 
Activity estimates 
Our activity estimates were in most cases correct, although they seem to be a little bit low 
compared to the given values (fig. 1). The underestimation of the source 03:01 indicates the 
difficulty of estimating the activity of heavily shielded sources. 
Activity estimates
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Fig. 1. Estimated activity of the found sources compared to values given by the organizers. 
There seems to be some underestimation especially of the more heavily shielded sources. 
Area C1 
In this area we had very good flight data available. The Finnish AGS team (FIA) had located 
all sources and it was an easy task to find them by car. We did not have a handheld GPS, so 
the location of the source 01:04 was reported according to the AGS data. 
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Area C2 
The flight data for this area was not useful for us. The sources possibly located by the Finnish 
AGS team were in such locations that it was not possible to reach them by car or, within the 
given time frame, by foot. In this area there where some weak sources which we did not 
detect. In the post processing of the data we did not see any additional signal in the areas close 
to these sources. This in addition to the fact that no other team reported any of these sources 
during the exercise1 leads us to the conclusion that the signals from these sources simply were 
too weak to be detected from a moving vehicle with the kind of instruments in use. (The 
241Am source at the gate was possibly reported as "source" by one team, but given the low 
activity and energy of the source, the possibility of detecting it would greatly depend on 
factors such as vehicle location on the road). The two big 60Co sources in the bunkers where 
found and reported. As many other teams, we did not report the reference sources situated in 
this area. 
Area C3 
In this area we had good flight data available. In the area there was only one 60Co source, 
which was very easy to find. Some confusion arose due to a military practice in the area, and 
accessibility of shooting areas, but we were able to scan practically all the roads. 
Area C4 
Because of fog problems for FIA we had no flight data available, so there where some sources 
normally detected by the air teams (04:03, 04:07) which we could not detect because of their 
great distance to roads.  
The 1.9 GBq source (04:06) was located 100 metes from the road and from theoretical 
calculations one can derive that this source, if totally unshielded, should yield approximately 
3 cps in the 137Cs window, which would be above the detection level. However, in the 
specified location the actual 137Cs count rate was below 0.5 cps, and the total counts well 
within normal variation, so the source was not detected, possibly due to some shielding. 
The 0.4 GBq source in the red shed was the smallest detected source during the exercise. It 
was still very easy to detect, because of its proximity to the road (fig. 3). 
The 2.5 GBq source in the "birdhouse" was the only source during this exercise that was close 
above the detection limit with our equipment. It was detected from the end of a small road 
from a distance of more than 100 meters. The maximum pulse rate in the 137Cs window 
detected during the initial passage was 2 cps as compared to a normal background of 0 to 0.8 
cps (fig. 4). This corresponds remarkably well with theory, as an unshielded 137Cs source of 
2.5 GBq at 125 meters distance would theoretically yield a count rate of 1.9 cps in the 137Cs 
window. The detection was facilitated by the fact that the car was turned at the closest 
location to the sample, so we got several time slices with higher count-rates. The calculated 
dose-rate from the source at this distance is approximately 0.01 µSv/h and thus totally 
indistinguishable from background variation, which gives that spectrometric equipment was 
mandatory for this detection. 
The source was identified as a point source and the direction to the source was determined 
using lead bricks, it was then located with the TSA meter and the activity estimates of the 
source were made using the portable spectroscopy system. 
Of the two closely placed 60Co-sources 04:04 and 04:05 we found only one. The other could 
clearly have been found with a little more careful examination of the area. The found source 
was easily identified, once a less shielded direction was found. On the shielded side of the 
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source the shielding was so heavy that no primary photons were detected, even though the 
dose-rate was clearly elevated. 
Area C7 
The main difficulty in this area was to plan how to use our time. It was obviously impossible 
to scan the whole area. We were lucky in our decisions and managed to find all 60Co sources, 
which were all very easy to find if you happened to drive on the right roads. The natural 
sources (226Ra) were too small to be detected and distinguished from background, when 
driving by. No team reported any of them, and there was no detectable signal at the locations 
found in the post processing of the data. 
All sources in this area were inside big military storehouses and we spent some time on each 
of them, trying to determine the approximate positions inside the buildings. We reported these 
positions in the form of sketches to REAC the next morning (fig. 5). 
Conclusions 
From an operational point of view, the exercise was a very positive experience for us and it 
was clearly demonstrated that the equipment and crew are able to successfully conduct this 
kind of missions. Some equipment improvements, which will be a part of our standard 
practice in the future, were made before the exercise. We gained valuable experience of 
overall equipment performance and the special demands that this kind of work puts on the 
operations and equipment that will be utilised in future designs (e.g. need of shielding from 
microphonics). 
The exercise was, however, not very suitable for testing detection limits or gaining experience 
on specific instrument performance. There were very few sources dimensioned so that the 
signal when passing the source was close to the detection limit of contemporary CGS. This 
can clearly be seen from the fact that most sources where either detected by the majority of 
teams, or not detected at all. Also the other Finnish CGS team (FIK), which had no 
spectrometric equipment was able to find all the same sources, but one although the source 
04:02 showed that spectrometric equipment in some conditions can be at least one magnitude 
more sensitive than dose-rate instruments. 
References 
1 https://secure.swerem.ssi.se/barents/portal.asp Web site open to participants 
after the end of the exercise. 
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Fig. 2. Detail of a part of area C4. The raster map fits reasonably well with GPS data (dots). 
One 137Cs source (upper left corner) was found from the end of the road from a distance of 
approximately 100 m. The 137Cs sources in the upper right corner and the 192Ir source in the 
upper left corner was not found due to large distance to the road and lack of flight data. One 
of the two 60Co sources in the middle right was found. 
 
Fig. 3. Waterfall plot of HPGe spectrum data (left). Energy increases to the right as time 
increases downwards. Higher count rates are shown with brighter colour. The right part of 
the diagram shows the count rates in three different ROI areas with histograms and colour 
changes. Data from source 04:01, which was the smallest source found during the exercise 
(137Cs, 0.4 GBq). The source is very clear from a close distance (upper part), but is also 
easily detectable in all plot areas (waterfall, total cps, ROI) while driving past with normal 
search speed (middle). Use of mobile phone and microphonics give detectable signals in the 
total cps and waterfall areas.  
  188
 
Fig. 4. Data from source 04:02. The source was unshielded in this direction, and therefore 
detectable in the 137Cs window. The signal is too weak to distinguish from background in the 
total count. In the waterfall plot the 137Cs peak can be seen as a faint line. The distance to the 
source during collection of this data is ≥100 m. 
 
4. 7:5 0.7 ±0.3 GBq Co-60  source at 7331281, 1711660
15-20 m
Beam
225°
road  
Fig. 5. Example of a source sketch made during the exercise. The source was inside a big 
military storehouse. To estimate the location of the source inside the building we made 
collimated measurements from different directions.  
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Latvian Team (LVK) 
Anita Skujina, Andrejs Dreimanis, Latvian Radiation Safety Centre 
Aldis Veide, Visvaldis Graveris, Latvian Environment Agency 
 
Equipment 
Main equipment used for gamma search was mobile gamma spectrometer Exploranium GR-
660 connected with Differential Geopositioning System (DGPS) mounted on the car Nissan 
Patrol. Measurements data were transferred afterwards to laptop Dell Latitude CPX and 
processed using Nucspec v.2.1 and Mapinfo software. 
As supplementary hand held instruments serve GPS Garmin 45, portable gamma spectrometer 
Exploranium Minispec GR-130, dose rate meter RDS-120 and compass. 
Methods 
Exploranium GR-660 has 4 L NaI detector placed on the roof of the car at the height about 2.2 
meters above ground level. For the spectrometer there has been set 512 channels measuring 
mode, each morning the device was calibrated using a standard Cs-137 source, then stabilized 
on natural Thorium. Spectrum has been recorded each 2 seconds, it means, that driving 30 
km/h (typical speed used for gamma search) it represents average spectrum for each 16,7 m 
distance. Searching for the gamma source we used Show mode, where can see large number 
of last spectra. Each spectrum is shown as horizontal coloured pixel line, horizontal axis 
corresponds to the energy (channel number), colour  to the number of counts in channel. 
When some abnormalities or deviations in the colour picture had been noticed, the Spectrum 
window, rarely Chart window was switched on and checked if the changes have natural origin 
 rocks, granite, or are due to artificial source. When source had been found, the car was 
positioned so that to get as minimal as possible source shielding and optimal count rate, in 
order to obtain best spectral shape allowing to determine the radionuclide. Afterwards there 
has been determined source positioning coordinates using hand held GPS Garmin 45.  Due to 
some confusion passing to RT90 coordinate system, DGPS data displayed on GPS window 
had wrong coordinate values, but nevertheless that in the data file there were recorded, with 
Nucspec 2.1 processed and in NKS format there were reported correct coordinate values. 
To estimate the source activity the count rates and dose rates were measured in various 
directions and distances from the source, thereby searching for the direction where the source 
was less shielded. The directions respective to the source were estimated using compass. 
Beside the spectrometer data, substantial role for gamma search played visual aspects: check 
of strange, unusual objects, such as left cars, trailers, etc. When these objects were not 
accessible by car, then hand held radiometer and spectrometer Exploranium Minispec GR-130 
had been used. So there had been detected source 2:6 having well collimated narrow beam at 
the height 1.5 meters parallel to the ground. The spectrometer on the car cannot register this 
source, because the beam passed lower than detector. 
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Data analysis 
Source apparent activity was estimated using expression: 
 A = 10-15 * D * R2 / Γ, 
where:   A  Activity expressed in GBq; 
 D – Dose rate at the distance R from the source, µSv; 
R  Distance to the source in meters;  
 Γ  Gamma constant characteristic for the given nuclide. 
Substantial factor for correct activity evaluation was knowledge of the real distance from the 
source because due to high activity of the source there was not possible to step close to the 
source and often source was hidden inside the big storehouse. In such cases the actual 
distance to the source was calculated using two gamma rate measurements in the same 
direction along the beam and using expression: 
 R = (DN  + SQRT(DN * DD)) * d / (DN  DD), 
where:          R -  Distance between the distal point and the source, in meters; 
 DN, DD   Dose rate at the nearest and the distal point, respectively, µSv; 
 d  Distance between both measurement points in meters. 
When it deals with medium and low dose rates then it is very important to subtract the 
background dose rates before using the expression above. After search the measured spectra 
were processed using Nucspec 2.1 and results reported in NKS format to REAC. 
Results 
The results of Latvian gamma search cell LVK (and LVE) are summarized at the next table. 
For the sources not found or not identified background is set grey. In the column Estimated 
there have been put estimated apparent activities of sources and in column ∆ - difference 
between the estimated and the actual coordinate. Latvian team LVK has found 18 gamma 
sources plus 2 sources found by LVE, it means 65% of all sources exposed for car born 
gamma search teams and 50% of sources exposed in area A5. In 4 cases there was not 
identified nuclide. By determining source coordinates the average deviation from the actual 
coordinate was some 12 meters. This corresponds to the accuracy of the hand held GPS 
Garmin 45. Source activity mainly was underestimated, because most of sources were more or 
less shielded and sometimes there was large uncertainties estimating the distance.  
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GBq ∆  
No. Nuclide Actual Estimate
d 
Code/ Area RT-90 m Placed 
1 Co-60 5 2.46 1:1/C1 1756005  
7298134 
10 
29 
In wooden cage in gravel pit, 
shielded upwards with 
concrete blocks 
2 I-131 9.25 4.0 1:2/C1 1756005 
7299224 
20 
11 
In shed, collimated with lead 
bricks upwards and to the W 
3 Co-60 5 0.44 1:3/C1 1755956 
7299830 
5 
5 
In wooden cage at the end of 
the road 
4 Co-60 5 NF 1:4/C1 1756747 
7300334 
NF In wooden cage on the south 
side of the closed road 
5 Co-60 5 0.15 2:1/C2 1764029 
7307246 
-3 
13 
Inside the round concrete 
bunker 
6 Co-60 5 0.05 2:2/C2 1764048 
7307266 
-7 
14 
Inside the concrete bunker, 
collimated obliquely upwards 
7 Mo-99 3.1 NF 2:3/C2 1764844 
7307031 
NF Inside tracked vehicle cart 
8 Mo-99 18 NF 2:4/C2 1765350 
7305451 
NF In the house on the attic 
9 Cs-137 3x0.5 NF 2:5-1/C2 1763466 
7306095 
NF Inside tracked vehicle cart, 
level guards, directed upwards 
10 Co-60 3x0.02 NF 2:5-2/C2 1763466 
7306095 
NF Inside tracked vehicle cart, 
level guards, directed SW 
11 Am-241 0.0004 NE 2:6/C1/C2 1760526 
7302595 
-26 
5 
In cart, on the inside the hood, 
about 1.5 m above ground 
12 Co-60 4x5 NE 3:1/C3 1766304 
7316848 
4 
-27 
In storehouse 36, side shielded 
with lots of concrete blocks 
13 Cs-137 0.4 NE 4:1/C4 1760923 
7321390 
-1 
6 
In red shed, in lead container, 
side shielded 
14 Cs-137 2.5 NE 4:2/C4 1760488 
7323895 
-14 
-27 
In "birdhouse". Shielded with 
a lead brick upwards 
15 Ir-192 13 NF 4:3/C4 1760310 
7323933 
NF Radiographic source in a tree 
16 Co-60 5 NE 4:4/C4 1761137 
7323702 
23 
-37 
In concrete fire trench, 
covered with steel plate and 
sand 
17 Co-60 5 NE 4:5/C4 1761117 
7323744 
3 
5 
In concrete fire trench, 
covered with steel plate and 
sand 
18 Cs-137 1.3 NE 4:6/C4 1761442 
7323932 
-9 
17 
In tracked vehicle cart, 
shielded upwards with 
concrete blocks 
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19 Cs-137 1.9 NF 4:7/C4 1761559 
7323941 
NF In tracked vehicle cart, side 
shielded with transport 
contain. 
20 Cs-137 2.6 1.4 6:1/R1 1761020 
7302427 
-4 
28 
Reference source in tracked 
vehicle cart 
21 Co-60 5 4.0 6:2/R1 1761670 
7302884 
20 
12 
Reference source in wooden 
cage 
22 Co-60 5 0.5 7:1/ C7 1725376 
7340248 
-20 
22 
Storehouse 27, shielded to 
three sides 
23 Co-60 5 1.0 7:2/ C7 1721169 
7340769 
-1 
19 
Storehouse 22, shielded to 
three sides 
24 Co-60 5 0.125 7:3/ C7 1718957 
7338223 
32 
18 
Storehouse 51, collimated 
towards storehouse 52 
25 Co-60 5 4.0 7:4/ C7 1718983 
7338209 
-7 
5 
Storehouse 51, collimated 
towards storehouse 52 
26 Co-60 5 NF 7:5/ C7 1711648 
7331315 
NF Storehouse 50, shielded with 
lead in different directions 
27 Ra-226 Nat NF 7:6/ C7 1721282 
7340593 
NF Piece of rock from Kvarnån in 
wooden box at the roadside 
28 Ra-226 Nat NF 7:7/ C7 1718765 
7337175 
NF Piece of rock from Kvarnån in 
wooden box at the roadside 
29 Ra-226 Nat NF 7:8/ C7 1712920 
7318874 
NF Piece of rock from Kvarnån in 
wooden box at the roadside 
LVE Cs-137 2.6 NE 5:2/A5 1755733 
7321627 
83 
37 
In red shed no shielding 
 
LVE Ir-192 46 NE 5:5/A5 1756402 
7324293 
-11 
0 
Radiographic source below 
boulder 
 
Conclusions 
The obtained results by Latvian team and their analysis show that in searching and 
identification of sources the largest problems we encountered in following situations: 
1) when the sources were rather strongly shielded  there were difficulties to identify the 
radionuclide in cases of relative large Compton effect; 
2) when the nuclide was not included in the ROI; 
3) in the cases where  for the processing and analysis of the recorded data there were 
necessity for effective use of the NASVD method; we were insufficient skilled in the 
practical use of this method. 
In the same time we found out that very important factor for efficient searching of a source is 
a choice of adequate searching strategy. 
To sum up, Barents Rescue 2001 Gamma Search exercises were excellent opportunity to 
develop skills in search of unknown gamma sources using on car installed gamma 
spectrometer, share experience with colleagues from other countries and see our force or 
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weakness and better reveal our mistakes.  Great contribution in understanding each other was 
this opportunity to collaborate and report results in common NKS format.  
It is reasonably such exercises repeat each two, three years. Gamma search exercises were 
perfect organised. Very worth was the possibility to pre-exercise some days before the real 
exercise and to get accustomed to the exercise conditions. 
Acronyms 
DEMA  Danish Emergency Management Agency; 
GPS   Geopositioning System; 
DGPS   Differential Geopositioning System; 
LVK   Code assigned to the Latvian Gamma Search Cell; 
NF  Not found; 
NE  Not estimated; 
NKS  Nordic Nuclear Safety Research; 
REAC   Radiological Emergency Assessment Centre; 
SRV  Swedish Rescue Services Agency 
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Results of LTK team within Gamma Search Cell of the 
Barents Rescue 2001 Exercise 
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2Joint Research Centre, Juozapaviciaus 9, 2600, Vilnius, Lithuania 
 
Equipment 
The main equipment used for searching sources was made by Exploranium firm. The portable 
spectrometer Exploranium GR-320 with a 4 L NaI (Tl) detector [1] mounted on the roof of 
the car was used for locating sources while the hand held spectrometer Exploranium GR-130 
with a 70 mL NaI (Tl) detector [2] was used for both radionuclide identification and true 
activity estimation. The dose rate meter SRP-88H produced in Russia was used for exposure 
rate measurements at some locations, too. The crucial parameter in true activity determination 
is the source-to-detector distance. As the sources to be found were expected of very high 
activities the photographic camera with lens of focus 135 mm was used for distance 
measurements. The spectrometer Exploranium GR-320 combined with radiation surveillance 
system Exploranium GR-660 [3] provided 512 channel real-time gamma-ray spectra at every 
2 seconds with the possibility to monitor at the color screen the all spectra collected during 
the last 5 minutes. In order to facilitate the identification of radionuclide by the help of this 
equipment the energy calibration was carried out using point sources of 152Eu (122 keV, 344 
keV) and 137Cs (662 keV), and two lines of natural 40K (1461 keV) and 208Tl (2615 keV). 
The results of energy calibration are shown in Fig. 1. 
0 100 200 300 400 500
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
En
er
gy
, k
eV
Channel No.
 
Fig. 1. Energy calibration for the Exploranium GR-320. 
 
Radionuclide-specific efficiency calibration of the mobile spectrometer Exploranium GR-130 
was done with regard to 137Cs using the reference source 6:1. The detector was positioned 
along the axis in the beam of gamma rays of maximum intensity at different distances from 
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the source of known activity (2.6 GBq), and absolute efficiency has been calculated according 
to equation  
 ε ηE
EN
A
=      (1) 
Here NE is full-energy peak counting rate expressed in counts per second, A is activity of 
radionuclide in the source, Bq, and η is emission probability of gamma-ray with energy E. 
Dependence of absolute counting efficiency on the distance from the source is shown in Fig. 
2. The counting efficiency was fit to a power function with distance: 
 7987.16662 105
−−
⋅= rε     (2) 
Here r is the distance in metres. 
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Fig. 2. Absolute counting efficiency versus distance for 662 keV energy, when using 
Exploranium GR-130. 
Methods 
The task was to find as many sources as possible and identify correctly the radionuclide type. 
Due to unknown shielding performance of each source the accurate quantitative analysis was 
of less importance. It was found during the pre-exercise on 16 September that the driving 
speed of approximately 20 km/h is sufficient to detect an event from collimated source (X:2-
1, 137Cs). High efficiency NaI(Tl) detector placed on the roof of the car at the height of 2.2 m 
from the earth surface was the main sensor indicating the presence of a source. This detector 
was sufficient to identify the radionuclide in many cases except the sources 1:2 and 2:2 when 
more detailed examination of the obtained spectra was needed by the help of hand held 
instrument Exploranium GR-130. The latter was used for ambient dose rate measurements, as 
well. The true activity has been estimated taking into account the maximum value of ambient 
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dose rate due to radiation from the source at fixed distance. The source activity has been 
determined according to equation 
 
2D rA ⋅=
Γ
     (3) 
Here A is the activity of the radionuclide in the source, Bq, D is the ambient dose rate, Sv/s, r 
is the distance from the source, m, and Γ is the gamma-constant for point source, m2 Sv Bq-1 
s-1. Exposure rate can be used for point source activity determination, too. In this case, the 
different value for gamma-constant should be applied. The values of gamma-constants were 
taken from [4, 5]. In case of 137Cs, a true activity has been estimated by two methods: 
ambient dose rate conversion through the gamma-constants and counting rate at full-energy 
peak conversion through the absolute counting efficiency at fixed distance.  
Data analysis 
Radionuclide type was identified by the typical shape of gamma-spectrum (60Co, 137Cs) or by 
the position of the full-absorption energy peak of the most efficient gamma-ray emission 
(131I). Some of the sources were hidden inside large storehouses, and the true distance to 
detector position was unknown in these cases. Together with varying shielding this was the 
main source of uncertainty in true activity estimations. The source 2:2 was shielded very 
heavy in all directions useful for car-borne gamma-ray spectrometry. Therefore, only 
scattered events could be seen in the spectrum. It looked as the spectrum of strong pure beta-
emitter. This source was identified properly only after the detector was placed just above it. 
This geometry allowed obtaining full-energy absorption events and collecting respective 
gamma-spectrum.  
Results 
The results are summarized in table 1. The total number of sources found is 13. Reference and 
pre-exercise sources are not taken into account here. There is seen clear systematic 
underestimation of the true activity, except for both 137Cs sources which were, probably, less 
shielded as compared to other sources. In case of 137Cs, the true activity shown in table 1 is 
that calculated from ambient dose rate measurements and not from the full-energy peak area 
conversion. If the latter approach was used the true activity would be overestimated by the 
approximately three times of the actual one for both sources. It shows considerable difference 
in shielding extent between reference source 6:1 and both sources in question. Generally, the 
estimated true activity falls within 50% of the actual value. The sources 3:1, 7:1, 7:4 and, 
especially, 7:5 are exceptions. All of them are attributed to the storehouses. The larger 
deviation from the actual value in these cases can be explained by uncertain source-to-
detector distance as well as by unknown variation in shielding performance. 
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Table 1. Results of source identification and activity determination. 
Source 
code 
Date Radio-
nuclide 
Distance, 
m 
Dose rate, 
µSv/h 
Exposure, 
µR/h 
Estimated 
true activity, 
GBq 
Actual 
activity, 
GBq 
1:1 01 09 19 60Co 20 2.7 240 3.2±0.6 5 
1:2 01 09 19 131I 15 1.5 140 6.0±1.0 9.25 
8.5* 
1:3 01 09 19 60Co 18 4.2 390 4.0±1.0 5 
2:1 01 09 19 60Co 7 14 1250 2.5±0.5 5 
2:2 01 09 19 60Co 3 70 n. m. 2.3±0.5 5 
3:1 01 09 18 60Co 10 3.4 415 1.1±0.2 4x5 
4:1 01 09 18 137Cs 10 0.52 n. m. 0.65±0.1 0.4 
4:2 01 09 18 137Cs 15 1.35 n. m. 3.4±0.6 2.5 
4:4 01 09 18 60Co 10 6.2 n. m. 2.5±0.5 5 
4:5 01 09 18 60Co 10 6.1 n. m. 2.5±0.5 5 
7:1 01 09 17 60Co 10 2.5 n. m. 1.0±0.3 5 
7:4 01 09 17 60Co 7 8.5 640 1.6±0.5 5 
7:5 01 09 17 60Co 3 0.9 n. m. 0.026±0.006 5 
• *  Decay -corrected value for 19 September assuming that the activity of 9.25 GBq was 
valid on 18 September. 
• n. m. Not measured 
Conclusions 
Using car-borne gamma-ray spectrometry there were 13 orphan sources found during the 
exercise. The radionuclide type was identified and a true activity of each source was 
estimated. It was very useful experience for the LTK team. The equipment was calibrated and 
tested in field conditions. The results obtained were fairly good: all sources found were 
identified correctly, true activity estimated with sufficient accuracy. However, some sources 
were missed. The reasons for that could be listed as follows: 
1. Driving speed was sometimes too high 
2. Not all suspiciously-looking targets were checked carefully 
3. Demanding exercise and limited time did not allow to check absolutely all roads 
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Mark A. Smethurst, John O. Mogaard, Eirik Mauring, Janusz Koziel, Ola Kihle 
 
Equipment 
Vehicle 
The measuring equipment for team NOK is mounted in a four-wheel-drive Toyota Hiace van 
(Fig. 1; Smethurst 2000).  The van has a crew of two, a driver and an instrument operator, 
both seated in the front of the vehicle.  
 
 
Figure 1. The measuring system used by team NOK of the Geological Survey of Norway. 
Note that the 16.7 litre NaI detector behind the side door can be rotated to present a larger 
cross-sectional area to the left and right sides of the road. 
Fixed Instrument 
The principal measuring instrument for mobile source detection is an Exploranium GR-820 
256-channel gamma ray spectrometer utilizing an Exploranium GPX-1024 16.7 litre NaI 
detector. Counting time is usually set to one second but this can be increased to 5 seconds. 
The detector is supported a few centimetres beneath the roof of the van on a steel frame. The 
centre of the detector is at a height of 1.5 m. The frame permits the rotation of the detector 
about an axis aligned with the direction of travel of the vehicle. The detector can be rotated 
and fixed so that its largest surface faces directly out to the side, maximising the sensitivity of 
the instrument to near-horizontal radiation from sources situated on or near the ground to 
either side of the vehicle.  
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Hand-held instrument 
An Automess 6150 AD6 dose rate meter is used to monitor dose rates in the vehicle for the 
protection of the crew. The instrument is also used outside the vehicle for determining the 
precise locations of radioactive sources and the doses associated with them. 
Navigation 
The vehicle's location is determined once every second using an Ashtech G12 GPS receiver 
linked to a dedicated PC. The navigation system is able to deliver most kinds of projected 
coordinates in real-time  including the Swedish RT90 coordinate system used in the Barents 
Rescue exercise.  
If the Automess dose rate meter is used at some distance from the vehicle, a position of the 
dose measurement can be obtained from a hand-held Garmin GPS 12 XL GPS navigation 
device. 
Real-time data processing, data display and data logging 
A laptop computer situated on the dashboard of the vehicle acquires data from the gamma ray 
spectrometer and navigation system, processes the data, displays the data in various forms, 
and records the data on disk in binary (full spectrum) and ASCII text forms (NKS format). 
Methods 
Strategy 
The NOK team, from the Geological Survey of Norway, exercised both a field measuring 
crew, present in Boden, and support personnel at the Geological Survey of Norway 
headquarters in Trondheim. The field team reported to the Barents Rescue Radiation 
Emergency Assessment Centre (REAC) as instructed, and shortly afterwards sent full 
spectrum data to Trondheim. The team in Trondheim archived the data, produced large-
format maps of various kinds, and produced an independent interpretation of the data. The 
Trondheim interpretation of sources was then sent back to the field crew in Boden together 
with a selection of illustrations and map images (Fig. 2).  
The field strategy for team NOK was to measure along all roads within each search area in the 
time allocated by the Gamma Search Cell leadership. Importance was placed on scanning the 
entire search area for strong and potentially hazardous sources at the risk of bypassing weak 
sources. With a large detector, measuring once a second, we set a maximum speed of 50 
km/h. In practice we drove between 30 and 50 km/h and still covered most of the roads in 
each search area.  
The search for sources was founded solely on data from the principal measuring instrument, 
the gamma ray spectrometer. Only when that instrument gave indication of a source did we 
stop the vehicle and investigate the surrounding area on foot. We did not stop and check 
objects at or near the roadside simply because they were there. 
It was also decided that we should report a single dose rate and cps (counts per second) 
measurement for each source found, even though several measurements of each source were 
made, so that more time could be spent covering the search area. 
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Figure 2. Example map of dose rates measured along tracks in the middle of area C4, 
18/09/2001. Note that a non-linear colour scale has been used. 
Surveying parameters 
In most situations driving speed was set to between 30 and 50 km/h. The NaI detector was 
turned on its side in order to present as large a cross-sectional area as possible to the left and 
right sides of the road. 
Data analysis 
All data processing is done in real-time. Conventional window stripping is performed to 
provide an indication of the amounts of naturally occurring K-40, daughters of U-238, and 
daughters of Th-232 in the surrounding natural environment (IAEA 1991). These values and 
the cosmic window' value (spectrum channel 255) are used to scale unit gamma ray spectra 
for K-40, U-238, Th-232 and cosmic radiation before they are summed to yield a model of the 
natural spectrum. The model spectrum is then subtracted from the measured spectrum to 
produce a residual or man-made spectrum. If the model spectrum is a close fit to the 
observed spectrum, the man-made spectrum is virtually zero (Fig. 3). If there is an exotic 
radionuclide within detection range, the man-made spectrum resembles the gamma ray 
spectrum of the exotic nuclide (Fig. 4). Dose rate (air kerma rate) is determined from the sum 
of energy-weighted channel count rates (Bargholz 1996, Bargholz & Korsbech 1997) for the 
observed spectrum (total dose), model spectrum (natural dose) and man-made spectrum 
(dose from source). The integrity of the natural model can break down when a photo-peak 
from an exotic source impinges on one of the energy windows used in the stripping process. 
The 1330 keV photo-peak for Co-60 does this. Even in this situation, where the spectra for 
natural and man-made sources are not properly separated, the deviation from natural 
behaviour is large enough to be quite obvious and the source is found. 
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Figure 3. Spectrum plot from area C2 16/09/2001 (counts per second versus spectral channel) 
showing almost exact agreement between the observed (red) and model spectrum (blue). The 
residual or 'man-made' spectrum is in green. Dose rates are in µGy/h and position in RT90. 
 
Figure 4. Spectrum plot near the Cs-137 source 6:1 in test area R2. The 'man-made' spectrum 
(green) contains the photo-peak for Cs-137 at 662 keV and dominates over the model for 
natural radiation sources (blue).  
A display of successive man-made spectra in a rainbow-plot (Fig. 5) linked with a 
complex alarm is the principal tool for source detection. Constantly varying and distracting 
natural spectra are virtually absent in this display, whereas significant deviations from normal, 
natural, behaviour are enhanced. Nuclide identifications are based on visual examination of 
spectral shapes.  
In most situations during the Barents Rescue exercise visual contact was made with either the 
sources themselves or the structures that enclosed them. In these cases the location of the 
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source was rapidly determined through direct observation from the vehicle and dose rate 
measurements made on foot. When practical to do so, the NOK team performed a controlled 
drive-by of the source to produce a simple source profile shape that could then be used to 
estimate distance to the source. Also estimates of source activity were made based on an 
adaptation of equation 9.1 given by IAEA (1991). 
 
Figure 5. 'Rainbow plot' of a drive by of sources R1:1 (Cs-137, left) and R1:2 (Co-60, right) 
at the helicopter airfield in Boden. This display form, consisting only of the difference 
spectrum ('man-made' spectrum), was heavily used in the exercise. The plot consists of 
vertical coloured strips, each representing one spectrum. Each new measurement appears as a 
vertical strip at the right of the screen and the previous measurements scroll to the left. For 
each strip the vertical axis represents spectral channel while colour is used to indicate counts 
per second in each channel. Warm colours denote high values. 
Results 
Source identifications were reported to REAC by mobile telephone. Relevant processed data, 
including source position in RT90, could be read directly from the computer screen in the car 
in real-time. There were only two or three occasions when contact with REAC could not be 
established within a few minutes of source detection. 
Finished processed measurements were stored in NKS files in real time. Each days track 
data, amounting to some 30,000 measurements made over 9 hours, were delivered to the 
REAC shortly after returning to the Exercise Area. Measurement data were checked in the 
vehicle during the half-hour journey from the search area back to the Exercise Area. This 
check included loading the NKS file into a map-making package, Geosoft Oasis Montaj, and 
making a map of the days data. The NKS files and example maps were delivered to REAC 
before 6 pm. 
Copies of the data were sent to Trondheim where an independent search for sources took 
place. Each days data took less than three hours to analyse (one third of the real data 
acquisition time), including the production of various maps of the data. The Trondheim team 
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recognised all of the sources reported by the NOK field team in Boden and further refined the 
interpretation of the data. 
The tables below summarise the performance of the NOK team in the various parts of the 
Barents Rescue exercise for car-borne measuring systems. The tables list all the sources 
present in the search areas, and indicate which of these were found by the NOK team. If a 
source was not found, a reason is given in the table. Overall, the NOK team made 16 positive 
source identifications, reported 2 small areas with Chernobyl fallout within search area C3, 
and made 2 false source identifications. Two additional sources were identified in the data 
during post processing. Otherwise, six sources (or source pairs) were passed without detection 
(only two of these were 'strong' sources), and 9 were not visited by NOK. 
Explanation of tables 
The result tables include official information on the sources on the left and the results of the 
NOK team on the right. Positions for the sources are in Swedish RT90. The difference 
between the official position and the position reported by NOK is given under the heading 
'Diff.'. We are uncertain of the relative accuracies of the two estimates of position. 
The tables include selected measurements of the sources. Measurement type (a) is derived 
from the gamma ray spectrometer (detector height 1.5 m). The measurement is in counts per 
second (e.g. 31700), measured at a given distance from the source (e.g. 20 m) in a given 
direction from the source (e.g. SW). Measurement type (b) is air kerma rate (µGy/h), also 
derived from the gamma ray spectrometer, for the same position relative to the source. 
Measurement type (c) is dose rate (µSv/h) obtained from the Automess dose rate meter for a 
position close to that of (a) and (b). 
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Official information on source 
Result from team NOK 
! Source found; ! False source; ! Chernobyl fallout; ! Found in post-processing; 
! Passed by but not found; " Source not visited 
Nuclide GBq Code Posn. Nuclide Posn. Diff. Measurement Result 
Cs-137 2.6 
6:1 1761020 
7302427 Cs-137 
1761020 
7302427 
0 m a. 31700 @ 20 m SW 
b. 0.47 
c. 0.45  
Positive identification in real-time, Exact knowledge of source 
location (military trailer). Investigated on foot. Photo-peak at 662 
keV. 
Co-60 5 
6:2 1761670 
7302884 Co-60 
1761670 
7302890 
6 m a. 20300 @ 47 m SE 
b. 0.40 
c. 0.45 
Positive identification in real-time, Exact knowledge of source 
location (chaotic wood stack). photo-peaks at 1170 and 1330 keV.  
Cs-137 1.9 
X:1 1762946 
7303659 Cs-137 
1762928 
7303669 
20 m a. 17010 @ 2 m N 
b. 0.19 
c. 0.26 
Positive identification in real-time, Exact knowledge of source 
location (civilian trailer). Photo-peak at 662 keV. 
Cs-137 0.5 X:2-1 1764308 7308519  
   Driven past source  no trace of the source in the data set. 
Co-60 0.02 X:2-1 1764308 7308519  
   Driven past source  no trace of the source in the data set. 
Cs-137 2x0.5 X:3 1764698 7306720 X 
   Short side road not driven. 
Co-60 2x0.02 X:4 1764300 7306424 X 
   Short side road not driven. 
Cs-137 
Cs-137 
Cs-137 
Co-60 
Co-60 
Ba-133 
1.3 
1.9 
0.4 
0.1 
0.1 
0.004 
X:5 1763856 
7305822 
Cs-137 
   Post-processing: Cs-137 source/s observed in two successive 
spectra measured a few metres from the source/s. The Cs-137 
source/s were only within detection range for 2 seconds and were 
therefore overlooked by the measuring team. 
Team NOK did not stop unless the primary measuring instrument 
gave indication of a possible source. No source was noticed and 
therefore we did not stop to investigate on foot.  
Pre-exercise, Sunday 16/09/2001 search area C2 
Approximate percentage of roads driven: 98% 
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Official information on source 
Result from team NOK 
! Source found; ! False source; ! Chernobyl fallout; ! Found in post-processing; 
! Passed by but not found; " Source not visited 
Nuclide GBq Code Posn. Nuclide Posn. Diff. Measurement  Result 
Co-60 5 
7:1 1725376 
7340248 Co-60 
1725380
7340240
9 m a. 39157 @ 20 m E 
b. 0.88 
c. 1.00 
Positive identification in real-time, Exact knowledge of source 
location (military warehouse). Investigated on foot. Shielded source 
 strong beam through door. Photo-peaks at 1170 and 1330 keV. 
Co-60 5 
7:2 1721169 
7340769 Co-60 
1721159
7340790
23 m a. 56200 @ 20 m N 
b. 1.12 
c. 1.89 
Positive identification in real-time, Exact knowledge of source 
location (military warehouse). Investigated on foot. Spectral peaks at 
1170 and 1330 keV. 
Co-60 5 
7:3 1718957 
7338223 Co-60 
1718945
7338220
12 m a. 160000 50m NNW 
b. 2.60 
c. 11.00 
Positive identification in real-time, Exact knowledge of source 
location (military warehouse). Investigated on foot. Photo-peaks at 
1170 and 1330 keV. 
Co-60 5 7:4 1718983 7338209 Co-60 
   This and the above source were located in the same military ware-
house. Team NOK interpreted the two sources as one single source. 
Co-60 5 
7:5 1711648 
7331315 Un-
identified 
1711641
7331309
9 m a. 6210 @ 3 m N 
b. 0.40 
c. ? 
Source found in real-time, Exact knowledge of source location 
(military warehouse). Investigated on foot. Shielding around source, 
no characteristic photo-peaks observed  isotope not identified.   
Ra-226 Nat 7:6 1721282 7340593  
   Driven past source  no trace of the source in the data set. 
Ra-226 Nat 7:7 1718765 7337175  
   Driven past source  no trace of the source in the data set. 
Ra-226 Nat 7:8 1712920 7318874 Ra-226 
   Post-processing: Ra-226 source observed.  
Reported  
  Low energy 
gamma 
1741435
7295615
  Suspicious low energy gamma radiation  not explained by live 
modelling of natural radiation sources.  Reported to REAC as 
Possible distant source 
Reported  
  Low energy 
gamma 
1717881
7336290
  Suspicious low energy gamma radiation  not explained by live 
modelling of natural radiation sources.  Reported to REAC as 
Possible distant source 
Barents Rescue exercise, Monday 17/09/2001 search area C7 
Approximate percentage of roads driven: 80% 
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Official information on 
source 
Result from team NOK 
! Source found; ! False source; ! Chernobyl fallout; ! Found in post-processing; 
! Passed by but not found; " Source not visited 
Nuclide GBq Code Posn. Nuclide Posn. Diff. Measurement Result 
Co-60 4x5 
3:1 1766304
7316848 Co-60 
1766288 
7316863 
21 m a. 175000 @ 6 m N 
b. 1.83 
c. 1.00 
Positive identification in real-time, exact knowledge of source location 
(military warehouse). Investigated on foot. Shielded source  strong 
beam through door. Photo-peaks at 1170 and 1330 keV. Heavily 
shielded  characteristic photo-peaks absent from most vantage points. 
Cs-137 0.4 
4:1 1760923
7321390 Cs-137 
1760897 
7321397 
27 m a. 51550 @ 8 m S 
b. 0.81 
c. 0.50 
Positive identification in real-time, exact knowledge of source location 
(red wooden shed). Investigated on foot. Photo-peak at 662 keV.  
Cs-137 2.5 4:2 17604887323895 X 
   Did not drive past this source (narrow track deep inside shooting range).  
Ir-192 13 4:3 17603107323933 X 
   Did not drive past this source (narrow track deep inside shooting range). 
Co-60 5 
4:4 1761137
7323702 Co-60 
1761122 
7323712 
18 m a. 87570 @ 12 m N 
b. 2.37 
c. 0.40 
Positive identification in real-time, exact knowledge of source location 
(concrete bunker, open upwards, with metal plate weighed down by 
stones over the opening). Photo-peaks at 1170 and 1330 keV. Complex 
shielding. Investigated on foot. 
Co-60 5 
4:5 1761117
7323744
Un-
identified
1761102 
7323749 
16 m a. 27420 @ 7 m E 
b. 0.32 
c. 0.20 
Source found in real-time, exact knowledge of source location (concrete 
bunker, close to source above). Complex shielding, no characteristic 
photo-peaks observed  isotope not identified. Investigated on foot. 
Cs-137 1.3 4:6 17614427323932 X 
   Drove close to but not past this source. 
Cs-137 1.9 4:7 17615597323941 X 
   Drove close to but not past this source. 
Fallout  
 
C3 
Chernobyl 
fallout 
Cs-137 
1766257 
7318837 
  Traces of Chernobyl fallout in the neglected lawns between abandoned 
residential buildings at road junction.  
Fallout  
 
C3 
Chernobyl 
fallout 
Cs-137 
1767383 
7315342 
  Traces of Chernobyl fallout around two run-down wooden warehouses. 
Barents Rescue exercise, Tuesday 18/09/2001 search areas C3 (morning) and C4 (afternoon) 
Team NOK accompanied by Norwegian civil defence force with dose rate meters. 
Approximate percentage of roads driven: 90% 
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Official information on source 
Result from team NOK 
! Source found; ! False source; ! Chernobyl fallout; ! Found in post-processing; 
! Passed by but not found; " Source not visited 
Nuclide GBq Code Posn. Nuclide Posn. Diff. Measurement Result 
Co-60 5 
1:1 1756005
7298134 Co-60 
1755997
7298125
12 m a. 131900 @ 20 m SW 
b. 1.35 
c. 0.5 
Positive identification in real-time, exact knowledge of source 
location (in green box under camouflage net). Investigated on foot. 
Photo-peaks at 1170 and 1330 keV. 
I-131 9.25 
1:2 1756005
7299224 Un-
identified
1755981
7299234
26 m a. 17320 @ 2 m SW 
b. 1.45 
c. 20.00 
Source found in real-time, exact knowledge of source location (in 
raised wooden shed  source visible from outside). Shielded source 
 strong beam towards the road. Clear photo-peak at 364 keV 
plus others. 
Co-60 5 1:3 17559567299830 X 
   Did not drive past this source. Shortest distance from source to 
road network: 450 m. 
Co-60 5 1:4 17567477300334 X 
   Did not drive past this source. Shortest distance from source to 
road network: 525 m. 
Co-60 5 
2:1 1764029
7307246 
Un-
identified
1764025
7307254
9 m a. 94370 @ 5 m E 
b. 1.04 
c. 0.8 
Source found in real-time, exact knowledge of source location 
(inside a concrete bunker  wood covering the opening). No 
characteristic photo peaks.  
Co-60 5 
2:2 1764048
7307266 Co-60 
1764041
7307275
11 m a. 149420 @ 6 m SE 
b. 1.65 
c. 1.2 
Positive identification in real-time, exact knowledge of source 
location (inside a concrete bunker  wood covering the opening). 
Investigated on foot. Photo-peaks at 1170 and 1330 keV.  
Mo-99 3.1 2:3 17648447307031  
   Driven past source  no trace of the source in the data set. 
Mo-99 18 2:4 17653507305451 X 
   Did not drive past this source. 
Cs-137 3x0.5 2:5-1 17634667306095  
   Driven past source  no trace of the source in the data set. 
Co-60 3x0.02 2:5-2 17634667306095  
   Driven past source  no trace of the source in the data set. 
Am-241 0.0004 2:6 17605267302595  
   Driven past source  no trace of the source in the data set. 
Barents Rescue exercise, Wednesday 19/09/2001 search areas C1 (morning) and C2 (afternoon) 
Team NOK accompanied by Norwegian civil defence force with dose rate meters (morning). 
Approximate percentage of roads driven: 95% 
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Conclusions 
The measuring system employed by the NOK team proved to be reliable. 140,000 
measurements were made in Boden over 8 days without technical failure. We feel that the 
source search strategy worked well and are satisfied that comparatively few strong sources 
were overlooked in the short time allocated for searching. We are also pleased that the support 
team in Trondheim were able to reproduce the results of the on-site team. The Barents Rescue 
exercise was a positive and learning experience for the NOK team members and we now feel 
better prepared for emergency measurements of this kind. 
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Norwegian Team (NOL) 
Mark Dowdall, Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority 
Tor Christian Berg, Norwegian Institute for Air Research 
 
Equipment 
The vehicle used by the NOL team was a standard rental van of the Hiace type. Mounted in 
the rear of the van was a 16 l NaI detector (4 x 4 l) manufactured by Exploranium Ltd. 
(Exploranium model 1024) mounted on a custom built adjustable, shock absorbing, rack 
system (NILU) which supported the detector at a height of approximately 1  1.5 meters from 
the surface of the road. The rack was designed to allow the detector to be tilted towards the 
roadside in a configuration that allowed for the maximum signal to be accumulated from the 
right hand side of the van. The door was closed during normal operation to reduce the ingress 
of contaminant dust into the van interior. The detector was connected to a Canberra Inspector 
MCA (model 1200), the output from which was fed to a laptop personal computer. The laptop 
computer was custom configured to accept data simultaneously from the MCA and from a 
roof mounted GPS unit. The software used was a custom program developed by the 
Geological Survey of Norway (NGU) and slightly modified by the NRPA. The program was 
developed in LabVIEW from the National Instruments Corporation. This program was 
originally developed for radiometric exploration purposes and the layout and functions of the 
system reflect that intention. The software allows for continuous observation of a gamma ray 
spectrum, counts at various regions of the spectrum and a measure of the ambient dose 
equivalent rate. A more detailed description of the program may be found in [1]. The team 
was also equipped with a range of portable dose meters. 
Methods 
The NOL strategy involved traversing each road in the search areas from both directions. A 
background measurement, consisting of approximately 40 readings, was taken upon entering 
each search area. This background was then subtracted from all subsequent readings. The car 
speed was maintained at approximately 30 km per hour. Readings were taken every two 
seconds. Elevated radioactivity was determined by the appearance of the acquired spectrum, 
the numbers of counts in specific spectral windows corresponding to the emission energies 
of a number of nuclides and the elevation of the dose rate above a certain threshold value. 
Areas of suspected elevated activity were noted and were then returned to for a more detailed 
examination. This involved acquiring a spectrum at various distances and orientations to the 
suspected source for identification purposes and surveys on foot with portable dose meters in 
order to ascertain the orientation, shielding and collimation of the source. 
Data analysis 
Sources were identified on the basis of their characteristic emissions at certain energies. These 
were identified manually from the gamma spectra obtained. Activity calculations were based 
on the dose rate and the distance from the source using certain factors for different nuclides.  
Results 
Technical problems during the early stages of the exercise prevented the searching of area C7. 
The team located 1 source in C1, 2 in C2, the single source in C3 and 2 sources in C4. Of 
these, 4 sources were correctly identified. In common with the majority of teams, activity 
estimates were poor. This may possibly be attributed to the positioning and collimation of the 
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sources. It proved extremely difficult to estimate distances from sources in many cases as the 
sources were often placed at unknown locations in large buildings and this made estimation of 
distance from the source very difficult to judge. Secondly, the level of shielding on any source 
was unknown. Identification of sources was largely dependant on the isotope involved. 
Sources consisting of Cs-137 and Co-60 were relatively easy to identify although this was not 
always true where the sources were placed in close juxtaposition or where collimation 
prevented positioning of the equipment in an ideal position. Positioning and collimation of 
some sources hampered location, such as, for example, when the source was collimated to 
point upwards or away from the road.  
Conclusions 
Given the level of technical problems encountered, the team were satisfied with their 
performance and that of the equipment used. The exercise did highlight the need for more 
hand-held equipment, particularly spectrometers and the need for equipment providing better 
energy resolution than that provided by NaI was also apparent. Methods of calculating 
activity may require further investigation. The team is currently investigating improvement of 
the software in relation to optimisation for the detection and identification of anthropogenic 
sources and investigating methods for the improved estimation of dose rate over larger 
distances. 
References 
1. Smethurst, M.A. A mobile gamma ray spectrometer for nuclear hazard mapping. 
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Polish Team (PLK) 
Krzysztof ISAJENKO, Pawel LIPIŃSKI  
CENTRAL LABORATORY for RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION  
Konwaliowa Str. 7, PL-013-194 Warszawa, POLAND  
Tel (++48103322) 8111999 
Fax (++48103322) 8111616  
e-mail: lipinski@clor.waw.pl, isajenko@clor.waw.pl  
Equipment 
The Central Laboratory for Radiological Protection uses 4 liter NaI(Tl) detector placed on the 
roof of the TOYOTA Land Cruiser vehicle. The detector is connected to Exploranium GR-
660 system which consists of GR-320 portable spectrometer, differential Global Positioning 
System, on-board computer running 660Rover software for the visualization and simple 
analysis of the data. The Polish team uses hand-held MiniSpec GR-130 spectrometer/survey 
meter for performing of the measurements while out of the car. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Polish Mobile System 
Methods 
The 4-liter NaI detector is placed at the right side of the car, on the roof at the height of 
210cm. The detector is placed in sealed aluminium box. The driving speed during the exercise 
was chosen to be 30 km/h. Spectra were measured every 2 seconds and stored on the disk of 
the on-board computer. The survey consisted in driving along the road and observing the 
changes of the count rate in Co-60 and Cs-137 energy, as well as low-energy windows (to see 
if there was a presence of the scattered radiation and thus suggesting the proximity of other 
sources). The spectra were also observed, but mainly when the source had already been 
detected to check for the nuclide. The GR-660 spectrometer has no any buzzer to inform the 
crew that the car is close to the radioactive source (and it is not easy to be concentrated for 
many hours)  so we used hand-held GR-130 also on the car working in the survey mode as 
source presence indicator. When the source was detected from the car or when there was a 
suspicion of the radioactive source being nearby, we left the car and started the search on-foot 
using GR-130.  
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Data analysis 
As soon as the source was found, the location was estimated by going around the area. The 
location of the source was determined using on-board DGPS giving the results both in RT90 
and WGS84 formats. During the exercise we found the bug in the Exploranium software 
which corrupted the readout of the location data in RT90 format. For the first two days of the 
exercise we were not able to identify where the problem really is, but finally it was solved. It 
occurred that pushing the button, which saves the current screen configuration caused 
software to change GPS configuration file.  
The identification of the nuclide was made using both GR-660 and GR-130 spectrometers. 
The source strength was determined by the GR-130 running dosemeter mode. The activity (Q) 
was estimated according to the formula:  
( )
)exp(
10 2
*
rr
QB
H amb
µ−
Γ
= ;  
where H*(10) is ambient equivalent dose rate, Γamb  gamma constant for H*(10), B  build-up 
factor for scattered photons (assumed B=1), r  distance to the source, attenuation in the air 
exp(-µr) assumed 1.  
We assumed no shielding of the source because in fact it was not known. So the activities 
given by the PLK team are usually lower than those given by the REAC.  
After the mission was completed we prepared NKS format files using NUCSPEC software.  
Results 
Our results are shown on the maps in below figures:  
 
Figure 2. Area C1.  
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Figure 3. Area C2.  
Figure 4. Area C3 
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Figure 5. Area C4 
 
Figure 6. Area C7  
It can be noticed that there is a difference of what was found and what was presented by the 
REAC. First and already mentioned is that due to the problems with RT90 coordinates in our 
system we had to provide REAC with the corrected SIRs. The corrected SIRs were both 
dictated by the phone and given on the paper when the mission was completed.  
Area C4  we found the Cs-137 source with the REAC code 4:2, but obviously on REAC 
maps there are two Cs-137 sources and not exactly in the right place. We think there might be 
that REAC assistant did not mark the second report of the source finding as correction or we 
did not do it.  
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Our mistake was to take two Co-60 sources placed in the fire trench as Cs-137 sources  the 
measurement was done probably too close to the sources.  
Area C3  the Co-60 source found in this area (in fact the only source) was erroneously put by 
the REAC assistant into wrong C4 area with number 3:33. This might be caused by two 
factors: we entered C3 area some minutes before 12:00 which was the time for us to enter the 
area (but it was told on the radio) and problems with RT90 format reporting that day.  
Conclusions 
When the mobile spectrometric laboratory was to be put into operation it was already 
assumed that it would be used to search for lost and orphan sources. Before Barents Rescue 
2001 some experiments had been made but not to a big extent. So it was in fact the first time 
for us to search for real sources in real conditions. During the Barents Rescue exercise we 
recognized that there are some improvements to be done, especially in the search procedure.  
First - one has to be very concentrated while using GR-660 system, because it has no 
possibility to inform the operator that there is something strange or unusual around the 
vehicle. It has to be improved.  
Second  there is a need to train on unusual sources (i.e. Am-241, Mo-99 etc.) to get used to 
the NaI spectra of different radionuclides. We are used to look at high-resolution HPGe 
spectra, and it is a need now to work with NaI spectra too.  
Third  now we know more or less what is the detection limit for our mobile system.  
Fourth  there is a need to have alternative GPS system in the car to assure that locations 
given by the team are correct.  
 
 
 
  230 
  231 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Russia, teams RUK/RUL 
  232 
  233 
Russian Team (RUK) 
Nikolai Drozdov, Emercom 
 
Team members 
Car leader  1 
Engineer - spectrometrist - 1 
Driver - dosimetrist - 1 
Equipment 
Gamma-survey set Sensor 
DKS-96 radiometric dosimeter equipped with M,B units 
DKG-02U radiometric dosimeter 
PVP-4A aerosol sampler 
PE-1110 water sampler  
Portable notebook with PSH-600/128/10/FDD7CD/FM/NW/121TFT  
Data transmitting system including R-23-02 radio modem, R-23-01 radio station and software 
package 
Methods 
Dosimetric 
Detection of radionuclides using the spectrometric method.  
Car speed  up to 40 km/h. 
Data analysis 
Source location detected using the GPS receiver; nuclide strength detected using the 
dosimetric equipment.  
Results 
19 ionising radiation sources were found.  
Conclusions 
We could not fully demonstrate our technical facilities 
Bad radio communication with personnel at collection and analysis of data location 
Problems using the reporting forms issued by REAC 
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Russian Team (RUL) 
Nikolai Drozdov, Emercom 
 
Team members 
Car leader  1 
Engineer  dosimetrist  1 
Engineer  spectrometrist  1 
Driver  dosimetrist - 1 
Equipment 
45x50 mm CsI (TI) scintillation gamma-spectrometer 
Stalker DKG-01-based gamma-survey system with a 63x63 mm NaI (Tl) crystal and GPS 
receiver 
RM-1402M radiometric spectrometer  
MKS-14ETS radiometric dosimeter 
RM-1603 personal dosimeter 
UVS-RM-1603 read-out device with software 
PU-ZP/12 aerosol sampler 
PE-1105 water sampler 
Soil sampler with Edelman nozzle 
Electronic balance Tefal 
Notebook personal computer with software 
Data transmitting system including R-23-02 radio modem, R-23-01 radio station and software 
package 
Methods 
Detection of radionuclides using the spectrometric method.  
Dosimetric  
Car speed  up to 40 km/h. 
Data analysis 
Source location detected using the GPS receiver, nuclide strength detected using the 
dosimetric equipment. 
Results 
10 ionising radiation sources were found.  
Conclusions 
We could not fully demonstrate our technical facilities. 
The main task of the mobile radiometric laboratory is spectrometric analysis, but not air 
radiological searching. 
Bad radio communication with personnel at collection and analysis of data location. 
Problems using the reporting forms issued by REAC. 
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Russian CGS Team (RUM/RUN) 
Sergey Vasiliev, 
Emergency Response Centre of Minatom. Russia 
 
Introduction
Our mobile systems are intended for
radiation monitoring of territories
with the scale to some hundred
kilometers.
  Such monitoring may be
conducted under a day-to-day
condition for controlling a radiation
situation at a territory that may
potentially be subject to
contamination, and should be
conducted efficiently in an
emergency to evaluate the actual
contamination and obtain the data to
take adequate countermeasures.
 
 
Main measured parameters
Main characteristics of a radiation situation, which are subject to be
measured efficiently or evaluated with using mobile systems of radiation
monitoring, include the following:
•Dose rate of gamma radiation
•Isotope composition of main dose-forming nuclides
•Surface alpha- or beta-contamination
•Concentration of radioactive nuclides in the air.
Exactly these characteristics determine a short-term forecasted dose and require
an efficient evaluation. In accordance with the measured characteristics,
selection of instruments is accomplished.
Besides that, when conducting the efficient monitoring for referencing the
measured values to the locality, the data are required on geographical
coordinates of a measurement point, i.e. it is necessary to use a navigation
system with the sufficient space resolution.
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Equipment
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Thus, a set of instruments should be determined by a set of the main measured
parameters.
Fig.1
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Scaning system (RUN)
Additionally, one of our systems is equipped
with a scanning device with the 150х100 mm
NaJ detector for searching local gamma-sources.
Fig.2
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Equipment
Computing devices and data communication devices
Computing devices of a mobile system should provide of
collection, visualization, analysis, storage and transmission of
the radiation monitoring data.
A system of communication and transferring data should
provide an opportunity to transfer the monitoring data to the
crisis center.
The real time data transfer mode seems the most desirable, and
therefore, preference is given to wireless communication
channels. The best characteristics, in this sense, relate to
cellular and satellite digital communication channels.
 
 
Methods
Measurement of the dose rate along a journey route.
The dose rate is measured using the  gamma-radiometer with 30х30 mm
NaJ detector. Integration time is 1 second. The program records an
average dose rate for a specified time interval or a specified distance
traveled by a car. A measured value is entered to the database with
referencing to coordinates of the car and time of registration. A mark of
the measurement is put in the  map, and a color of the mark depends upon
the measured value of the dose rate (Figure 3). An operator might set a
control level of the dose rate with the excess of which the program was
beginning to generate a sound signal. The data accumulated were
transmitted with using digital communication systems to the operation
center.
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Methods
Fig.3  
 
Methods
Measurement  of a gamma-spectrometer count rate.
We used a portable gamma-spectrometer with a NaJ detector with the
size of 63х63 mm. A special window was introduced to the program of
the spectrometer, where the dependence of the count rate against time
was represented in the selected energy range.
The operator was determining visually the presence of a peak in this
window.
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Fig.4  
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Methods
Usage of a scanning device.
A scanning device consisted of a NaJ detector and of a lead collimator
rotating around it. The device driver recorded the count rate for five energy
ranges in each of 32 sectors.
Mathematical processing gives opportunity to determine a direction towards
a source (sources) on the absolute coordinates in the  map.
 Two or three measurements for various positions of the car were sufficient to
obtain the coordinates of a source. This method has proved to be particularly
useful when identifying several sources located close by and searching
sources in locations difficult of access.
 The system allowed to register reliably sources with the activity of about 1
GBk at the distance of 100 m.
 
 
Methods
The screen of a computer at the moment of determination of a direction on a sources
Fig.5
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Methods
Determination of the nuclide composition and the activity of sources.
Measurement of characteristics of a source was performed with using a
gamma-spectrometer with a NaJ detector with the size of 63х63 mm and the
energy resolution of 9% for the energy of 660 keV. Processing was
implemented with using a traditional method by full absorption peaks.
Calculation of the activity was being conducted with using the curve of the
detector efficiency measured for a point source at the distance of one meter.
When calculating the activity, a distance to the source and absorption in the
air were taken into account.
The main condition of measurement was selecting a direction where shield
of а source was minimal. As a criterion of selection, we used the ratio of
amplitudes of scattered and direct radiation, which ratio was being estimated
visually by gamma-spectrum.
 
 
Results 
Together (RUM & RUN) we found 16 sources, one of them was not 
identified. 
When discussing the results, to my mind, the most interesting issue for 
consideration is to discuss sources of errors and difficulties arisen at the
stages of searching, measuring and analyzing the results. 
Searching sources. 
Rather high activity of sources and their close location to the roads 
helped the most of teams to detect a considerable part of sources. To 
detect them, it was enough to drive carefully along all roads accessible 
for a car, and watch attentively for indications of devices. For detecting 
the most of sources, even the high sensitivity of devices was not 
required. 
But... 
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Results
Weak sources or sources with low energy of radiation
Sources of molybdenum were an exception, since nobody
detected them. However, as it seems to us, either they were
located outside the area being accessible for driving by car,
or energy of radiation was lower than the discrimination
threshold of devices.
Sources located close by
Also we did not find one source located in a pipe under a
road. Perhaps, too long time of integration (4 sec) and the
presence of a dead zone (about 10 m) of a scanning device
did not allow us to detect it.
 
 
Results
Double sources
Some difficulties arose in case of two sources located close
by each other. In this case, radiation of the nearest source
masked radiation of the further one, and made its detection
difficult. In this situation, the presence of a scanning device
helped us very much, in a scanning plot  all sources of
radiation were distinctly visible.
False sources
It is interesting to note the appearance of false sources
bound up with scattering of radiation on surrounding
objects. So, for example, we had to investigate carefully a
group of trees at the distance of about 20 m from a source,
because radiation scattered on them created a distinct peak
on the screen of the scanning device. Unfortunately, this
picture was not stored.
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Results
Natural sources
Probably, all groups encountered a situation of rising the
radiation background caused by the high concentration of
natural radionuclides, and spent much time to investigate
them. The natural origin of such anomalies may be
identified by their space distribution and, of course, by the
spectrum of gamma radiation.
 
Results
Determination of parameters of sources.
Coordinates of a source
The presence of GPS devices helped to determine correctly
enough the coordinates of sources after their detection.
Individual errors, in our opinion,  occurred at the stage of
registration and transmission of information. Such errors
might be avoided by means of total automation of the
process of determining the coordinates of a source and using
a digital system of transferring the data.
 
Results
Determination of the isotope composition
The most difficulties arose when identifying the isotope
composition of sources. The main reason was the presence of
shield from several sides of a source. In this case, the main
contribution to the dose rate from the shielded sides was
made by low-energy scattered radiation, the spectrum of
which did not allow to identify correctly a nuclide (Figure 6).
Special difficulties arose when using software identifying
automatically the isotope composition.
The only way out of this situation was determination of a
direction where the shield was minimal, and full absorption
peaks were appearing in the spectrum (Figure 7).  
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Results
Spectrum of scattered radiation (Co-60)Fig.6  
 
Results
In this Figure, the full absorption peaks are distinctly visible,
as well as a backscattering peak  indicating of the presence of
shield at the opposite side.
Fig.7
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Results
Many groups had met difficulties when identifying Ir-192 and I-
131. Probably, the data on these nuclides were absent in
libraries used by the software, or algorithms of programs were
not able to determine correctly the energy of the full absorption
peaks. For such cases we recommend to all developers of
software for analyzing gamma-spectra to add the image of main
lines of the true spectrum of the selected nuclide to the image of
spectra.
 
Results
Such picture is very clear, and facilitates considerably the task of
identification.
Fig.8
 
Results
Determination of the activity
When determining the activity of a source, the main error was
produced by the presence of shield and the uncertainty in a
distance to a source. The uncertainty of these parameters
resulted the most considerable error.
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Conclusion
The exercise have provided a unique opportunity to check
abilities of all systems at all stages of work. We have understood
which of our systems work well, which ones should be changed,
and which ones should be created additionally.
The experience of contacts with colleagues and acquaintance with
their systems were very useful. Unfortunately, the competitive
nature of the studies prevented some groups from being interested
more thoroughly in possibilities and results of other groups. I
hope, here, we will be able to know each other better.
 
 
Conclusion
The presence of real sources in real conditions helped to watch
such effects distorting a shape of a spectrum (absorption and
scattering in the shield, in the air, in the surrounding objects,
etc.), which were seldom observed when conducting
measurements in laboratory conditions. Probably, it would be
very interesting and helpful to demonstrate these effects with
using one or two sources as an example and conducting more
thorough investigation of them. Unfortunately, the lack of time
did not allow to conduct such investigation.
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Conclusion
The first experience of data exchanging was very useful. It is
necessary to continue the development of unified formats of data
exchange by common efforts, using the experience of each other.
A very important factor in a real emergency is the interaction of
all participants. It is a very important problem, and, probably, the
special exercise should be devoted to it.
.  
Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to thank again the organizers of the
exercise. We are always willing to cooperate, and will be glad if
our experience may prove useful.
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Swedish Team (SEK/SEL) 
Team consisting of two cars in cooperation 
Olof Karlberg ,SSI, main author (car 1). 
Björn Sandström, FOI (car 1) 
Lynn Hubbard, SSI (car 2) 
Benno Bucher, Paul Scherrer Institute , Switzerland (car 2) 
 
Equipment 
Car 1 
Ortec HPGE 36% with DigiDart MCA ,GPS and laptop computer (mobile monotoring 
system) 
SRAT NaI Scintillator 
SRV2000 GM-tube 
RNI 10-S GM-tube 
RNI 10-S with external GM-tube, GPS, Nokia 9000 Communicator cellular phone (automatic 
doserate monitoring system; data sent to remote database; no operator interactions) 
Car 2 
GDM (MCA and GPS) system with 3"X3" NaI Scintillator and laptop computer (mobile 
monitoring system) 
Exploranium GR130 with BGO-scintillator 
SRAT NaI Scintillator 
Methods 
The two cars worked in collaboration, thus being able to cover as much territory as possible. 
The HPGE and the Exploranium detectors were mainly used for source identification. The 
speed was varying but not more than 60 km/h. 
Data analysis 
The monitoring systems used the following data analysis methods: 
• Spectrum plots (counts versus channel number) 
• Time plots of variables like: counts in peak areas corresponding to possible 
nuclides, quotients high/low spectrum part, total counts etc. 
• Rainbow spectrum plots 
• Map plots 
• Time series analysis with accumulated background subtraction (according to 
Hjerpe) 
All variables with position were accumulated and saved in the NKS data format. 
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Results 
There were 16 sources found. In most of the areas the best approach for finding sources was 
to drive and watch for suspicious military buildings or parked cars! It is therefore of no 
meaning to try to analyse why a certain source was found or not (a better procedure for testing 
the capability of the systems to find sources would have been to drive a common road where 
all sources were hidden). 
It was not possible to use the HPGE system while the car was moving (at least on bad gravel 
roads) because of audio or vibration influences.  
Conclusions 
The SRAT scintillator was the most effective source finder, mainly due to its rapid response 
and audio output (in the long run, it is tiring to watch a computer screen continuously). Also 
the NaI monitoring system in car 2 was useful, although the volume of the detector was a bit 
small. 
HPGE systems are not so useful for locating sources, due to the relatively low efficiency with 
only a few counts/channel. Since lost sources also could be shielded, which would decrease 
the non-scattered photon fluence, the advantage with the high resolution of the HPGE detector 
is lost. 
The HPGE system could be used for source identification, however, especially if it is possible 
to remove the detector from the car and find the unscattered beam. 
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Swedish Team SEM 
Thomas Hjerpe§, Christopher Rääf&, and Christer  Samuelsson§ (team leader) 
Lund University, Sweden 
§) Radiation Physics, The Jubileum Institute, Lund 
&) Radiation Physics, Malmö 
 
Equipment 
Detectors and team inside a GMC van with an extended plastic roof and equipped with an 
interior 6 kW generator supplying 220 V AC. Handheld as well as car-bound GPS equipment 
for positioning. The software for treating and presenting spectral data was kindly supplied by 
SSI. The following detectors were used: 
1. Carborne spectrometer HPGe (Ortec ruggidized) rel eff 100% + 8 k MCA (Dart, 
EG&G Ortec) 
2. Carborne spectrometer NaI(Tl) 0.3 L (Gammadata GDM 40) 
3. Handheld countmeter NaI(Tl) 0.1 L (Saphymo SPP_2_NF, SRAT) 
4. Handheld dosemeter, plastic scintillator (Bicron Microrem)  
5. Handheld spectrometer NaI(Tl) 0.05 L  (Bicron Fieldspec 130) This instrument was a 
demo instrument on loan Tue-Wend). 
Methods 
The objectives of our participation in Gamma Search Cell were to evaluate what a carborne 
team can do on its own, without any prior information concerning source locations or 
strengths. Thus, the recommended cooperation between an air team and a car team, the 
optimum use of resources in most real emergency situations, was not adopted.  
Driving speed dependant on road condition but normally about 30 km/hour on gravel roads 
and 50 km/h on asphalt roads. Both spectrometers inside car at the rear end and shielded 
towards all side by the plastic roof of the car. The height above ground is approximately 2 m. 
for the two car borne spectrometers. The initial on-line strategy for finding sources was that 
one or several of the predefined alarm levels of the spectrometers should be exceeded and 
thus warrant the stop of the car. As it were, most sources seen from the car by us, were strong 
enough to be spotted already by the NaI count meter (Saphymo).  
Once a source was found the car was stopped and in-car Ortec HPGe was used to identify the 
source by collecting an ordinary MCA spectrum over a few minutes. Some sources were 
heavily shielded or collimated and no peaks were seen in the Ortec HPGe spectrum if the 
detector was outside the primary gamma beam. In such a case the source was identified either 
by taking the Gammadata NaI spectrometer out of the car and into the primary beam or using 
the handheld Bicron Fieldspec (if available) in the primary beam. The activity of an identified 
gamma emitter was estimated by means of dose rate measurements on two different distances 
from the source, followed by calculation based on the inverse-square-law and the dose rate 
constant of the radionuclide in question. 
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Data analysis 
The sampling time of the HPGe spectrometer system was 10 s, while the 512 channel NaI 
spectrometer integrated over 5 s. The spectral and positioning data from the HPGe detector 
were analysed by software developed by the staff of SSI and displayed on a PC computer 
display. For the HPGe spectrometer the net count rate in each energy window was calculated 
by subtracting the background estimated from count rates to the left and right of the full 
energy peak.  The following energy windows were defined for the HPGe detector and the 
number of pulses was converted to the NKS file format: 
1. Total cps (1-4095 ch) 
2. Co-60 net cps 
3. Co-57 net cps 
4. Tc-99m net cps 
5. Cs-137 net cps 
6. I-131 net cps 
7. Ra-226 net cps 
For the GDM 40 NaI spectrometer 12 parameters based on 8 spectral windows were defined. 
Parameters1-5 are gross counts windows, 6-8 and 10-12 moving background gross counts 
parameters (MB), and parameter 9 is a Cs-137 window stripped from counts emanating from 
K-40 (PSC). In the MB 3/12 parameters the mean value of the latest 3 spectra is divided by 
the mean value of the preceding 12 spectra. For each MB 3/12 parameter an alarm level is 
defined, based on data from driving the car during natural background conditions (the alarm 
levels are in the parenthesis after each parameter below). The MB 3/12 algorithm is optimised 
for finding gamma sources emitting radiation isotropically and is less well suited for 
collimated sources affecting a single spectrum only. 
1. CPS full spectrum gross cps (400) 
2. I-131 window gross cps (80) 
3. Cs-137 window gross cps (30) 
4. Co-60 window gross cps (20) 
5. K-40 window gross cps (15) 
6. MB 3/12 High/Low ratio (1.3) 
7. MB 3/12 Low/High ratio (1.3) 
8. MB 3/12 Scattered (100-300 keV) (1.06) 
9. PSC MB 3/12 Cs-137 window (2.0) 
10. MB 3/12 I-131 window (1.7) 
11. MB 3/12 Co-60 window (1.9) 
12. MB 3/12 Cs-137 window (1.7) 
Results 
The 13 sources detected online are listed in Table 1. While comparing the performance of 
different equipments, it is worthwhile noting that our findings are based on: 
1. Blind search (no air-team data consulted prior to search) 
2. Small NaI spectrometer (0.3 L) 
  257 
3. A moving background (MB) algorithm that was not optimized for collimated source 
geometries. 
Table 1. Sources found and reported online by our team SEM. The first five columns display 
the source inventory as given by the Gamma Cell Search exercise management and the last 
four columns contain the figures we reported. 
 
Nuclide GBq Code RT E RT N SEM nucl SEM GBq SEM RT E SEM RT N 
I-131 9,25 1:2 1756005 7299224 I-131 9 1755999 7299226 
Co-60 5 2:1 1764029 7307246 Co-60 3,4 1764035 7307241 
Co-60 5 2:2 1764048 7307266 Co-60 3,1 1764055 7307263 
Co-60 4x5 3:1 1766304 7316848 Co-60 0,9 1766302 7316882 
Cs-137 0,4 4:1 1760923 7321390 Cs-137 0,18 1760915 7321376 
Cs-137 2,5 4:2 1760488 7323895 Cs-137 0,18 1761205 7321747 
Co-60 5 4:4 1761137 7323702 Co-60 1,7 1761137 7323696 
Co-60 5 4:5 1761117 7323744 Co-60 1,4 1761116 7323746 
Co-60 5 7:1 1725376 7340248 Co-60 1,3 1725392 7340242 
Co-60 5 7:2 1721169 7340769 Co-60 0,75 1721159 7340769 
Co-60 5 7:3 1718957 7338223 Co-60 6,6 1718955 7338224 
Co-60 5 7:4 1718983 7338209 Co-60 5,8 1718991 7338206 
Co-60 5 7:5 1711648 7331315 Co-60 0,3 1711645 7331282 
 
Due to heavy collimation and errors estimating the source distance for in-house sources, 
several activity figures reported is too low. As it were, 12 out of 13 sources observed on-line 
by us, were strong enough to be revealed by the sound from small Saphymo NaI count meter. 
The Cs-137 source under the nesting box (code 4:2) deserves a special comment. This source 
was the only source that was sensed by the large HPGe detector only. Neither the Saphymo 
NaI count meter nor the GDM 0.3 L NaI spectrometer gave any indication of a Cs-137 source 
from inside the car. Unfortunately, we reported erroneous coordinates for this source and 
consequently the REAC staff did not assigned any source code or SIR to our report. We have 
no explanation for the wrong coordinates. We can only guess that our handheld GPS received 
weak signals in the area and was not updated properly with the new position. Adding to the 
confusion is the fact that we in our notations has a dose rate of 6.5 microsievert per hour at 1.5 
m from the lower end (which we by the way, thought was the position of the source) of the 
metallic rod hanging down from the nesting box. Even if we correct for our misunderstanding 
of the source position, the noted dose rate is a factor of 10 too low. Misreading 65 
microsievert per hour as 6.5 is a possible explanation for our erroneous activity estimate of 
source 4:2.All our equipment kept operational throughout the exercise and no problems with 
energy drift, microphony etc occurred. The only exception was a PC laptop that has to be 
exchanged due to a destroyed serial port caused by our own erroneous handling. On the 
negative account is also that the GPS positioning from our car borne systems was 
occasionally lost. The software from SSI for both the HPGe MCA Dart and the NaI(Tl) 
gammadata equipment was invaluable for sorting, displaying and alerting us on incoming 
spectral data. However, some parts of the software, e.g. waterfall display, need further 
development to be useful during real time conditions.  
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Conclusions 
It is noticeable that the expensive HPGe detector was necessary for only 1 (source 4:2) out of 
13 sources. This is however, more an effect of the special source geometries and strengths 
during the exercise, than a deficiency in the HPGe spectrometry system itself.Clearly, the 
post-processing of the spectral data from the Gamma Search Cell will be an important tool for 
improving real-time evaluation and presentation techniques. Especially for the HPGe 
spectrometer one can expect improvements in real-time source detectability as the on-line 
presentation software from SSI used by us is just in its infancy. 
Acronyms 
MCA = Multi-Channel Analyser 
MB = Moving Background 
PSC = Potassium Stripped Counts 
REAC = Radiological Emergency Assessment Centre 
SIR = Source Identification Report 
SSI = Swedish Radiation Protection Authority 
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Sweden, Team SEN & SEP 
Christina Greis1, Håkan Grundin2, Mats Isaksson2, Håkan Pettersson1  
and Raine Vesanen2. 
1Department of Radiation Physics, Health Faculty, Linköping University, SE-581 85 
Linköping, Sweden.  2Department of Radiation Physics, Göteborg University, SE-413 45 
Göteborg, Sweden. 
 
Equipment, Methods and Data analysis 
A NaI(Tl)-spectrometer, GR-130 MiniSpec (Exploranium, Canada) with a 74 cm3 crystal, was 
used as a survey instrument in order to locate the sources. The same instrument (in dose rate 
mode) was also used for determination of the ambient dose equivalent rate at an estimated 
distance from the radiation source. The sources where identified with a 10% rel.eff. HPGe-
detector (EG&G Ortec inc., USA) except for two remote sites where the MiniSpec was used, 
due to its portability. The germanium spectrometer was connected to an Inspector multi 
channel analyzer and a Genie software (both Canberra inc., USA) run from a laptop PC. The 
source coordinates were identified with a Garmin GPS 12 (Garmin International inc., USA)  
Spare instruments were also calibrated and tested during the first days, but not used during the 
LIVEX missions. These comprised: a Garmin GPS 50, a 103 cm3 NaI(Tl) detector connected 
to a Nomad 92X-P multi channel analyzer with Maestro software (both EG&G Ortec inc., 
USA) run from a laptop PC, and four RNI 10/SR (RNI AB, Sweden) dose rate instruments, 
which we also carried during the missions for personal safety.  
The driving speed was 30-50 km/h. The NaI(Tl)- and the HPGe- detectors were situated at 
window height inside the car. Indications were based on (i) alarm levels, i.e. when dose rates 
exceeded ambient background dose rate levels, the acoustic alarm indicated presence of a 
source, and (ii) simultaneous monitoring of suspicious peaks in the germanium spectrum. On 
indication of higher activity, the suspicious part of the road was searched at lower speed. 
However, most of the time additional search had to me made on foot around the areas with the 
survey instrument. When a source was found, the radionuclide was identified by manual 
inspection of the gamma spectrum. Then the distance to the source was estimated by using the 
inverse square law. A reading of the ambient dose equivalent rate was then taken at a given 
distance. The shielding material and its thickness was estimated. The data was finally 
analyzed while travelling towards the next source; (i) The source apparent activity was 
determined by using the dose rate, distance and the gamma constant for the identified 
radionuclide. (ii) The estimated true activity was calculated taking the shielding material and 
its thickness in consideration by using attenuation coefficients for the actual gamma energies. 
The data was reported whenever possible to the REAC by cellular phone. 
Results and discussion 
In total there were 29 different sources in the gamma search cells. Some of the sources were 
difficult to find and identify. On average 10 of the 29 sources were correctly identified by the 
car-borne teams. None of the teams succeeded in identifying more than 15 sources correctly. 
We were able to locate 13 (45%) of the sources. However, identification was made on all of 
the located sources, and thereby we could calculate the apparent activities. In four cases we 
could identify the source shielding material and estimate its thickness, to such extent that it 
was possible to make an estimation of the true activity (table 1). The differences between 
actual activities and estimated true activities are probably due to uncertainties in the apparent 
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activity estimates and in the estimated thickness of the shielding materials. In addition, the 
attenuation factors for inhomogeneous materials such as concrete can differ quite a lot due to 
different types of bulk material, see sources 2:1 and 4:4 in table 1. 
Table 1. Data for all of the sources in the gamma search cells. The results for the 
SEN&SEP teams are presented under the apparent activities and the estimated true 
activities and the deviation between estimated true activities and the actual activities are 
also shown. The table also shows the number of car borne teams that located the source 
and how many of them identified the found source correctly.  
Existing Actual Apparent Estimated Deviation (%)
Sources activity (Gbq) activity (GBq) Activity (GBq) Located Identified
1:1     Co-60 5 4,3 4,5 10 3 2
1:2     I-131 9,25 9,5 10 8 14 6
1:3     Co-60 5 10 8
1:4     Co-60 5 15 10
2:1     Co-60 5 3,7 3,7 26 15 12
2:2     Co-60 5 0,15 15 9
2:3     Mo-99 3,1 0 0
2:4     Mo-99 18 0 0
2:5-1  Cs-137 1,5 0 0
2:5-2  Co-60 0,06 0 0
2:6     Am-241 0,0004 1 0
3:1     Co-60 20 1,04 16 15
4:1     Cs-137 0,4 0,45 8 6
4:2     Cs-137 2,5 10 9
4:3     Ir-192 13 5 4
4:4     Co-60 5 1,7 8,6 72 13 7
4:5     Co-60 5 10 2
4:6     Cs-137 1,3 0,32 6 2
4:7     Cs-137 1,9 1 1
7:1     Co-60 5 1,1 10 9
7:2     Co-60 5 2,9 11 10
7:3     Co-60 5 1,06 13 12
7:4     Co-60 5 6,4 7 6
7:5     Co-60 5 0,071 9 8
7:6     Ra-226 Nat 0 0
7:7     Ra-226 Nat 1 0
7:8     Ra-226 Nat 0 0
Number of teams that
 
Conclusions 
We learned a lot from this exercise and our results are quite encouraging. However, some 
improvements in source findings seem to be necessary. Some reported data were incorrectly 
given at the Barents rescue web page, maybe due to communication or reporting error, which 
should be avoided in the future. Survey instruments like the GR-130 MiniSpec seems to be 
quite versatile for this kind of investigations. However, car borne detectors need larger 
crystals (>74 cm3) if sources of lower activity are to be located or if driving at higher speed is 
desirable. Further, for the purpose of dose-rate and or spectrometric tracking, the instruments 
should include facilities for simultaneous GPS-recording. Cars with off-road capabilities are 
also recommended for such missions. 
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Seminar workshop 
Thomas Ulvsand, FOI 
The participants were divided into six groups. The groups were given the task to discuss 
certain questions provided by the seminar management, on nuclear emergency preparedness, 
mobile monitoring, and nuclear exercises. 
Group members and questions are given below. The chairman of each group is given in bold 
letters. Identical questions were given to groups 1 and 2, and similarly for groups 3 and 4, and 
to groups 5 and 6, respectively. After the two groups follow the questions they were asked to 
discuss in bold letters and a summary of their answers. 
Group 1  
Wolfgang Fehringer Federal Ministry of the Interior 
Christer Samuelsson Lund University 
Visvaldis Graveris Latvian Environment Agency 
Mark Dowdall Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority 
Mats Wedmark Geological Survey of Sweden 
Simon Karlsson Swedish Radiation Protection Institute 
 
Group 2  
Andreas Polaschek Gendarmerie Headquarter of Lower Austria 
Peder Beausang FOI, Swedish Defence Research Institute 
Andrejs Dreimanis Radiation Safety Centre 
Peter Hagthorpe Geological Survey of Sweden 
Robert Finck Swedish Radiation Protection Institute 
 
What kind of information concerning radioactivity in the environment is needed in an 
emergency situation? 
It is important to know the nuclide(s),physical nature, activity concentration, extensiveness, 
dose rate and the radiation field. It is not likely that measurements will give the first 
information. 
Can AGS/CGS information be integrated into present decision support systems? 
It is important, but there is an uncertainty about the way to do it. There can be problems with 
information exchange due to different systems. Data presentation is crucial 
What is the proper way of reporting measurements of fallout activity? 
Reports must go in classical ways about: source identity, area affected, homogeneity and 
equivalent surface activity, for which it is important to have an agreement on the definition. 
What is the proper way of reporting measurements of lost sources? 
The following should be reported: nuclide(s), activity and uncertainty, physical nature, beam 
characteristics, dose rate as a function of distance, position coordinates and safe distances. 
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Group 3  
Frank Andersen Danish Emergency Management Agency 
Jarkko Ylipieti STUK-Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority  
Mark Smethurst Geological Survey of Norway 
Boris Petrov Emergency Response Centre of Minatom, St.-
Petersburg 
Sergey Vasiliev Emergency Response Centre of Minatom, St.-
Petersburg 
Sören Byström Geological Survey of Sweden 
 
Group 4  
Kim Bargholz Danish Emergency Management Agency 
Mikael Moring STUK-Radiation and Nuclear Safety Authority  
John Mogaard Geological Survey of Norway 
Kenneth Lidström FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency 
Ari Tryggvason Geological Survey of Sweden 
Thomas Ulvsand FOI, Swedish Defence Research Agency 
 
Is the information from AGS/CGS systems useful for a nuclear emergency 
organization? 
Yes, and not only useful, it is necessary. 
Can the role of AGS/CGS after the next major accident be foreseen? 
It will be dependant on the accident scenario, but mapping and nuclide identification will be 
important. 
What are the typical tasks we can expect for AGS/CGS? 
To measure and to collect and process data for estimation of doses at populated areas. There 
are differences between countries about how early in the accident scenario AGS and/or CGS 
will be used, for example during or after plume passage. 
If the role of AGS/CGS is to quantify fresh fallout - are we able to? 
Yes we are, but there are restrictions. For AGS bad weather or lack of relevant calibrations 
can give difficulties. There also will be problems to identify nuclides if NaI-detectors are used 
in fresh fall-out. For CGS there is the risk of getting the vehicle contaminated. 
If the role of AGS/CGS is to find and identify lost sources - are we able to? 
Yes we are, but the search will not be effective in all situations. The success will be dependant 
of shielding, source activity, gamma energy, distance and LUCK. AGS scan an area and CGS 
is used for local follow up. Mobile sources will be hard to find. 
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Group 5  
Anders Damkjær Risø National Laboratory 
Markku Kettunen The Finnish Defence Forces Research Centre 
Arunas Gudelis Institute of Physics 
Kerstin Lundmark Swedish Radiation Protection Institute 
Olof Karlberg Swedish Radiation Protection Institute 
 
Group 6  
Helle Karina Aage Technical University of Denmark 
Christian Bourgeois CEA/France 
Thor Engøy Norwegian Defence Research Establishment 
Nikolai Drozdov  EMERCOM of Russia 
Victor Vinnikov EMERCOM of Russia 
Hans Mellander Swedish Radiation Protection Institute 
 
Should the CGS and AGS teams be focused on operational aspects or should they be 
scientific groups focused on research? 
They must be focused on both, to have a parallel development of operational and scientific 
aspects. It is important with collaborations inside and between nations. 
What scientific questions should be solved, in order to improve mobile measurements? 
Better software for online- and post processing, with minimum operator interface. 
Standardization of communication equipment. Harmonize reporting units, for example 
equivalent surface activity. 
How do we run a continuous operation for several weeks? 
A lot of personnel will be needed, both for measuring operations and for analysis support. 
Cooperation between several groups will be important, like sharing team members. 
Equipment with alarm triggers, like sound, will improve the effectiveness. 
How do we prepare for the unexpected? 
By using a scientific approach and to look for new (and far fetched) scenarios and evaluate 
them. It is important to have back-up systems and to exercise. 
Assuming a scenario like the one at Barents Rescue LIVEX. What will the monitoring 
teams require of the emergency management? 
They will need accommodations, food and beverage, logistics. There must be a 
command/coordination centre (like the REAC). They will need communication, technical and 
scientific support.  Effective reception of data, like coordination between AGS and CGS will 
be important. 
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ECCOMAGS 
Hans Mellander, SSI 
 
ECCOMAGS PARTNERS
!Scotland
!Germany
!Sweden
!Denmark
!France
!Austria
!Portugal
!Switzerland
! University of Glasgow
! Bundesamt fuer Strahlenschutz
! Swedish Radiation Protection 
Authority
! Technical University of Denmark
! Danish Emergency Management 
Agency
! Commissariat à lEnergie 
Atomique
! Geologische Bundesanstalt
! Instituto Geologico e Mineiro
! Swiss Federal Institute of 
Technology Zurich
 
 
ECCOMAGS OBJECTIVES
!The project objectives are to conduct an 
international calibration exercise for 
airborne gamma spectrometry, with the 
aim of validated standard procedures for 
measurement of deposited environmental 
radioactivity and dose rate, and to 
coordinate further European research
leading to improved capabilities for 
emergency response.
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ECCOMAGS BUDGET
!Total budget 650000 
EUROS
!Partners exercise 
participation 18000 
EUROS
 
 
 
 
ECCOMAGS TIMETABLE
!Draft protocols to be finalised autumn
2001
!Precharacterization field work November 
2001
!Precharacterization report March 2002
!Exercise May/June 2002 (weeks 22 & 23)
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ECCOMAGS exercise tasks
!To accurately measure three calibration 
areas that has been precharacterized
!Demonstrate a cooperation capability by 
producing a common mosaic map
!Extras?
!Ground teams are supposed to contribute to 
the area characterization
 
 
 
ECCOMAGS CONTACT INFO
! Joyce J McLeod/David Sanderson
! Scottish Universities Research & Reactor Centre 
(SURRC)
! Rankine Avenue
! Scottish Enterprise Technology Park
! East Kilbride, G75 0QF
! Scotland, UK
! Tel: +44 (0)1355 270145
! Fax: +44 (0)1355 229898
! Email: J.McLeod@surrc.gla.ac.uk
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Appendix 2 
List of participants 
 
Country Name Organization Mailing address E-mail Phone no. 
Austria Wolfgang Fehringer Federal Ministry of the Interior Vorgartenstrasse 223, A-1024 
Vienna 
zivilschutzschule@aon.at +43 664 111 44 38 
Austria Andreas Polaschek Gendarmerie Headquarter of Lower 
Austria 
 n-einsatz@gendarmerie.at +43 1 81105 2200 
Denmark Frank Andersen Danish Emergency Management 
Agency 
Datavej 16, 3460 Birkerod, 
Denmark 
fan@brs.dk +45 45 82 54 00 
Denmark Kim Bargholz Danish Emergency Management 
Agency 
Datavej 16, 3460 Birkerod, 
Denmark 
kba@brs.dk +45 45 82 54 00 
Denmark Kirsten Juul Danish Emergency Management 
Agency 
Datavej 16, 3460 Birkerod, 
Denmark 
kbl@bra.dk +45 45 82 54 00 
Denmark Anders Damkjær Risø National Laboratory P.O. Box 49, DK-4000 Roskilde, 
Denmark 
anders.damkjær@risoe.dk +45 46 77 49 03 
Denmark Bent Lauritzen Risø National Laboratory P.O. Box 49, DK-4000 Roskilde, 
Denmark 
bent.lauritzen@risoe.dk +45 46 77 49 06 
Denmark Helle Aage Technical University of Denmark Ørsted-DTU, Bldg. 327, 
Elektrovej, DK-2800 Kgs. 
Lyngby, Denmark  
hka@oersted.dtu.dk  +45 45 25 34 59 
Estonia Eia Jakobson Estonian Radiation Protection 
Centre 
Kopli 76, Tallinn 10416, Estonia eia@ekk.envir.ee +372 66 03 336 
Estonia Larissa Palmin Estonian Radiation Protection 
Centre 
Kopli 76, Tallinn 10416, Estonia larissa@ekk.envir.ee +372 66 03 336 
Finland Jarkko Ylipieti STUK-Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority  
Louhikkotie 28 96500 
ROVANIEMI FINLAND 
jarkko.ylipieti@stuk.fi +358 16 18 14 482 
Finland Mikael Moring STUK-Radiation and Nuclear Safety 
Authority  
P.O.Box 14, 00881 Helsinki 
FINLAND 
mikael.moring@stuk.fi +358 9 7598 8438 
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Country Name Organization Mailing address E-mail Phone no. 
Finland Markku Kettunen The Finnish Defence Forces 
Research Centre 
P.O.Box 5, FIN-34111 Lakiala markku.kettunen@pvtt.mil.fi +358 3 18153254, 
+358 40 8298309 
France Christian Bourgeois CEA/France DASE/RCE/Hélinuc, France 
91680 Bruyères-le-Châtel 
 
christian.bourgeois@caramail.com +33 169 26 42 06, 
+33 680 18 94 95 
Latvia Visvaldis Graveris Latvian Environment Agency Osu str. 5, LV-2015 Jurmala, 
Latvia 
vigraver@vdc.lv +371 941 9228 
Latvia Andrejs Dreimanis Radiation Safety Centre Peldu str. 26/28, Riga LV-1050 rdca@varam.gov.lv +371 722 9867 
Lithuania Arunas Gudelis Institute of Physics Savanoriu av. 231, LT-2028, 
Vilnius, Lithuania 
gudelis@ktl.mii.lt +370 2 641836 
Norway John Mogaard Geological Survey of Norway 7491 Trondheim John.Mogaard@ngu.no +47 73 90 44 75 
Norway Mark Smethurst Geological Survey of Norway 7491 Trondheim Mark.Smethurst@ngu.no +47 73 90 44 52 
Norway Thor Engøy Norwegian Defence Research 
Establishment 
P.O. Box 25, NO-2027 Kjeller, 
Norway 
thor.engoy@ffi.no +47 6380 7855 
Norway Mark Dowdall Norwegian Radiation Protection 
Authority 
NRPA, Polarmiljosenteret, 
9296, Tromso, Norway 
Mark.dowdall@nrpa.no +47 77 75 01 67 
Russia Nikolai Drozdov  EMERCOM of Russia Teatralny Proezd, 3, 103012 
Moscow, Russia 
 +7 095 208 29 64 
Russia Victor Vinnikov EMERCOM of Russia Teatralny Proezd, 3, 103012 
Moscow, Russia 
 +7 095 208 29 64 
Russia Boris Petrov Emergency Response Centre of 
Minatom, St.-Petersburg 
2-nd Murinsky 28, 194021, 
St.Petersburg, Russia 
Boris@atom.nw.ru +7 812 2475753 
Russia Sergey Vasiliev Emergency Response Centre of 
Minatom, St.-Petersburg 
2-nd Murinsky 28, 194021, 
St.Petersburg, Russia 
skv@atom.nw.ru +7 812 2475753 
Sweden Kenneth Lidström FOI FOI SE-901 82 Umeå Sweden Kenneth.lidstrom@foi.se +46 90 10 67 38 
Sweden Peder Beausang FOI  peder.beausang@foi.se +46 8 555 03 816 
Sweden Anders H Lindén Geological Survey of Sweden SGU Box 670 S-751 28 
Uppsala 
  
 281 
Country Name Organization Mailing address E-mail Phone no. 
Sweden Ari Tryggvason Geological Survey of Sweden SGU Box 670 S-751 28 
Uppsala 
 
Sweden Mats Wedmark Geological Survey of Sweden SGU Box 670 S-751 28 
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Proceedings of the NKS/Barents Rescue 2001 LIVEX seminar, held 
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